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Abstract 
This study examines philosophically the main theories and methodological assumptions of 
the field known as the cognitive science of religion (CSR). The study makes a philosophically 
informed reconstruction of the methodological principles of the CSR, indicates problems 
with them, and examines possible solutions to these problems. The study focuses on several 
different CSR writers, namely, Scott Atran, Justin Barrett, Pascal Boyer and Dan Sperber. 
CSR theorising is done in the intersection between cognitive sciences, anthropology and 
evolutionary psychology. This multidisciplinary nature makes CSR a fertile ground for 
philosophical considerations coming from philosophy of psychology, philosophy of mind 
and philosophy of science.  
I begin by spelling out the methodological assumptions and auxiliary theories of CSR 
writers by situating these theories and assumptions in the nexus of existing approaches to 
religion. The distinctive feature of CSR is its emphasis on information processing: CSR 
writers claim that contemporary cognitive sciences can inform anthropological theorising 
about the human mind and offer tools for producing causal explanations. Further, they claim 
to explain the prevalence and persistence of religion by cognitive systems that undergird 
religious thinking. I also examine the core theoretical contributions of the field focusing 
mainly on the (1) “minimally counter-intuitiveness hypothesis” and (2) the different ways in 
which supernatural agent representations activate our cognitive systems. Generally speaking, 
CSR writers argue for the naturalness of religion: religious ideas and practices are widespread 
and pervasive because human cognition operates in such a way that religious ideas are easy to 
acquire and transmit. 
I raise two philosophical problems, namely, the “problem of scope” and the 
“problem of religious relevance”. The problem of scope is created by the insistence of 
several critics of the CSR that CSR explanations are mostly irrelevant for explaining religion. 
Most CSR writers themselves hold that cognitive explanations can answer most of our 
questions about religion. I argue that the problem of scope is created by differences in 
explanation-begging questions: the former group is interested in explaining different things 
than the latter group. I propose that we should not stick too rigidly to one set of 
methodological assumptions, but rather acknowledge that different assumptions might help 
us to answer different questions about religion. Instead of adhering to some robust 
metaphysics as some strongly naturalistic writers argue, we should adopt a pragmatic and 
explanatory pluralist approach which would allow different kinds of methodological 
presuppositions in the study of religion provided that they attempt to answer different kinds 
of why-questions, since religion appears to be a multi-faceted phenomenon that spans over a 
variety of fields of special sciences.  
The problem of religious relevance is created by the insistence of some writers that 
CSR theories show religious beliefs to be false or irrational, whereas others invoke CSR 
theories to defend certain religious ideas. The problem is interesting because it reveals the 
more general philosophical assumptions of those who make such interpretations. CSR 
theories can (and have been) interpreted in terms of three different philosophical 
frameworks: strict naturalism, broad naturalism and theism. I argue that CSR theories can be 
interpreted inside all three frameworks without doing violence to the theories and that these 
frameworks give different kinds of results regarding the religious relevance of CSR theories.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The cognitive science of religion (henceforth CSR) is an inter-disciplinary research program 
that spans over the fields of cognitive sciences and the study of religion. During the last 20 
years, the writers in this field have applied theories from cognitive sciences and evolutionary 
psychology to explain the general forms of religious ideas and behaviour.1 The work at hand 
is a philosophical examination of the claims and background assumptions of scholars 
associated with the field of CSR.   
In their introduction to a collection of articles aimed at presenting the CSR to 
anthropologists, professors of anthropology James Laidlaw and Harvey Whitehouse set the 
scene in the following way: 
 
[w]ithin the large and loosely integrated fields of cognitive science and evolutionary 
psychology, there has emerged a relatively tightly-knit group of scholars engaged in 
what has become known as the “cognitive science of religion”. This group of 
scholars enjoys an unusual measure of agreement on shared presuppositions, 
methods, and problems. Over the last twenty years or so they have succeeded in 
establishing not only a paradigm for their research, but also several institutional 
centres around the world, a journal and a book series, and a substantial literature 
based on new empirical research that has given rise to a series of new research 
problems.2  
 
Several scholars are associated with CSR of whom the most prominent ones are E. Thomas 
Lawson, Robert McCauley3, Harvey Whitehouse4, Pascal Boyer and Justin Barrett. In 
addition, scholars such as Scott Atran, Ilkka Pyysiäinen5, D. Jason Slone6, Stewarth Guthrie7, 
Todd Tremlin8, Jesse Bering9 and Brian Malley10 are also regularly associated with CSR.11 In 
                                                 
1 For general introductions to the field, see Tremlin 2006; Pyysiäinen 2001, 2004a; Slone 2004. For collections 
of relevant articles, see Andresen 2001; Boyer 1993; Pyysiäinen & Anttonen 2002; Slone 2006; Whitehouse & 
Laidlaw 2007. 
2 Whitehouse & Laidlaw 2007, 13.  
3 Lawson‟s and McCauley‟s Rethinking Religion: Connecting Cognition and Culture (1990) is widely considered as the 
starting point of CSR for two reasons: firstly, the book developed the first theory in the CSR, the ritual form 
hypothesis; and secondly, it laid out the basic methodological assumptions for connecting the study of religion 
to the study of cognition. See also the follow up Bringing Ritual to Mind: Psychological Foundations of Ritual Forms 
(2002a). Lawson is professor emeritus of Comparative Religion in West Michigan University, USA. McCauley is 
a philosopher of science who is currently working at Emory University in Atlanta. 
4 Whitehouse has formulated the “modes of religiosity” theory (1995, 2000, 2004) and contributed to 
methodological discussions of the field (2001). The “modes of religiosity” theory has generated a considerable 
discussion. See, e.g., Whitehouse & McCauley 2005; Whitehouse & Laidlaw 2004; Whitehouse & Laidlaw 2007. 
Whitehouse is Professor of Social Anthropology and Head of the School of Anthropology and Museum 
Ethnography at the University of Oxford.   
5 Pyysiäinen has published extensively about different aspects of the CSR spanning from overviews and 
methodological discussions (2001, 2004a, 2006, 2009) to other themes and experiments (2002, 2003, 2004b, 
2004c, 2005a; Pyysiäinen et al 2003). Pyysiäinen is working as researcher in the Helsinki Collegium of Advanced 
Studies at the University of Helsinki, Finland.  
6 Slone 2004.  
7 Guthrie is difficult to classify because historically he was the first to use the term “cognitive science of 
religion” in his article from 1980. Nowadays, he does not clearly associate himself to the CSR. However, some 
of his claims – especially those dealing with anthropomorphism - have had a considerable impact on CSR 
writers. See, e.g., Guthrie 1993, 2002.   
8 Tremlin 2006, 2004.  
9 Bering is the director of the Institute of Cognition and Culture in Queen‟s University Belfast and has 
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addition to these writers working inside CSR, we should also mention some important 
people outside the CSR who have had a profound influence to the central claims of CSR 
writers. Developmental psychologist Frank Keil12 is one of these important figures as well as 
anthropologist Dan Sperber. Some CSR writers are also closely related to writers in 
Evolutionary Psychology such as Leda Cosmides, John Tooby and Steven Pinker.   
This work will focus on the writings of Scott Atran, Justin Barrett, Pascal Boyer and 
Dan Sperber. I have chosen these writers because they share a relatively stable set of 
methodological assumptions and theories. Despite the shared assumption, we should not 
overestimate the similarities between these writers: we will see that CSR writers have major 
differences in background assumptions and as such do not necessarily constitute “a relatively 
tightly-knit group”. Rather we can observe certain recurring themes in the writers and these 
themes will be the object of this study.  
Pascal Boyer is an anthropologist and psychologist who is currently the Henry Luce 
Professor of collective and individual memory in Washington University St. Louis. He is one 
of the pioneers of CSR and has been involved in the formation of the field from the 
beginning of the 1990s. My focus will be on his monographs The Naturalness of Religious Ideas: 
a Cognitive Theory of Religion (1994) and Religion Explained: Evolutionary Origins of Religion Thought 
(2001). The former is a quite technical overview of the possibilities of applying cognitive 
science in the anthropology of religion, whereas the latter is a semi-popular take of the whole 
CSR with a strong emphasis on Evolutionary Psychology. Boyer has also produced a 
relatively large corpus of articles about the CSR ranging from empirical experiments (e.g., 
Boyer & Ramble 2001, Boyer 2000a) to popular overviews (2003a) and clarifications (1996a, 
1996b, 1996c, 1998, 2000b, 2000c, 2002, 2003b, 2006). In addition, his publications deal with 
cognitive development and cultural evolution in general (e.g., Boyer & Barrett 2005, 
Bergstrom & Moehlmann & Boyer 2006). In this work, the focus is on the part of Boyer‟s 
work that is explicitly dealing with CSR: the two books (1994, 2001), especially the latter, will 
be in the centre of focus and the articles are used to supplement and clarify the ideas in the 
books.13   
Scott Atran is a cognitive anthropologist working at the Research Centre for Group 
Dynamics in the Department of Anthropology at the University of Michigan and also holds 
the positions of adjunct professor at the Department of Psychology, visiting professor at 
Ford School of Public Policy and Directeur de Recherche at the Centre National de la Recherche 
Scientifique in Paris. Atran‟s work has focused on folk biological categorisations (Atran 1990, 
1994, 1998, 1999; Atran & Medin 2004; Atran et al. 2002; Atran & Norenzayan et al. 2006), 
terrorism (e.g., Atran 2006b, 2006c; Magouirg et al. 2008) and cognitive anthropology in 
general (e.g, 2000, 2005, 2006a). In the context of this work, his book In Gods We Trust: 
Evolutionary Landscapes of Religion (2002) and the related article Religion’s evolutionary landscape: 
counterintuition, commitment, compassion, communion (2004) represent the most relevant part of 
Atran‟s work. In Gods We Trust develops several theories about the evolution of religious 
beliefs, rituals and sacrifice that are based on research in the CSR and in psychological 
commitment theories. Although Atran shares a lot of common ground with other writers in 
                                                                                                                                                  
published extensively on afterlife beliefs and folk psychological notions of soul (2002, 2003, 2006, Bering et al 
2004, 2005, 2006). 
10 Malley is a psychologist currently working at the University of Michigan. See Malley 2004; Malley & Knight 
2008. 
11 We might also mention Paolo Sousa (2006, 2001, Knight et al. 2004, Sousa et al 2002), Emma Cohen (2007a, 
2007b) and Joseph Bulbulia (2009a, 2009b, 2007, 2004). 
12 See, e.g., Keil 1989, 2003. Keil is a of professor psychology at the University of Yale and the head of 
Cognition & Development Lab.  
13 Homepage: http://artsci.wustl.edu/~pboyer/PBoyerHomeSite/index.html 
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the CSR, his interest in religion seems to be a by-product of his interest in the cognitive 
foundations of culture in general.14 
Justin Barrett is an experimental psychologist who is currently working as a senior 
researcher in the Centre for Anthropology and Mind in the Institute of Cognitive and 
Evolutionary Anthropology at the University of Oxford. He has conducted several 
experimental studies (1998, 1999, 2001, 2002; Barrett & Keil 1996; Barrett & Nyhof 2001; 
Barrett et al. 2003; Barrett & Richert 2003) and written numerous overviews of the field 
(2000, 2004, 2007). Barrett's Why Would Anyone Believe in God (2004) is an overview of the 
CSR written by an “insider” and one of its special features is the strong evidence from 
developmental psychology that suggests the primacy of theistic god-concepts.  
Dan Sperber is an anthropologist working in the Institut Jean Nicod in Paris and is 
considered one of the pioneers of cognitive anthropology. His book Rethinking Symbolism 
(1975) constitutes a starting point for many contemporary cognitive approaches to religious 
material and it had a profound influence in the subsequent emergence of CSR in the 
1990ties. In his works, Sperber is attempting to create a framework that would combine 
anthropology and cognitive sciences in a naturalistic research program which would explain 
cultural evolution based on individual cognitive mechanisms (1985, 1994, 1996, 2006a, 
2006b). In his Explaining Culture: A Naturalistic Approach (1996) he summarises his 
“epidemiology of representations” which conceptualises the study of culture as a study of 
widespread mental representations in human populations and insists that human cognitive 
systems have a significant role in explaining cultural diversity and stability. Sperber's 
epidemiology is explicitly adopted by Atran and Boyer and other writers make references to 
his works. Sperber has also produced a cognitive theory of communication - the relevance 
theory - in collaboration with Deirdre Wilson (1988, 2004). The relevance theory is strongly 
connected to the epidemiology of representations as it attempts to show how the selection 
processes of representations are based on the principle of relevance.15   
As we can see from the diverse backgrounds of CSR writers CSR theories draw from 
several different disciplines and fields of research that are mainly dealing with the 
development and structure of human cognition. In their account of the historical 
development behind current CSR writers, Laidlaw and Whitehouse present four 
developments that are relevant for the emergence of the CSR. Most of these four 
developments have their roots in the “cognitive revolution” and its subsequent effects in the 
emergence of such fields as cognitive psychology and cognitive anthropology. In addition to 
the explosion of cognitively oriented disciplines, there are also developments in 
anthropology, especially emerging models of cultural evolution and other evolutionary 
approaches to anthropology, that have had a profound impact on the CSR.16  
The general background for all cognition-based approaches is the cognitive 
revolution in psychology and computer science which led to the emergence of cognitive 
psychology and cognitive sciences from 1950ties onwards.17 One of the founding fathers of 
cognitive science was Noam Chomsky who claimed that language acquisition and structures 
of human languages are strongly constrained by innate, psychological capacities of language 
                                                 
14 Homepage: http://sitemaker.umich.edu/satran/home 
15 Homepage: www.dansperber.com. 
16 Whitehouse & Laidlaw 2007.  
17 The basic idea of cognitivism is, very roughly, that human thought as a computational process – a form of 
information processing in which individual symbols are transformed to other symbols according to a set of 
rules. Traditionally, this “symbolic processing” paradigm has been the starting point of cognitive science 
theorising, although from the 1970s onwards we have seen the emergence of another basic paradigm, 
“connectionism”. Connectionism is not committed to cognitivism as a claim according to which thinking equals 
processing physical symbols in the brain: instead, it claims that thoughts are holistic states of neural networks. 
For an overview of the development of the cognitive sciences, see Bechtel et al. 1998. 
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processing. Thus Chomsky was the first to formulate the basic idea of “innateness” or 
“nativism”. According to Whitehouse and Laidlaw,  
 
[t]he defining and foundational premise of the cognitive-science approach is that the 
mechanisms by means of which humans learn, think, perceive, remember, and so on, 
affect the content of their thoughts and behaviour.18  
 
In other words, Chomsky and other pioneers of cognitive sciences argued that the mind is 
not a “blank slate” which only passively records and memorises the information which is 
presented to it. Rather, the human mind comes with innate biases, schemas, models and 
mechanisms that actively shape the acquisition and transmission of information.19  
The second major development behind CSR was the emerging consensus from 
cognitive psychology according to which the innate biases and information processing 
tendencies of the human mind have different effects in different domains of knowledge. The 
basic idea of this “domain-specificity” hypothesis is, again very roughly, that in the very early 
stages of human development we can already see very specialised and context sensitive 
cognitive mechanisms at work. It follows that rather than consisting of “domain-general” 
mechanisms, which would be applied to all domains of learning and information processing, 
the mind consists of numerous “domain-specific” mechanisms, which have highly specialised 
functions.20  
The third essential development contributing to the birth of CSR was the emergence 
of cognitive anthropology as a reaction to the developments in cognitive psychology. Several 
anthropologists realised how the cognitive revolution could benefit anthropology: if the 
human mind actually had an effect to the content of the information which was acquired and 
transmitted, then this might provide a starting point for explaining why cultures exhibit 
recurrent patters. According to this view, the human mind does not just acquire and 
memorise all information that is available to it in a given cultural environment, but rather it 
transforms this information and thus transforms its cultural environment. According to this 
way of thinking, the relationship between culture and mind is not a one-way process in which 
cultural input explains all individual psychological processes as some social constructivists 
had argued. What the cognitive sciences had shown was that the relationship was actually a 
two-way process: the mind not only acquires cultural information, but also transforms it. In 
the light of cognitive psychology, the anthropologist could now assume that underlying all 
cultural forms and diverse belief systems, there was a single cognitive architecture shared by 
all humans.21  
The fourth development that contributed to the emergence of the CSR was the 
emergence of Cultural Darwinism, namely, theories that applied conceptual resources from 
Darwinian evolution to model cultural evolution. Usually three different theories are 
mentioned in this context: Memetics, gene/culture co-evolution and Sperber's epidemiology 
of representations. What is common to all of these theories is their commitment to 
“selectionism”: they conceptualise culture as widespread individual representations in 
people's heads and set out to explain why some representations have been selected instead of 
some others. According to this view, cultures are not “entities” or “structures”, but 
widespread ideas in a given population. This starting point makes it possible to explain these 
                                                 
18 Whitehouse & Laidlaw 2007, 7.  
19 For introductions to the cognitive sciences, see, e.g., Bechtel & Graham 1998; Stilling et al. 1995; Thagard 
1996. Chomsky's claim was presented in the context of linguistics where it soon spread to other disciplines as 
well.  
20 The seminal work in this area is Hirschfeld & Gelman 1994.  
21 For the development and central topics of cognitive anthropology, see D'Andrade 1995. 
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ideas with the conceptual tools of evolutionary biology which explain why certain traits are 
widespread in some animal populations.22 
The CSR combines all four developments and puts them to work in explaining cross-
culturally recurrent patterns in religious beliefs and behaviour.23 The basic idea is that 
religious beliefs and practices are informed by our non-religious cognitive systems working in 
different domains. Thus there is not a single “religious cognition” or “religious module” in 
the head, but rather 
 
the effects we call religion are, they claim, explained severally by a wide range of 
different mechanisms, operating in the context of certain environmental inputs, and 
interacting with each other. These are the same general causes that explain other, 
non-religious, features of human cognition.24  
 
Laidlaw and Whitehouse conclude that  
 
[t]he cognitive science of religion is thus theoretically and methodologically fully a 
part of the general enterprise of cognitive science, but has so far taken as its special 
subject matter – this is therefore how “religion” is operationally defined for the 
purposes of much of the research initially undertaken – beliefs and behaviour 
concerning culturally postulated supernatural beings and entities. Since these entities, 
being supernatural, are particularly underdetermined by the usual “inputs” to human 
cognition – the environment as experienced and perceived by the human animal – 
cognitive mechanisms are likely ... to play an unusually large part in accounting for 
the “outputs”, and this is where the special challenges and opportunities lie for the 
cognitive science of religion.25 
 
If we hold that CSR is a paradigm or a research program of some sort, we can 
identify three different levels in it: its “core” theoretical contributions, its auxiliary theories 
and broad philosophical frameworks. First of all, the core of the paradigm is formed by the 
actual hypotheses and theories the writers in CSR have put forward. If we look at the whole 
field, these theories and hypotheses include at least (1) the minimal counter-intuitiveness 
hypothesis (MCI) of Boyer26, (2) the notions of Hypersensitive Agent Detection Device 
(HADD)27 and (3) Theological Correctness28 of Barrett, (4) the Intuitive Theism hypothesis29 
of Deborah Kelemen, (5) the hazard precaution model of ritual behaviour30 by Boyer and 
                                                 
22 The basic ideas of Memetics were originally presented by Richard Dawkins (1978, 1983), but it has been 
subsequently developed by several other authors. See, e.g,. Blackmore 1999. For a critical discussion on 
Memetics, see Aunger 2000. One of the most influential forms of the gene/culture co-evolution theories has 
been formulated by Robert Boyd and Peter Richerson (1985, 2005a, 2005b). For overviews of evolutionary 
theorising in human sciences, see, e.g., Haines 2007 and Laland & Brown 2002. 
23 Atran's account of the roots of the CSR is similar to Laidlaw's and Whitehouse's. His list includes five 
different developments: (1) computational thinking, (2) the idea of domain specificity, (3) nativism, (4) 
adaptationism and (5) cultural epidemiology. See Atran 2002, 243-247. Although Atran's terminology is little 
different, the developments which he tracks are essentially the same as the Laidlaw & Whitehouse account: we 
have the cognitive revolution as the outbreak of computational thinking, the innateness of cognitive 
architecture (=nativism), its specialised and context sensitive mechanisms (=domain-specificity) and population 
thinking (=epidemiology).  
24 Whitehouse & Laidlaw 2007, 7-8.  
25 Whitehouse & Laidlaw 2007, 8. 
26 Boyer 1994, 2001; Boyer & Ramble 2001; Barrett & Nyhof 2001.  
27 Guthrie 1993; Barrett 2000.  
28 Barrett 1999; Barrett & Keil 1996.  
29 Kelemen 1999a, 1999b, 1999c, 2004; Kelemen & DiYanni 2005. See also, Boyer & Walker 2000. Barrett 
sometimes talks about “the preparedness hypothesis”. See Barrett & Richert 2003.  
30 Boyer & Lienard 2006a, 2006b. 
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Pierre Lienard, (6) Lawson‟s and McCauley‟s ritual form hypothesis31, (7) Modes of 
Religiosity theory32 of Harvey Whitehouse and (8) hypotheses concerning afterlife beliefs33 by 
Jesse Bering and his associates.34 It is useful to distinguish these hypotheses and theories 
from the level of auxiliary theories that CSR writers assume and use when they formulate 
their own hypothesis. Such theories include at least Sperber‟s epidemiology of 
representations35, computationalism, domain specificity, modularity, nativism and 
adaptationism. Generally speaking, it is possible to put Evolutionary Psychology and 
evolutionary biology here as well. Finally, we have the level of underlying philosophical 
assumptions concerning the nature of scientific knowledge and method and their 
relationships to extra-scientific claims and enquiries. Distinguishing these three levels will 
help us in the future to see the big picture better and provide orientation for philosophical 
engagement with different aspects of CSR.  
 
Figure 1. Three levels of CSR theorizing. 
 
 
 
At this point, it must be mentioned that CSR is closely related to other cognitive and 
evolutionary approaches to cultural material. I am thinking particularly about Evolutionary 
Psychology from which some CSR writers – especially Boyer and Atran – draw extensively. 
As several views associated with Evolutionary Psychology come up in this work, a brief 
overview is useful here. First of all, we must notice that there is no single “evolutionary 
psychology”. Rather we should distinguish Evolutionary Psychology the paradigm (with 
capital letters) from the field of evolutionary psychology, as David Buller suggests.36 
Evolutionary psychology as a field of research is a broad and loosely connected group of 
diverse disciplines such as behavioural ecology, human etology and evolutionary 
anthropology. In this sense, evolutionary psychology is a general term for approaches that 
                                                 
31 Lawson & McCauley 1990, 2002a, 2002b. 
32 Whitehouse 1995, 2000, 2004.  
33 Bering 2002, 2006; Bering & Bjorklund 2004; Bering & Johnson 2005; Bering & Parker 2006.  
34 For an overview, see Knight et al. 2009.  
35 Sperber 1985, 1996, 2006a, 2006b.  
36 Buller 2005a, 8-12.  
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use contemporary evolutionary theory as background for psychological, anthropological or 
neuroscientific theorising.37 However, Evolutionary Psychology (with capital letters) is used 
to refer to a certain paradigm advocated by a group of scholars with relatively well defined 
theories and background assumptions. The main persons in this group are psychologists 
Steven Pinker, David Buss and Leda Cosmides, and anthropologist John Tooby. The central 
idea of this approach is that the human mind is a massively modular system whose modules 
(specialised systems) were created by natural selection to solve adaptive problems in our 
ancestral environment. Today these once adaptive modules are used in different tasks and 
they form the basis of our cultural forms. These writers understand Evolutionary Psychology 
as an attempt to integrate social and cultural sciences with behavioural and biological 
sciences.38 
Now, one might ask what philosophy has to do with all of this. Although CSR clearly 
has a strong naturalistic and scientific outlook, I will try to show that under the surface there 
are several questions and problems to which a philosopher can draw attention and perhaps 
even try to solve. In addition, the results of the CSR raise questions that may have impact on 
theology and philosophical reflection of religious phenomena. How then should a 
philosopher engage with cognitive sciences – or any science for that matter? Philosopher 
Alvin Goldman distinguishes three modes of engagement in the case of cognitive sciences. 
First, philosophers can present their contributions for these sciences to use. Philosophical 
tools, such as logic and semantic theories, are now used in AI and cognitive linguistics. 
Further, philosophical theories concerning the mind-body relationship or propositional 
attitudes, for instance, now have a life of their own in various sub-disciplines of the cognitive 
sciences. Second, philosophers can provide methodological criticism by revealing 
background assumptions, explicating ontological commitments or otherwise bring insights 
from the philosophy of science. In this function, the philosopher attempts to clarify concepts 
and methods that scientists use by relating them to more general discussions in philosophy of 
science. Third, philosophers can be consumers of theories and results of cognitive sciences 
and use them to reformulate, or perhaps even answer, mainline philosophical questions.39  
Goldman's distinctions are useful for explicating the intentions of the work at hand 
as well. First and foremost, my aim is to clarify and sometimes criticise methodological issues 
that emerge from CSR writers. This is what philosophers of special sciences normally do: 
they clarify central concepts and analyse background assumptions of theories by relating 
them to a more general framework of philosophical questions and discussions. In addition to 
identifying problematic concepts and assumptions, I will also present insights from several 
different fields of philosophy that might help to resolve the issues.  
From a philosophical point of view, CSR as a field of research spans over at least 
three different disciplines or groups of disciplines that all have their distinctive philosophical 
problems and discussions: study of religion, socio-cultural sciences, such as anthropology 
and sociology, and cognitive sciences. Furthermore, we must note that the CSR is not the 
only field of research which attempts to combine insights from natural and behavioural 
sciences to explain socio-cultural phenomena: as we have already pointed out, Evolutionary 
Psychology, for instance, is engaged in similar activities and it has also attracted some 
philosophical discussion that is to some extent relevant for CSR as well.   
                                                 
37 For overviews, see Barrett & Dunbar & Lycett 2002 and Barrett & Dunbar 2007.  
38 The basic assumptions of Evolutionary Psychology are similar to the CSR: (1) computational theory of mind, 
(2) strong nativism, (3) adaptationism and (4) massive modularity. The seminal work of this group is Cosmides 
& Tooby & Barkow 1992. Others include Buss 1995 and Pinker 1997, 2003. Buss 1999 is the new “bible” of 
the group. Cosmides & Tooby 1997 is a good source for their basic methodological assumptions. For criticisms 
of Evolutionary Psychology, see, e.g., Buller 2000, 2005a, 2005b; Buller et al. 2005; Richardson 2007.  
39 Goldman 1992, 2-3.  
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The study of religion has its own distinctive set of methodological questions and 
problems that are reflected in the CSR. Perhaps the most contested issue is the concept of 
“religion” itself. Several writers have argued that the way we currently use the concept of 
“religion” is misleading and therefore we should try to avoid the concept completely and 
replace it with concepts like “tradition” or “practice”.40 Others have claimed that we can 
have a definition of religion that is adequate for scientific purposes, but we must at the same 
time acknowledge that there cannot be a waterproof definition of religion.41 As we will see, 
CSR writers‟ answer to this problem is somewhere in between of these alternatives. There is 
also another much debated problem known as the insider/outsider problem. What is at stake 
here is the way in which scholars of religion approach religious phenomena: several scholars 
have argued that religion should be studied as a kind of autonomous thing in itself (sui generis) 
whereas others have claimed that religion should be studied and explained with non-religious 
categories. The former group, “religionists”, is convinced that the latter group, “naturalists”, 
is reducing religion to something that it is not, whereas “naturalists” criticise “religionists” 
for lack of engagement with the sciences.42 
The philosophy of the social sciences is in its current state a thriving discipline of 
philosophy: recent years have seen the diverse influence of natural sciences in fields 
traditionally held by the social sciences and ongoing methodological debates about the nature 
and aims of social sciences.43 There are at least two problems that are relevant to our subject. 
First, there is the long standing question of the ontology of socio-cultural phenomena. 
Should we take cultures and societies as something more than the sum of the individuals that 
constitute them? If we answer “yes”, then we are saying that societies are something “above” 
individuals. If we answer “no”, we are claiming that society is “just” its individuals and its 
structures and development can be explained by describing individual behaviours. This 
debate between “methodological individualists” and “methodological holists” has had a 
prominent place in the philosophy of the social sciences.44 Secondly, there is the question of 
the relationship between natural and social sciences: do social sciences have their own 
methods and subjects that are distinct from natural sciences? Again, we have several answers 
to this question. “Methodological monists” claim that there is no essential methodological 
difference between natural and social sciences even though their scopes might be different, 
whereas “methodological pluralists” or “dualists” argue for a meaningful difference between 
natural and social sciences.45   
Finally, we have the diverse field of cognitive sciences which includes disciplines such 
as cognitive linguistics, cognitive psychology, cognitive neuroscience, artificial intelligence 
studies, cognitive modelling and cognitive anthropology. It is fair to say that “cognitive 
science” is an umbrella term for loosely related approaches to information-processing 
systems. Moreover, cognitive considerations have become standard tools in neuroscience and 
psychology as well as more “humanistic” disciplines such as education. It seems almost as if 
                                                 
40 See, e.g., Smith 1964, 1979.  
41 Saler 2000.  
42 “Religionism” has deep roots in the study of religion. See, e.g., Otto 1958; Eliade 1960, 1971. “Naturalism” is 
defended by, e.g., Segal 1992, 1999; Wiebe 1991, 1999. Most of the classic articles in this debate are reprinted in 
McCutcheon 1999.  
43 For overviews, see Kincaid 1996; Trigg 2001; Manicas 2006. 
44 See, e.g., Rosenberg 1986.   
45 Most notable “naturalistic” approaches have been motivated by evolutionary or psychological considerations. 
For example, Edward O. Wilson stirred a big debate with his Socio-biology (1975) in which he claims that the 
social structures and behaviours of humans can be explained in terms of adaptation and natural selection in the 
same way the behaviour of animals can. For the debate, see, e.g., Alcock 2001. In addition to evolutionary 
models, there are several approaches that have been motivated by the booming development of the cognitive 
sciences and cognitive psychology. We have seen the rise cognitive anthropology (D'Andrade 1995) and 
Evolutionary Psychology to name just a few.  
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there would be a cognitive approach to X for any possible X.46 As philosophers have been 
involved in cognitive sciences from the beginning it is not a surprise that it has its own 
thriving philosophical discussions. Usually these discussions are conducted under the 
heading of philosophy of psychology or philosophy of mind and cognition. First, there are 
several questions concerning the central ideas of the cognitive sciences, namely, “mental 
representation” and “computation”. How are mental representations implemented in the 
brain? How do they acquire their content? How are they processed? Second, there are 
discussions that deal directly with particular topics like modularity of mind, implementation 
of representations in the brain and the role of consciousness.47 Finally, there are philosophers 
who have challenged the foundations of the cognitive sciences completely and claimed that 
information-processing approaches in general cannot grasp what human thinking actually is. 
John Searle, for instance, has argued that information-processing cannot account for the 
qualitative character of conscious experience (qualia) and the intentional nature of thinking.48  
Finally, philosophy of science is a branch of philosophy that deals with general 
questions concerning science. It seems that most of the philosophical questions and 
problems in the study of religion, cognitive sciences and social sciences can be subsumed 
under philosophy of science.49 Of recent developments in philosophy of science, the most 
relevant for the CSR are discussions about the nature of scientific explanation, especially the 
recent interest in mechanisms in explanations and interdisciplinary and inter-theoretic 
relationships.50 In addition, there are large discussions going on about the unity of scientific 
methods and knowledge. Several philosophers are arguing for strong forms of naturalism 
where all scientific knowledge and scientific methodologies would be unified under one 
scheme, whereas others argue for a more pluralist approach and independence of the special 
sciences. This debate takes different forms in social and behavioural sciences: should social 
sciences be combined with behavioural sciences? Should the study of religion be unified 
within a single methodological framework?51 
Even this very brief overview shows how philosophically contested the fields from 
which CSR draws its inspiration are. To anticipate, we can say that this fact creates 
considerable difficulties for CSR writers since there is no consensus over important 
philosophical background issues such as the nature of consciousness and the adequacy of 
computationalism. Not only is the philosophical ground contested but the scientific ground 
is as well: many of the assumptions of Evolutionary Psychology – massive modularity and 
                                                 
46 For an overview of approaches and topics in cognitive science, see Bechtel & Graham 1998.  
47 Although philosophy of mind is closely related to cognitive sciences, it is useful to distinguish philosophy of 
mind from philosophy of psychology (or philosophical psychology, as it is sometimes called). Philosophy of 
mind usually focuses on broader and generally metaphysical questions whereas philosophy of psychology deals 
with questions that are more closely related to the actual research conducted by cognitive scientists and 
neuroscientists. A quick look into introductory books about these subjects suggests that philosophy of mind 
deals with subjects such as the mind-body problem, intentionality, consciousness and physicalism, namely, 
topics that deal with metaphysics of the mind. See, e.g., Crane 2001, Kim 1996. On the other hand, 
introductions to philosophy of psychology deal with topics like modularity of mind, folk psychology, mental 
representation, language of thought and questions of representational content. See, e.g., Botterill & Carruthers 
1999; Bermudez 2005. However, in the end we cannot make a clear cut difference between these fields of 
philosophy and they are sometimes even introduced together. See Braddon-Mitchell & Jackson 1996.    
48 See Searle 1984, 1992, 2000, 2001 2004. For more criticism of cognitive science, see Fodor 2000, 2005 and 
answers from Pinker (2005a, 2005b). For an overview of these discussions, see Braddon-Mitchell & Jackson 
1996. Stainton 2006 is a good introduction to recent debates in cognitive sciences.  
49 For overviews, see Chalmers 1999; Rosenberg 2004. 
50 For explanation, see, e.g., Craver 2007; Woodward 2003a, 2003b.  
51 Wilson (1998) argues for a comprehensive and unified scheme of all scientific knowledge and inquiry. 
Dennett (1995) makes similar points as well. Evolutionary Psychology argues for “conceptual integration” or 
“vertical integration” which would make social and behavioural sciences mutually consistent and continuous 
with natural sciences (Cosmides & Tooby & Barkow 1992). The relative independence of special sciences is 
defended by Fodor (1974, 1991a, 1997), for instance. 
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adaptationism, for instance - have created fierce debates that are far from over. These 
considerations suggest that CSR should not be understood as a firmly established scientific 
discipline, but rather as a loosely related set of assumptions and approaches spanning over 
different disciplines that might face considerable revisions in the future. In other words, 
there is no single, universally accepted theory that is the cognitive science of religion nor is 
there a methodological manifesto or a creed which would be professed by all those who are 
associated with CSR. Finally, it must be pointed out that the study at hand is not intended as 
an overview of the diverse philosophical questions and problems presented in the preceding 
paragraphs. Rather, I will take up some of these questions and problems to the extent to 
which they are relevant for understanding the prospects and boundaries of CSR as well as the 
criticisms that have been directed against it.     
My study will proceed as follows. In chapter 2 (Cognition and Culture), I will focus on 
the recurring methodological assumptions of CSR writers by contrasting their approach with 
other approaches to religious beliefs and practices. We will see that the assumptions of CSR 
writers are not uniform, but rather consist of general “rules of thumb” and shared antipathies 
towards hermeneutical and sociological approaches prevalent in current religious studies. In 
this chapter, we are thus operating on the level of auxiliary theories of CSR. Chapter 3 
(Religion and Cognition) summarises the core claims and theoretical contributions of CSR 
writers and examines criticisms levelled against them. The subsequent chapters take up two 
problems that come up in the first two chapters: the problem of scope and the problem of 
religious relevance. In chapter 4 (The Problem of Scope), I will outline what I call the 
problem of scope, that is, the problem concerning the boundaries and scope of application 
of CSR explanations. Further, I will point out how the answer to this problem depends 
heavily on our philosophical views concerning explanation and integration of disciplines and 
draw inspiration from current discussions in philosophy of science that might help us with 
the issue. Finally, chapter 5 (The Problem of Religious Relevance) will examine the problem 
of religious relevance, that is, the question of the religious impact of CSR theories. This 
question is interesting because it can be used as leverage to reveal the philosophical 
assumptions of CSR writers and those who interpret CSR‟s results. In conclusion, I will 
summarise the points made along the way and reflect on the future prospects and boundaries 
of CSR.    
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2. Cognition and Culture 
 
This chapter will focus on the recurrent methodological background assumptions of CSR 
writers. In his Cognitive Aspects of Religious Symbolism (1993), Boyer presents a useful list of five 
methodological claims that are, in his view, central for the whole project. I will discuss each 
claim in their respective sections and, although these claims are very general in nature, they 
are, I will argue, more or less shared by CSR writers. This treatment has two functions: 
firstly, it is to situate the CSR methodologically in the nexus of existing approaches to 
religious phenomena; and secondly, it is supposed to show how CSR writers themselves 
understand their relationship to existing approaches. The reader would do well to remember, 
however, that I will not go through all possible approaches to religion, because this task 
would be too much for obvious reasons. Instead, I have compared the CSR to approaches 
that the scholars in the CSR themselves criticise. Furthermore, my account is based on how 
the scholars in CSR see their methodological assumptions: critical analysis is not the function 
of this chapter. So, with these restrictions in mind, we can now turn to the five 
methodological claims as formulated by Boyer:  
 
(1) The study of religion is explanatory in nature, rather than interpretative.   
(2) Culture is not an independent level of reality. Religious phenomena consists of 
nothing more than special configurations and distributions of people‟s ideas, 
discourse and action.  
(3) Cognitive study of religion assumes that cognitive constraints (universal properties of 
the mind-brain) are relevant.  
(4) Relevant properties of human minds are approached by formulating independent 
hypotheses of the human mind. Hypotheses are not to be formulated on the basis of 
cultural data acquired in socio-cultural sciences in an ad hoc manner, but rather the 
hypotheses should be grounded in the cognitive and behavioural sciences.   
(5) Religious representations differ from everyday domains of knowledge such as folk 
psychology and folk biology. Cognitive science of religion is needed because the 
theories of cognitive anthropology are not sufficient.52 
 
Boyer‟s claim can also be presented as a step-by-step diagram where every step rules out 
another methodological position. When a step on the left hand side is taken, a possible step 
on the right hand side is ruled out.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
52 Boyer 1993a, 7. 
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Figure 2. Five methodological choices and their alternatives (Boyer 1993a, 7). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Section 2.1 examines Boyer‟s first claim, namely, the claim that the study of religion should 
aim to explain rather than to understand religion. The claim implies that the phenomenon of 
religion is not to be considered as sui generis, as a category of its own. It also entails that the 
study of religion cannot be independent of other social science disciplines (such as 
anthropology or sociology) or natural sciences (such as cognitive science or neuroscience). 
Thus religion is, in CSR, considered a part of human culture and human nature – that is, 
religion is seen as a natural phenomena. Section 2.2 describes the implications of Boyer‟s 
second claim in detail. CSR writers argue that the domain of culture and society depends on 
non-cultural and natural factors such as psychological mechanisms. Indeed, the whole 
enterprise of the socio-cultural sciences (to which the study of religion belongs to) cannot 
proceed without help from the behavioural and natural sciences. Most CSR writers adopt 
Dan Sperber's idea of cultural epidemiology as a framework which integrates the study of 
culture to cognitive psychology. Furthermore, Sperber's epidemiology provides a way to re-
conceptualise the whole socio-cultural domain in naturalistic and materialistic terms. Section 
2.3 describes Boyer‟s third and fourth claim and their implications. CSR writers argue that 
the architecture of the human mind/brain strongly constrains the acquisition and 
transmission of representations and thus explains why some representations achieve 
population-scale distribution – that is, become “culture”. Hypotheses that concern the 
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cognitive architecture of the mind/brain should be adopted from cognitive sciences and 
other behavioural sciences, rather than from social sciences. Finally, section 2.4 continues to 
discuss the architecture of the human mind and describes how some CSR writers apply 
evolutionary hypotheses in explaining the origins of human cognitive architecture and its 
culture producing capabilities.   
Boyer‟s fifth claim (existing social sciences, such as anthropology or sociology, are not 
sufficient to explain religious phenomena) is the topic of chapter 3. This claim implies that 
there is, after all, a place for a science of religion and there are phenomena in the world that 
can legitimately be called religious. These phenomena require their own field of research, 
namely, the study of religion. Although CSR writers claim that the study of religion should be 
more closely integrated with other social and behavioural sciences, it does not endorse 
elimination of the study of religion.  
 
2.1. Explanation and Understanding  
Boyer's first methodological choice is made between two approaches that are supposedly 
alternatives, namely, between understanding the meaning of religious ideas and actions and 
explaining them in terms of non-religious patterns of behaviour. He insists that if we take 
contemporary cognitive sciences into account, then the basic assumptions behind 
approaches that endorse strong forms of “understanding” or interpretation turn out to be 
insufficient, or at least misguided. Rather than attempting to understand the “meaning” of 
religious ideas and behaviours in terms of those who have them, we should aim to explain 
causally why religious ideas and behaviour exhibit certain recurrent patterns. Furthermore, he 
claims that currently available explanatory and naturalistic theories of religion are not enough 
to do the job even though they possess valuable insights. The greatest shortcoming of 
previous approaches is that they do not take the human mind into account.     
The historical and philosophical background of the explanation/understanding 
distinction is highly complex and keeps coming up in different parts of this work. The 
distinction revolves around the methodology of the humanities and social sciences which 
deal with human action, beliefs and human products.53 Two strands of this complex set of 
problems interest us here. First, there is the insistence of the hermeneutical scholars on the 
strong separation of the humanities from the natural sciences which is based on a certain 
notion of human action. Secondly, there is the question of whether religion has its own 
“essence”: several scholars of religion have claimed that scientific enquiry into religion 
should proceed by methods that take account of this “essence” which is argued to be 
irreducible to non-religious categories such as biology or sociology.  
According to Boyer, the core of the interpretative or hermeneutical approaches is the 
claim that cultural phenomena in general and religious phenomena in particular are somehow 
                                                 
53 According to Russell McCutcheon (2002), there are four possible positions which can be adopted concerning 
the relationship between insider/outsider problem in the humanities and social sciences. According to 
hermeneutically oriented scholars (1), the study of human ideas, cultures and actions should be conducted with 
a special method, “understanding”, because humans are creative and as a result their products such as cultures 
and religions do not exhibit simple patterns and cannot be subsumed under general laws. The naturalist (2) 
insists that human behaviour, cultures and ideas are parts of the natural world and as such they exhibit law-like 
patterns and can be explained by theories that posit entities and processes that are outside of the subject's first-
person point of view. Methodological agnosticism (3) represents an intermediate position between the first two 
when it claims that the scholar of human actions and cultures should deliberately avoid making value or truth 
judgements. Finally, there is the position – usually associated with strong forms of postmodernism (4) – which 
is basically a sceptical version of the first position. According to hermeneutically oriented scholars, it is possible 
to understand why people think and do what they to, whereas the postmodernist acknowledges the 
tentativeness of all understanding, because the observations of the observer are necessarily intertwined with 
self-referential statements of the observer.  
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special and as such they cannot be subjected to causal explanations of the type that natural 
sciences successfully endorse. The reason for the rejection of causal explanation by the 
hermeneutical approaches, in Boyer's view, is the claim that cultural and religious phenomena 
cannot be understood in terms of physical phenomena, but rather they inhabit a world of 
their own – the world of meaning. However, as plausible this premise might seem, it is a 
mistake, Boyer claims: 
 
The hermeneutic stance is based on the fundamental premise that phenomena of 
meaning cannot be the object of explanation because they cannot be causally related 
to other, notably physical phenomena. Against this framework, the “naturalised” 
view of cultural phenomena is based, precisely, on the assumption that “meanings”, 
or in less metaphysical terms, thought events and processes, are the consequence and 
manifestation of physical phenomena.54 
 
The explanatory point of view, Boyer insists, grounds cultural phenomena, such as religions, 
in natural properties, namely, properties of human minds, their environments and so on.   
In order to understand why Boyer argues for a naturalistic approach to human 
culture and religion – that is, an approach that emphasises the continuity between human 
actions, cultures and ideas on the one hand and natural phenomena such as human biology, 
psychology and ecology on the other – we should take a brief look at the hermeneutical 
approach against which he is reacting.  
Boyer names the anthropologist Clifford Geertz as one of the most eminent 
representatives of the interpretative approach. According to Geertz, human action cannot be 
causally explained in terms of physical events because human action occurs in a meaningful 
context of ideas and reasons.55 In his classic article Thick Description: Towards an Interpretive 
Theory of Culture (1973) he points out that his concept of culture is a semiotic one. He writes:   
 
[b]elieving, with Max Weber, that man is an animal suspended in webs of significance 
he himself has spun, I take culture to be those webs, and the analysis of it to be 
therefore not an experimental science in search of a law but an interpretive one in 
search of meaning.56  
 
Geertz seems to be claiming that the descriptions of these “webs of meaning and 
significance” cannot be given in terms of observable behaviour and insists that such 
behavioural descriptions must be informed by “thick descriptions”. Geertz borrows the term 
“thick description” from philosopher Gilbert Ryle who uses it to highlight the difference 
between action descriptions and behaviour descriptions.57 Behaviour consists of reactions, 
but actions have reasons and intentions that supersede their physical descriptions. His 
famous example involves two boys which both contract their eyelids rapidly: in one, this is an 
involuntary twitch; in the other, a conspiratorial signal to his friend. As movements they are 
identical but the difference in terms of meaning is enormous: one is a communication with a 
special message and the other is meaningless.58 If the idea of thick description, namely, that 
describing actions includes descriptions of the reasons and intentions of the actors 
                                                 
54 Boyer 1993a, 8. 
55 Geertz's anthropological theory and his theory of religion can be found in essays collected in his Interpretation 
of Cultures (1973). In his numerous later works, he develops the themes presented in these essays. See, e.g., 
Geertz 2000a, 2000b. For an overview of Geertz's methodological assumptions and his approach to religion, 
see Pals 1996.  
56 Geertz 1973, 5.  
57 Ryle 1971. 
58 For the whole story, see Geertz 1973, 6-7.  
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themselves, is taken seriously, then, Geertz argues, we should see actions as interconnected 
in a web of cultural meaning. He writes that  
 
[c]ulture, this acted document, thus is public, like a burlesque wink or a mock sheep 
raid. Though ideational, it does not exist in someone's head; though unphysical, it is 
not an occult entity. ...  Once human behaviour is seen as (most of the time; there are 
true twitches) symbolic action – action which, like phonation in speech, pigment in 
painting, line in writing, or sonance in music, signifies – the question as to whether 
culture is patterned conduct or a frame of mind, or even the two somehow mixed 
together, loses sense. The thing to ask about a burlesque wink or a mock sheep raid 
is not what their ontological status is. ... The thing to ask is what their import is: what 
it is, ridicule or challenge, irony or anger, snobbery or pride, that, in their occurrence 
and through their agency, is getting said.59  
 
The point is here that culture can be seen as if it is a text or a document.  
Later in his article Geertz opposes what he calls ethnoscience or cognitive 
anthropology, which claims that culture is located in the heads of individuals and it can be 
described in terms of knowledge structures. According to Geertz, this claim is a form of 
“cognitivist fallacy”, which reduces culture to individual's knowledge of culture. Instead he 
claims that cultural products, such as Beethoven's string quartet, are not “in anybody's head”, 
but rather they are public since meaning is public.60 The aim of anthropology, in Geertz's 
terms, is to enlarge the universe of human discourse by describing – giving thick descriptions 
of - how cultures as systems of construed signs provide a context for meaningful human 
actions. In Geertz terms, “Understanding a people's culture exposes their normalness 
without reducing their particularity”61. Finally, Geertz points out that in addition to 
interpreting social discourse, anthropological description is dealing with microscopic events: 
anthropologists are dealing with particular persons, events and actions rather than whole 
societies or civilizations. Thus Geertz is highly sceptical towards all attempts to construct 
some sort of complete theory or an image of some culture or society as a whole; the data that 
the anthropologist can gather deals with individuals and their actions.62 
Now, some points have to be made explicit before we go forward. Notice how 
Geertz's analysis leads to the rejection of causal explanation. In his view, there can be no 
causal theory of actions because intentions and reasons do not exhibit law-like regularities. 
Instead of seeking and comparing general patterns of behaviour across cultures, we should, 
according to Geertz, go as deeply to the micro-level, to particular actions, as possible. This 
rejection of causal explanation also entails the rejection of prediction as an aim of 
anthropology: theories in anthropology uncover the conceptual structures that inform 
subjects' acts and construct a system of analysis which shows how such structures stand out 
against other determinants of human behaviour.63 Such theories will not predict future 
actions or cultural development. In addition to not being predictive, such theories do not 
                                                 
59 Geertz 1973, 10.  
60 Geertz 1973, 11-13. Geertz‟ assumption that meaning is essentially a public than rather than private can be 
traced back to Wittgenstein who famously argued against the possibility of a “private language”.  
61 Geertz 1973, 14.  
62 Geertz 1973, 20-23.  
63 Geertz 1973, 27. Note that Geertz does not in any way believe that only culture determines human 
behaviour. Humans have a psychological and biological nature which is innate to all humans but that nature has 
no direction or self-control: human nature without cultural symbolic systems is functionally incomplete, “a 
chaos of spasmodic impulses and vague emotions”. Culture is needed to give a direction and means to deal with 
natural impulses. See Geertz 1973, 55-83, 99.   
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make progress in the same way that natural sciences do: cultural analysis is always incomplete 
and contestable; it refines the discussion rather than creates a consensus.64 
Geertz approach is deeply rooted in a certain notion of human action – a notion that 
rises from the tradition of hermeneutical philosophy.65 This notion includes the claim that 
when we are explaining human actions we are explaining something different than 
movements of physical objects. Philosopher Georg Henrik von Wright systematises these 
assumptions in his book Explanation and Understanding (1971). The basic idea is that accounts 
of human actions include normative elements that are lacking from causal explanations. 
Instead of causal explanations that seek general laws and are unable to grasp the particularity 
and the meaningful context of human actions, we should aim at rational or intentional 
explanations. The normative judgement included in action descriptions, von Wright holds, is 
based on the assumption that humans are rational agents, that is, humans have reasons to 
undertake certain actions and these reasons involve goals and beliefs about those goals. Note 
the normativity of this statement: a human agent has a reason to believe or act, if given her 
other psychological states, the belief or action in question is justified. Understanding the 
action consists of explicating this justificatory link. Thus actions are explained by describing 
the goals that the actors set out to achieve and the beliefs which they had about how those 
goals are best met. What makes actions different from mere behaviour is, therefore, their 
teleological or intentional nature. The connection between beliefs, desires and actions is 
made by what von Wright calls practical reasoning which was made famous by Aristotle 
under the title of the “practical syllogism”.66 The job of the one who attempts to understand 
an actor is to reconstruct the practical reasoning behind the actor‟s action. 
What Boyer disapproves of in this whole scheme is that it presupposes that reasons, 
beliefs and inferences cannot be accessed from a third-person perspective, that is, in terms of 
psychology or biology. Instead of allowing metaphysical dualism of this kind, he suggests 
that reasons, beliefs and inferences should be seen as mental representations processed in the 
physical brain. This is a move from implicit dualism between the mind and the body and 
between psychology and culture to a more naturalistic (or materialistic) view facilitated by the 
cognitive sciences:     
 
What is new about the cognitive science „paradigm‟ is that it makes at the least the 
principle of the connection intelligible, by observing that the rule-directed 
manipulation of tokens of abstract symbols by machines of whatever nature 
(mechanical, electronic or biological) can simulate some regularities in thought 
processes. In other words, the shift to „physicalist‟ or materialist interpretation of 
cognition is made possible, because cognitive science has at least a minimal „causal 
                                                 
64 Geertz 1973, 29.  
65 Hermeneutics have been a central topic of the continental tradition, where it has been developed by writers 
such as Paul Ricouer (see, e.g., Ricoeur 1981) and Hans-Georg Gadamer (1975). For a historical overview, see 
Palmer 1969. See also Bleicher 1980. On the analytic side, hermeneutical reflections have stemmed from 
Wittgenstein's later philosophy and its applications to the social sciences especially by Peter Winch (1958, 1970). 
66 Von Wright's practical inference (1971, 96) is of the following form. From the premises that “from now on A 
intends to bring about p at time t” (goal, desire) and “from now on A considers that, unless he does a no later 
than time t´, he cannot bring about p at time t” (belief), we can infer that “as soon as A thinks time t´ has 
arrived, A sets himself to do p, unless he forgets about the time or is prevented.” Von Wright's systematisation 
of the hermeneutical position basically just spells out our folk psychological commitments in the language of 
scientific methodology. At this point, we should remember that both Geertz and von Wright understand causal 
explanation in terms of the Deductive-Nomological model of explanation. They argue that causal explanation 
requires the existence of universal laws of nature (as the D-N model suggests) and as it seems that such laws are 
not available in the case of most human actions we should conclude that the whole notion of causal explanation 
of action should be abandoned. Today, however, most philosophers have abandoned the D-N model of 
explanation and see no major problems in interpreting actions as a result of causes, some mental and some non-
mental. We will return to this topic in chapters 4.3 and 4.4 at some length.    
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story‟ to explain how thought processes can be actualised in material processes, as 
well as some practical implementations of that story.67 
 
What Boyer – and other scholars in the CSR as well – want to argue here is that human 
actions and their products such as cultures and religions need not be considered only as a 
class of first-person objects, but rather are at least to some extent open to third-person 
analysis that is based on natural categories. In this sense, cultural and religious ideas are not 
out of reach of the natural and psychological sciences.68 The precise extent to which human 
action should be explained in terms of non-intentional factors is at this point left relatively 
open. All the CSR wants is to refute the claim that non-intentional factors play no a role in 
explaining human action and cultures at all. We will return to this topic at length later.  
We can now turn to the second relevant aspect of the explanation/understanding 
divide: the problem of “religious essence” or, as it is sometimes put, the sui generis nature of 
religion. As I already pointed out, the CSR assumes that non-intentional, natural factors 
should play a role in explaining the recurrent features in religious behaviour and thinking. 
This claim implies that enquiries into religion should not be limited to approaches that start 
from some religious “essence” behind all religion. Rather than presuming some general 
underlying principle of all religion, such as the “sacred” or “holy”, we should approach 
religious ideas and behaviours as natural products of non-religious and non-cultural (natural) 
factors. Naturalistic theories that attempt to explain recurrent patterns in religious ideas and 
behaviours should link religious ideas and behaviours to non-religious and natural factors.69   
Such naturalistic theories contrast heavily with sui generis theories. These scholars - 
sometimes also called anti-reductionists or religionists - claim that religious ideas and 
behaviours are spiritual and imaginative creations that are highly resistant to explanations 
based on non-religious or psychological, social or biological factors. Mircea Eliade, for 
instance, insists that such “reductionist explanations” miss the religious nature of religion, 
that is, the aspect of the sacred. Eliade's program also attempts to describe the recurrent 
patterns in religious symbols in different cultures and religious traditions: religious beliefs and 
practices symbolise the sacred in different ways. The task of the scholar of religion is to 
interprets these systems of symbols and analyse them by comparing them to symbols of the 
same type in other cultures and traditions. The results of these analyses should be relevant or 
at least acceptable to religious subjects themselves.70  
Geertz's theory of religion expresses similar sentiments. His claim is that religion 
should be considered as a collection of sacred symbols that synthesise people's ethos and 
their world view. Thus  
 
[i]n religious belief and practice a group's ethos is rendered intellectually reasonable 
by being shown to represent a way of life ideally adapted to the actual state of affairs 
the world view describes, while the world view is rendered emotionally convincing by 
being presented as an image of an actual state of affairs peculiarly well-arranged to 
accommodate such a way of life.71   
 
                                                 
67 Boyer 1993a, 9. 
68 See also, Atran 2002, 4-10, Sperber 1996, 9-16. Lawson and McCauley (1990, 17) insist that explanation and 
understanding do not rule each other out, but rather they belong together: we should include both in our 
explanatory scheme.  
69 Boyer 1994a, 4-9.  
70 Pals 1996 158-192. See also Eliade 1960, 1971. 
71 Geertz 1973, 90.  
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In short, Geertz is arguing, that religious symbols connect a particular way of life and a 
specific metaphysic and thus sustaining both of them. He reduces his approach to religion to 
a definition which states that religion is  
 
(1) a system of symbols which act to (2) establish powerful, pervasive, and long-
lasting moods and motivations in men by (3) formulating conceptions of a general 
order of existence and (4) clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality 
that (5) the moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic.72   
 
As we have already seen, in Geertz's terms, symbols are carriers of meaning that can be 
publicly observed and understood. Religious activities involve symbols that create moods and 
motivations, that is, liabilities to perform particular classes of actions or have feelings of 
some particular kind and increase the probability of persons‟ falling in certain moods, such as 
“reverential” or “worshipful”. What makes these symbols, moods and motivations religious 
is that they refer to something that is of the most universal and ultimate kind, some 
transcendent order. Transcendent order is needed because chaos – lack of moral certainty 
and analytic capabilities - threatens human life everywhere. What is important in the idea of 
transcendent order, Geertz maintains, is that it sustains faith in the intelligible world: no 
matter how strange or painful things are, they are somehow understandable. Religious man 
thus moves from a perception of disorder to believing in fundamental and ultimate order 
thus taking a religious perspective on the world. This religious perspective is aimed towards 
what is “really real”, an ultimate metaphysic, and connecting it to a certain way of life.73  
Both Geertz and Eliade can be criticised along the lines of Sperber in his early book 
Rethinking Symbolism (1975). According to Sperber, the problem is that such approaches 
assume that religious ideas symbolise some hidden meanings rather than straightforwardly 
refer to the external world. Religious ideas, in this scheme, are symbols whose hidden 
meaning the observer interprets with a specific method. Sperber also points out that such 
symbolic interpretation also presupposes the existence of a special religious domain where 
the laws of normal reasoning do not apply and thus recreate the distinction between religious 
and non-religious. There are two fallacies here, argues Sperber: the “domain-specificity 
fallacy”, and the “cryptological fallacy”. With the domain-specificity fallacy Sperber refers to 
the assumption that religious thinking is based on different cognitive mechanisms than 
everyday thinking. The fallacy here is that some kind of “religious cognition” is presumed 
even though no psychological evidence exists. Opposing this view, Sperber argues that 
“symbolism” is not domain-specific and it operates on cognitive mechanisms that can be 
found in ordinary thinking as well. Second, if one considers symbolic ideas as substitutes for 
other ideas, one has committed the cryptological fallacy. The trouble, again, is that there is no 
psychological evidence that would reveal the existence of these hidden, unconscious 
processes.74 The result is that both central assumptions of the sui generis approaches, namely, 
that there exists a special religious domain of thinking and that there is some essence in all 
religion, seem to be mistaken.     
 We can now summarise the results of the previous discussion. First of all, CSR 
rejects the idea that religious ideas and behaviours are non-natural, namely, that natural 
factors, such as psychology and biology, do not play a role in explaining them. Instead, it 
claims that there is at least a minimal causal story behind the formation of religious ideas and 
practices. Second, from the assumption that a minimal causal story is possible, it follows that 
the religious domain is not completely independent from other, non-religious and natural 
                                                 
72 Geertz 1973, 90.  
73 Geertz 1973, 91-123. 
74 Boyer 1993a, 23-27; Sperber 1975, 85-148. 
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domains. Therefore, sui generis approaches that presume a special essence of religion must be 
only partially true, if not mistaken completely.    
 
2.2. Cognition and Culture 
Boyer's second methodological choice is made between two mutually exclusive positions. 
According to the first position, cultures and religions are “levels of reality”, that is, they are 
somewhere over and above individual psychological processes. As we have already seen, for 
Geertz culture cannot be “reduced” to what people think about culture. The second position 
- endorsed by Boyer and other CSR writers – emphasises naturalism: rather than being 
“levels of reality”, cultures and religions are a special class of cognitive processes. In short, 
there is no gap between culture and cognition: they are, in fact, identical. I will begin by 
giving a short description of one popular form of the “level of reality” position and proceed 
to contrast it with CSR's position.   
Traditionally, positions according to which cultures, religions and societies exist 
relatively independently of individual minds are called methodologically holistic. One 
classical example of such an approach is Emile Durkheim's sociological program. 
Durkheim's methodology is based on two claims: the first claim is that the nature of society 
can be systematically studied, and the second claims that the social world consists of “social 
facts” that are external to the individual. Whereas a natural scientist studies the facts of 
nature, sociologists study the facts of social life that are as stable as natural facts. So in this 
scheme, societies (norms, institutions) have priority over individuals. Further, Durkheim‟s 
program proposes that these social facts can be explained by describing their function and 
beneficial effects in the society. Durkheim‟s theory of religion illustrates his methodological 
convictions neatly: religion, in his view, is integral to all societies. At the heart of religion is a 
distinction between the sacred and the profane which is symbolised in the collective 
behaviour of the community. Durkheim then claims that the sacred is in fact an image of the 
community itself: by worshipping the sacred reality, the community is really symbolizing the 
structure and the priority of the community over the individual.75  
Although holistically oriented sociology often assumes, as Geertz does, that cultural 
systems are extra-individual, it does not assume, contrary to Geertz, that human action and 
culture require a special method of understanding. On the contrary, Durkheim sees no 
qualitative difference between natural and social sciences. Differences are in scope rather 
than in methodology. If social facts should be approached as facts of nature, then sociology 
should be considered as an explanatory endeavour: patterns of human action are explained 
by invariances in the structures of societies. For the purposes of explanation, the 
methodological holist adopts a functionalistic stance: the existence of an institution, norm, or 
a practice is explained by its beneficial consequences to society in general. In other words, 
the holist explains macro-level events (cultures, societies) with other macro-level events. As a 
consequence, individual actions with their micro-level causes do not interest the holist. 
Finally, we must emphasise that methodologically holistic social science is naturalistic in the 
sense that it assumes that societies are parts of nature even though biological or 
psychological causes do not explain certain features of societies. The rationale behind this 
approach seems to be that when the complexity of a social system reaches a certain level, it 
surpasses the intentions and behaviours of individual humans.76 
According to Boyer, the holistic reasoning contains several problematic psychological 
claims. First, the relationship between the descriptions of normative cultural systems and 
what individuals actually think and do is vague. An anthropologist can say, for instance, that 
                                                 
75 Pals 1996, 88-118.  
76 For defences of this type of social sciences, see, e.g., Kincaid 1997 and Little 2007.  
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the Zande tribe believes that the capacity of witchcraft only inherited from the mother's side. 
The anthropologist's claim is based on interpretations made from native behaviour and 
native statements of their own ideas. However, in the course of this interpretation the 
anthropologist brings in his implicit, folk psychological assumptions of, e.g., rationality and 
the connection between beliefs and actions (rational explanations described in section 2.1) 
that may distort the picture considerably: the interpretations of the anthropologist are not 
necessarily identical with the actual representations in natives‟ heads.77 Furthermore, when 
the holist assumes that cultural realities are distinct from individual representations of them, 
she completely ignores the way in which human cognitive capacities influence cultural 
realities. Boyer writes that   
 
[t]he fact that psychological realities are “shared” by many people, more precisely, 
that they have important similarities in many people, does not by itself make them 
non-psychological, or implies an essential difference, between “ideas”, “desires”, 
“inferences”, etc., as described in anthropology and the corresponding objects in 
psychology. It suggests, on the contrary, that cultural anthropology should comprise 
some hypotheses about the mechanisms whereby ideas are represented, stored and 
transmitted.78 
 
Boyer's point is here that anthropological theories (theories of culture and theories of 
religion) have implicit psychological assumptions and that these assumptions are not 
necessarily true in the light of cognitive science. A psychologically more plausible approach 
would begin by describing how the processes of human cognition constrain cultural content. 
In addition to making problematic psychological assumptions when presuming the 
independence of cultures, societies and religions, the holist grounds her theory of religion on 
the idea that there can be a general or universal principle that explains all phenomena under 
the category “religion”:  
  
The hypothesis of rich universals has often led anthropologists to adopt generative 
models, in the specific sense explained above. They posit certain processes, either 
mental or social, such that their operation would be sufficient to account for the 
occurrence of those supposedly universal religious ideas.79   
 
Several scholar of religion have suggested that religion everywhere should be explained in 
terms of its essence - principles like the “sacred” in Eliade or the “holy” in Otto. Holists, like 
Durkheim, suggest that religions serve a certain function in all societies, that is, they uphold 
social cohesion.80 The problem with these explanations is that they presume the existence of 
                                                 
77 Boyer 1993a, 11-12. Boyer distinguishes what he calls “epistemic” from “cognitive” approaches. In epistemic 
approaches, individual beliefs are seen as parts of a way of thinking or a mode of reasoning characteristic of the 
domain in question. In the case of religion, an epistemic approach would assume that religious thinking and 
reasoning constitute a category of its own or a particular religious world-view. The cognitive approach, 
however, does not confuse the anthropologist's interpretative descriptions with the real representations in 
native's heads as the epistemic approach does: “A cognitive description of religious representations should 
focus on the mental representations involved, rather than on their abstract descriptions in terms of “theories,” 
“conceptions”, “worldviews,” and so on. Such intellectual constructions do not constitute cognitive phenomena; 
they constitute their analytical description, from an epistemically optimal viewpoint. Otherwise, whatever 
explanations we put forward are likely to be about imaginary objects rather than real processes.” Boyer 1994a, 
51.  
78 Boyer 1993a, 13. 
79 Boyer 1994a, 13.  
80 Boyer claims that existing naturalistic theories are not satisfactory because they all make the “magic bullet” 
mistake, that is, they presume that there is one principle that can be invoked to explain all religious phenomena. 
Boyer (2001, 6-30) describes at least four different groups of naturalistic theories of religion. The first 
28 
 
events and processes that are not acknowledged by other fields of research, such as 
psychology. Durkheimian social facts cannot be observed in psychology and the same thing 
goes for “urges” or “needs” postulated by other theories. In all cases, finally, there is one 
“magic bullet” that explains all there is to explain about religion. Contrary to “magic bullet” 
approaches, Boyer suggests that we should not presume that “religion” is a homogeneous 
category at all, but rather a collection of different kinds of activities, events, concepts and 
representations. As there can be no single explanation for individual representations of 
things as diverse as rituals, god-concepts, religious specialists, misfortune and so on, there 
cannot be a single “theory of religion”.81  
One final point should be made. If the category of religion does not pick out an 
entity in the world, how can we say that it picks out anything at all? Boyer's answer is that 
there really are recurrent patterns in transmission and processing of representations that 
seem to have something to do with what we usually call religion. Ideas about non-observable 
agents and their communications with ordinary humans, beliefs that a non-physical 
component of a person survives death, rituals associated with non-observable agents are all 
are cross-culturally widespread in human populations.82 These patterns do not necessarily 
coincide with what we normally call religion, but that does not really matter, in Boyer's view, 
as long as they can be identified with scientific categories and explained.83  
In sum, one could say that, in Boyer's view, “magic bullet” theories of religion are 
based on dubious psychological assumptions of distinct domains of thinking or modes of 
reasoning. We should instead hold that religions, societies and cultures do not exist as non-
physical systems outside human mental processes but the other way around: it is the 
structure of human mental capacities that makes some ideas stable in populations and thus 
candidates for being “social facts”. Thus, Boyer claims, in order to study religion, we need an 
account of how the human mind actually forms and transmits ideas.84 The tools for such 
                                                                                                                                                  
group starts from the explanatory function of religious ideas: religion functions as explanation of natural and 
psychological phenomena. The second group of theories explains religion by referring to the comfort and 
security that religion brings about in a world full of turmoil and death. The third group refers to the social 
function of religion: religious ideas increase social and moral cohesion. Finally, the fourth group of theories 
explains religion as neglect of human rationality. In addition to the “magic bullet” mistake, the main problems 
of these theories are as follows. First, religious explanations do not really explain anything, instead they create 
relevant mysteries. Second, religion creates terror as much as security: supernatural worlds can be terrifying as 
much as they are comforting. Third, social and moral orders are independent from religion because they are 
based on spontaneous intuitions of the mind that would exist without religion. Fourth, religions are not results 
of neglected rationality because everyday thinking neglects rationality as much as religious thinking. Lawson & 
McCauley (1990, 32-44) make the same points with slightly different typologies. They categorise current 
theories of religion as intellectualistic, symbolistic or structuralistic. Intellectualistic theories correspond to the 
first group of theories that Boyer describes and symbolistic and structuralistic theories to the third group. For 
an overview of historical naturalistic theories of religion, see Preus 1996.   
81 Boyer (1994a, 40-42) calls the assumption that religious ideas constitute a system “theologistic bias”. 
Theologistic bias is a tendency to assume that religious beliefs exist as parts of a theological system with abstract 
claims such as “gods exist”. This bias is mistaken for several different reasons, Boyer argues. (1) Religious 
representations do not necessarily consist of general principles, but, e.g., of particular episodes. (2) Religious 
representations are context bound. This means that they are difficult to describe in general or abstract terms. (3) 
Religious representations – as well as other representations that people have – are not necessarily consistent at 
all. (4) Religious representations have individual variations and individuals might be sceptical about their truth.    
82 Boyer 1994a, 29-37. 
83 In the study of religion, the definition of religion is a hotly debated topic. Some scholars of religion - e.g. 
Russell McCutcheon, and Benson Saler - have argued that scholars create religion as they observe it. This would 
imply that religion is an academic construct, not a something “in the world”. See McCutcheon 1997, viii; Saler 
2000, 212-13. If this claim were true, it would seriously undermine religion as an analytic category. Although the 
CSR does not assume that religion is an autonomous, non-physical entity in the world, it claims that the 
category of religion can be meaningfully regarded as picking out something in the world. 
84 Boyer's critique of approaches in anthropology of religion is mainly borrowed from Sperber. See, e.g., 
Sperber 1985; Sperber 1996, 32-55, 77-97. 
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selective explanations are given by Sperber in his epidemiology of representations which we 
will describe next. 
In the beginning of his Explaining Culture (1996), Sperber draws an analogy between 
explaining culture and explaining the spread of diseases, that is, “epidemiology”: 
 
Though the word „epidemiology‟ is long and rare, the idea it expresses is simple and 
general. Say you have a population (for instance, a human group) and some 
interesting property (for instance being diabetic, having white hair, or believing in 
witches) that the members of this population may or may not have. An 
epidemiological approach would consist in describing and explaining the distribution 
of this property in this population.85 
 
The epidemiology of representations presupposes that culture consists first and foremost of 
contagious ideas. To explain culture is to explain why certain ideas are more contagious than 
other ideas. The task of the epidemiology of representations is to describe and explain a 
property of some human population, or the whole human population, that makes the 
distribution of some ideas easier than others.86 Sperber continues to clarify the idea:   
 
All epidemiological models, whatever their differences, have in common the fact that 
they explain population-scale macro-phenomena, such as epidemics, as the 
cumulative effect of micro-processes that bring about individual events, such as 
catching a disease. In this, epidemiological models contrast starkly with „holistic‟ 
explanations, in which macro-phenomena are explained in terms of other macro-
phenomena – for instance, religion in terms of economic structure (or conversely).87  
 
Boyer introduces the idea of a “constraint” to the scheme: Constraints are factors that 
contribute to the selection process of representations and, thus, explain the recurrence and 
patterns in transmission of representations: 
 
The notion of constraint plays a central role in a cognitive account of religious ideas. 
Selective models are based on the assumption that a set of general constraints can be 
described, such as they would constitute a plausible causal explanation for the 
observed recurrence and patterns of transmission. They would explain, in our case, 
why certain types of cultural representations are more likely than others to be acquired, 
represented and transmitted.88 
 
In the case of religion, these constraints should constitute an explanation for the fact that 
religious representations have high frequency of acquisition and transmission. Therefore, 
explaining cultural phenomena, such as religion, consists of describing the cognitive systems 
involved in the formal processing of input information and constraints which these systems 
impose on the structure and content of the information.89 
In Sperber's account, culture consists of physical movement of objects, the 
movement of human beings (behaviour), and different kinds of representations. 
Representations are relations between three factors: that which represents, that which is 
represented and the user of the representation. Basically there are three types of 
representations: cultural representations, public representations, and mental representations. 
                                                 
85 Sperber 1996, 2. 
86 Sperber 1996, 1-6, 77-98. 
87 Sperber 1996, 2. 
88 Boyer 1994, 14. 
89 Boyer 1994, 10-21. 
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Mental representations in individual minds have priority over public and cultural 
representations. Public representations are created from individual mental representations by 
sound (spoken language) or by some other tools (text, pictures, artefacts, etc.) Moreover, 
public representations presuppose a system of interpretation which should be considered as 
mental representation rather than abstract, non-psychological entities as in hermeneutic 
approaches. Some public and mental representations can become so contagious that they 
spread and, in the end, are entertained in almost all minds in a certain group. In this case, 
these widely distributed representations are called cultural representations, that is, culture.90 
Such an account highlights why there cannot be unambiguous criteria for what is religion and 
what is not: even in principle, there is no way of distinguishing individual representations 
from cultural representations, because the latter are widespread groups of the former. As 
there are no abstract entities such as “Navaho culture”, there are no abstract religions such as 
“Islam”. Both are abstractions of a large number of individual similarities between individual 
representations.91 
Sperber‟s epidemiology is developed in a larger context of explaining human 
communicative performance. Communication in general aims to create a resemblance 
between the communicator‟s and the audience‟s thoughts. Sperber insists that the process of 
transmission of representations, namely, communication, is not a process of copying but a 
process of constant transformation and distortion. In order to represent the content of 
representation A, the mind produces a representation B with similar content. The content of 
the representation A is interpreted not duplicated or copied. Thus interpretation is a 
representation about a representation based on the similarity of content. Communication is 
hence a process of interpretation that goes (1) from public representations to mental and (2) 
from mental to public. Individual mental representations are somewhat easy to interpret, 
even scientifically, but the problem of anthropology has been that anthropologists usually 
form interpretations of collective representations which are, in fact, not entertained as such 
by any member of the studied group.92  
The interpretation of representations is based on relevance. Sperber holds that the 
“relevance theory” is an attempt to explicate Paul Grice‟s claim that communication is based 
on expressing and recognizing intentions. The communicator of a message produces 
evidence of his intentions from which the receiver attempts to infer the intention. Relevance 
is something that the human cognitive system is geared for. Any input-information can be 
relevant to an individual depending on his context and already acquired information. The 
more positive cognitive effects a piece of information has the more relevant it is. Positive 
cognitive effects consist of making a worthwhile difference to the individual‟s representation 
of the world. However, the greater the processing effort required by a representation, the less 
relevant the input will be.93 The principle of relevance is crucial for the explanation of the 
recurrence of religious representations as we will see in section 3.1.  
At this point, it is useful to notice the sort of naturalism which these writers offer. 
The central tenets of Boyer's and Sperber's attempt to connect cognition and culture (and 
religion) are the rejection of ontological dualism and the introduction of causal explanation 
                                                 
90 Sperber 1996, 24-25. Cognitive psychologists usually argue that mental representations are more basic than 
public representations. It must be possible for a public representation to be represented mentally but not the 
other way around: one can have mental representations without any public expression. Traditionally, social 
scientists and social constructivist philosophers have argued that public representations are more basic because 
the meaning of a representation is a public thing, it transcends the individual. The latter position draws heavily 
on Wittgenstein‟s argument against the possibility of private language.   
91 In Sperber's view, cultures are not “closed systems”, but wide open: cultures and religions do not have clear 
boundaries and they are not necessarily stable “systems” at all.  
92 Sperber 1996, 31-36.  
93 Sperber 1996, 83-85. Sperber presents a detailed account of communication and relevance in Sperber & 
Wilson 1988. For an updated and shorter version, see Sperber & Wilson 2004. 
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and ontological materialism that goes with it. First of all, Boyer and Sperber reject not one 
dualism but two: the distinction between culture and the mind and the distinction between 
the mind and the brain.94 Both writers insist that anthropology of religion should take 
cognitive sciences as their paragon and reject non-physical causes and effects. According to 
their “minimal materialism”, the entities and processes posited in theories of anthropology 
and theories of religion should be either observed or deduced from accepted theories in 
physics, natural sciences or psychology.95 The basic idea here is that Boyer and Sperber want 
to reject the possibility that there could be explanatory principles, events or facts in social 
and cultural phenomena that are invisible to psychology or impervious to “lower-level” 
analysis. If one does not insist that cultural systems or their properties are materially realised 
in individual minds and public artefacts, then one is adopting a dubious form of idealist 
ontology, they claim. Idealists, in Sperber's view, have two different and ontologically distinct 
worlds: the social world and the natural world. Atran sums up the basic idea nicely:   
 
[n]aturalism in cognitive anthropology describes the attempt to causally locate the 
commonsense objects of study – cultures – inside the larger network of scientific 
knowledge. This approach posits no special phenomena, ontologies, causes, or laws 
beyond those of ordinary material objects and their inter-relationships. It studies the 
structure and content of representations, both private and public, and their variously 
patterned distributions within and between human populations.96 
 
Sperber's “minimal materialism” is basically just a different title for what 
philosophers call “non-reductive materialism” in which mental representations are 
considered as functional states of the human brain. The non-reductive materialist holds that 
individual representations are products of material interactions between other 
representations and the environment without being identical with a single physical state of 
the brain.97 We will return to different forms of materialism and physicalism later at length. 
For now, it is sufficient to remember that cognitive systems produce internal representations 
about the environment on the basis of physical interaction with the environment, as Sperber 
stresses. Based on these interactions, mental representations are connected to what they 
represent, thus, they have semantic properties, a meaning. Public representations are 
connected to what they represent only through the meaning attributed to them by their users: 
public representations have meaning only through being associated with mental 
representations. Similar meanings are attributed to public representations to the extent that 
people have the same knowledge; people think in a similar way. It is this similarity described 
in abstract terms which we in everyday life call culture: culture is a name for similarity.98  
Materialism of this kind leads to a certain notion of causal explanation. As we have 
seen, the epidemiological study aims to identify mechanisms that enhance the probability of 
                                                 
94 These two interfaces – between culture and mind and between mind and brain – correspond to relationships 
between socio-cultural and behavioural sciences and behavioural and biological sciences respectively.  
95 Atran 2002, 4-13; Boyer 2001, 116-123; Barrett 2004, ix; Sperber 1996, 12-16. 
96 Atran 2002, 10. Atran goes on to claim that “[c]ultures and religions do not exist apart from the individual 
minds that constitute them and the environments that constrain them, any more than biological species and 
varieties exist independently of the individual organisms that compose them and the environments that 
conform them. They are not well-bounded systems of definite clusters of beliefs, practices, and artifacts, but 
more or less regular distributions of causally connected thoughts, behaviors, material products, and 
environmental objects. To naturalistically understand what “cultures” are is to describe and explain the material 
causes responsible for reliable differences in these distributions” 
97 Sperber (1996, 12-15. 24-27) does not commit himself to type-type identity between brain states and mental 
states. For him, some form of material realisation thesis and type-token identity are enough to guarantee the 
possibility of genuine materialism.     
98 Sperber 1996, 77-82. 
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some representations achieving a cultural level of distribution and to produce a causal 
explanation of cultural phenomena. An explanation is 
 
mechanistic when it analyses a complex set of causal relationships as an articulation 
of more elemental causal relationships. It is naturalistic to the extent that there is 
good ground to assume that these elementary relationships could themselves be 
further analysed mechanistically down to some level of description at which their 
natural character would be wholly unproblematic.99  
 
Sperber goes on to emphasise that he is not after universal reduction of the cultural to the 
psychological and the psychological to the biological and so on, but rather he is seeking to 
close the gap between natural sciences, behavioural sciences and social sciences.100 However, 
the assumption that only entities and processes that can be identified through the natural 
sciences have “causal power” can be problematic. We will return to this point later when we 
discuss the topic of explanation more carefully.  
 To sum up the discussion so far we can say that the CSR rejects all approaches that 
assume that cultural systems and artefacts, religions, norms and so on can be described and 
explained independently of psychological processes that uphold them. Thus, it rejects 
attempts to approach cultures and religions as levels of reality or coherent systems of ideas. 
Instead, Sperber and Boyer offer a selectionist framework which links cognitive processes 
with macro-level cultural phenomena and explain culture in terms of the distribution of 
representations. Finally, their rejection is based on a certain type of ontology, namely, non-
reductive materialism, which requires material the realisation of culture. 
 
2.3. The Architecture of the Mind: Modularity and Domain Specificity 
My purpose in the previous section was to describe how writers in the CSR construe the 
relationship between cognition and culture. I have attempted to show that they reject the 
idea of cultures and religion existing independently of individual minds and the cognitive 
processes going on in those minds. This result shows how these writers align themselves 
with Boyer's third methodological position according to which cognitive constraints are 
relevant for explaining cultures, societies and other macro-level phenomena. This section 
explicates Boyer's third and fourth methodological claims. First, Sperber's and Boyer's 
approach outlined in the previous section rests on the idea that cultural level phenomena are 
grounded in cognitive processes going on in individual minds. Second, it claims that we 
should not regard anthropology or other social sciences as legitimate sources of 
psychological data because they are saturated by everyday psychological assumptions that are 
sometimes in conflict with the way psychological science understands how human minds 
work.   
As we have already seen, Boyer insists that anthropologists usually have implicit 
psychological assumptions that can contradict the findings of the cognitive sciences. Folk 
psychological assumptions, such as the validity of rational explanations, may sometimes be 
misleading or even mistaken. The basic assumption of what Boyer calls the “anthropological 
theory of non-cognition” is that “people who grow up in a certain group just “absorb” 
whatever cultural models are held valid in that culture, and that this process of absorption is 
both simple and passive.”101 In addition to the assumption that minds just copy ideas that are 
around, there is another folk psychological assumption that seems mistaken in the light of 
                                                 
99 Sperber 1996, 98.  
100 Sperber 1996, 98-100. 
101 Boyer 1993a, 14.  
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recent developments in the cognitive sciences, that is, the assumption that the processes of 
the human mind are transparent for those who have them. Whereas hermeneutical 
approaches, such as Geertz's, emphasise what is normally called “first-person authority” in 
judging what is going on in an individual's mind, cognitive science insists that some cognitive 
processes are totally invisible to individuals themselves. They are what Fodor calls 
“doxastically impenetrable”, or in more commonsensical terms “going on in the mental 
basement”.102 Boyer emphasises the same point when he writes that “this is the most 
important point – the workings of the inference systems are not something we can observe 
by introspection”103. In sum, the folk psychological understanding of the mind is misleading 
in two senses: first, it assumes that minds do not have an effect on the information they 
process, and second, it assumes that introspection has complete access to the processes that 
form our representations.104  
It is useful to realise that what we see here is a certain problem that in the 
philosophical literature usually goes under the name of the “interface problem”. The 
interface problem concerns the relationship between the common sense – or folk 
psychological – understanding of the mind and the explanations of thinking and behaviour 
given in the cognitive sciences and neurosciences. Different solutions to this problem 
produce different kinds of ideas on how human thinking and behaviour should be explained. 
For our topic this problem is very important and we will return to it at length later (section 
4.3). For the time being, it suffices to note that writers in the CSR usually try to avoid folk 
psychological notions as much as possible.    
Instead of a “general purpose learning machine” that is transparent to introspection, we 
humans, CSR writers claim, have minds that actively shape, select and distort information in 
different ways in different domains of knowledge.105 Barrett sums up this view of the human 
mind as follows: 
 
(1) Basic functions of the human mind do not vary across cultures because human 
minds emerge from similar biological foundations (brains) in basically uniform 
natural environments. 
(2) Human minds are not “general purpose learning machines”, but rather house a great 
number of cognitive systems that perform highly specialised tasks. 
(3) Specialised cognitive systems shape our perceptions, inferences and sometimes even 
distort them rather than faithfully just recording “what is out there”. 
(4) Specialised cognitive systems produce recurrent patterns in human thinking and 
behaviour by constraining and informing possible ways of thinking and acting. Thus, 
                                                 
102 Boyer (2001, 93-94) illustrates the “mental basement” claim by the simile of an English mansion where the 
guests upstairs are oblivious to the operations of the staff working downstairs. For the guests, meals appear in 
time and clothes appear washed, but to achieve this remarkable efficiency there has to be numerous, highly 
specialised people working downstairs. In this sense, Boyer concludes, our relationship to the workings of our 
mind is the same as quests‟ understanding of the staff working in the basement. Barrett's analogy of choice 
(2004, 3) is a workshop: the human mind is not a general purpose tool, but rather it houses great numbers of 
different, specialised tools, that operate automatically and outside of introspection for most of the time.  
103 Boyer 2001, 18.  
104 This, of course, raises the question of causes and reasons of behaviour. Boyer (2001, 94-05) writes that 
“[a]nother misconception is that we can explain people's having particular thoughts if we can understand their 
reasons for holding them. ... But the mind is a complex set of biological machines that produces all sorts of 
thoughts. For many thoughts there are no reasonable reason, as it were, except that they are the inevitable result 
of the way the machines work.” In other words, folk psychology can mislead us to think that all our thoughts 
have reasons, Boyer argues. Recall that the fact that some beliefs have causes rather than reasons is not 
controversial. Rather, the controversial question is whether causes “go all the way up” in the sense that reasons 
do not enter into the picture at all. 
105 See, e.g., Atran 2002, 57-59; Boyer 2001, 93-106.  
34 
 
recurrent patterns in, say, religious thinking and acting can be explained by evoking 
these systems.106   
 
What follows is an overview of human cognitive architecture and information processing as 
they appear in writers in the CSR. I will show how the somewhat diverse views of the human 
mind that different CSR writers have can be organised under the notions of “modularity” 
and “domain specificity”. This is to clear the “conceptual landscape”, as it were, by unifying 
the terminology of the CSR. Although the latter notion is more central, I will begin by 
providing a brief sketch of the “modularity hypothesis”. But before we can go into the 
modularity hypothesis itself, we must make a brief detour into the basic assumptions behind 
the cognitive approach to human thinking.   
The “computational/representational theory of mind” (CRTM) which forms the 
backbone of CSR theorising about the mind is based on the idea that thinking is a process 
where symbolic representations are formed and computationally processed in according 
syntactic rules. I will use the CRTM as an umbrella term for several different approaches that 
regardless of their differences more or less share three assumptions: computationalism, 
representationalism and functionalism.107 The CRTM is a theory about thinking and 
reasoning. First, a theory of mind is computationalist in as much as it assumes that thinking 
(mental states and events) is based on the processing of symbols according to their syntactic 
properties. In this sense, thinking resembles the algorithms of digital computers: symbols are 
organised and altered according to their physical or some other syntactic (non-semantic) 
properties. Second, a theory of mind is representationalist when it assumes that symbols 
form complex representations that are the subjects of computational processes and that such 
representations are connected to the world (have semantics). According to this view, 
intentional mental states are relations between a thinking subject and representations of 
states of affairs. For example, believing that my friend loves me is to be related to the 
representation “my friend loves me” in a certain manner (holding it true). Such a state would 
be distinguishable from a state in which I hope that my friend loves me: the representation is 
the same but the relation would be different (hoping). In sum, the main point of 
representationalism is that there are symbolic structures (be they conscious concepts, 
propositions or intentions or sub-personal mechanism, processes, perception or the like) in 
the mind that can be distinguished from each other on the basis of their semantics. Finally, 
the CRTM is based on a functionalistic account of the nature of mental states. Functionalism 
comes in many different forms but the basic idea is that mental states are not identified by 
their internal constitution, but rather by the way the mental state functions as a part of some 
larger system (or theory). Functionalism as well as the whole CRTM attempts to form a 
mediating position between dualism and type-identity theory. An additional feature of 
functionalism is that functional states are multiply realised: mental states as functional states 
are distinct from their material implementation. Thus, in principle the same mental state can 
be realised in human brains, Martian brains, silicon chips or some other material.108 
                                                 
106 Barrett 2007, 59. 
107 For overviews, see, e.g., Thagard 1996 and Bechtel & Graham 1998.  
108 For overviews of functionalism and computationalism, see, e.g., Braddon-Mitchell & Jackson 1996 and 
Crane 2001. David Marr (2982), for instance, exemplifies computational analysis well when he insists that 
computationally operating information processing systems can be analysed in three distinguishable but 
interrelated levels. The first level is computational. First, the task performed by a cognitive system is broken 
down into individual problems that need to be solved in order to perform the task (functional decomposition) 
and second, the possible constraints of any solution to the information-processing problems must be worked 
out. Thus, computational analysis produces accounts which describe system‟s input information and output 
information (or behaviour). The second level of analysis is the algorithmic level: algorithmic analysis produces 
an account of the individual information-processing steps that are needed to get the system from the input-state 
to the output-state. For instance, the input might be the distribution of light in the visual field and the output 
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The “modularity hypothesis” concerns the architecture of cognition, that is, the 
nature of cognitive systems and their relationships to one another. The hypothesis itself can 
be formulated in several different ways, but the basic idea is that the human mind consists of 
“modules” (units or individual systems) that are relatively independent and have specialised 
functions. Modularity of the mind is one of the most hotly debated topics in cognitive 
science and in the philosophy of cognitive science today. The debate is basically about the 
extent, rather than the existence, of modularity: is it the case that only some cognitive 
processes are modular or does modularity go “all the way up”? The difficulty of the debate is, 
however, that definitions of what it takes for a process to be modular are different.109  
Philosopher Jerry Fodor formulated the idea of modularity in his Modularity of Mind 
(1983), in which he claimed that the mind consists of central processes, such as reasoning, 
judgement and decision-making, that are not modular and peripheral systems, such as 
different kinds of visual and perceptual systems, that are modular. According to Fodor's 
view, the input processes, operating in the fringes of cognition, can be reasonably held as 
modular, but most of the information processing work is still done by central processes – 
simply put: thought (or conceptual processes) – that are necessarily non-modular because 
they flexibly combine and process outputs of numerous input systems. “Fodorian” modules 
are identified by having properties such as domain-specificity (specialisation), mandatory 
application (reflex-type response), shallow outputs (non-conceptual outputs), fast operation, 
informational encapsulation (modular processing is not affected by other processes), fixed 
neural architecture (distinct regions in the brain) and specific breakdown pattern.110 
Recently, a certain version of the modularity hypothesis has been advocated by 
Evolutionary Psychologists as well as by Sperber, who argue that not only peripheral 
processes of the mind are modular, but the central processes as well. The massive modularity 
hypothesis extends the idea of modular structure to all cognitive processes whereas Fodor's 
original idea of modularity denied the possibility that “higher-level” thought could be 
understood in modular terms.111 However, as Barrett and Kurzban point out, massive 
modularity theorists loosen Fodor's rigid definition for modular processing: in Steven 
Pinker's view, for instance, modules are characterised by functional specialisation: “modules 
should be defined by the specific operations they perform on the information they receive, 
rather than by a list of necessary and sufficient features.”112 Similarly, Carruthers also ends up 
endorsing a view according to which  
 
modules might be isolable function-specific processing systems, whose operations are 
mandatory, which are associated with specific neural structures, and whose internal 
                                                                                                                                                  
would be a group of three-dimensional representations of the environment around the perceiver. The third 
level of analysis is implementation: the main task of implementation is to find a physical realisation for the 
algorithm. Physical realisation means identifying the physical structures (such as packs of neurons) that perform 
the computational task. For an overview, see Bermudes 2006, 17-27.  
109 For an overview of this messy debate, see Barrett & Kurzban 2006. See also the debate between Peter 
Carruthers (defending massive modularity), Jesse Printz (arguing against all modular architecture) and Richard 
Samuels (defending restricted modularity) in Stainton 2006.  
110 It must be pointed out, however, that in Fodor's view, it is not necessary for a module to have all the 
aforementioned features. Processes can be modular to “a greater or lesser extent”. For Fodor, the most 
important features of modules were informational encapsulations and automaticity. Recently, Fodor (1997, 
2000) has argued fervently against those who endorse the massive modularity thesis and criticised the cognitive 
sciences in general. Especially revealing is his debate with Steven Pinker who defends massive modularity. See 
Fodor 2005 and Pinker 2005a, 2005b.  
111 The most extensive and systematic defence of massive modularity is Peter Carruthers‟ Architecture of the Mind 
(2006a). For other defences, see Pinker 1997 and Sperber 1994, 1996, 2005.  
112 Barrett & Kurzban 2006, 629. Carruthers (2006b) also points out that if the massive modularity thesis adopts 
the Fodorian definition of modules, then the idea of “massive modularity” is surely impossible, and also 
suggests functional specialisation as the defining characteristic. 
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operations may be both encapsulated from the remainder of cognition and 
inaccessible to it.113  
 
This definition of a module allows massive modularity theorists to seek modular processing 
across the board without specifying how modules actually process information (Fodorian 
mandatory application or informational encapsulation).114 As the difference between the 
Fodorian definition (automaticity and informational encapsulation, for instance) and the 
massive modularity definition (functional specialisation) of modules is considerable, Barrett 
and Kurzban conclude that these positions are mainly talking past each other. Finally, 
massive modularity theorists assume that there are great (even vast) numbers of modules. 
Take Cosmides and Tooby, for example, who write that “our cognitive architecture 
resembles a confederation of hundreds or thousands of functionally dedicated computers 
(often called modules)”115.   
So, we might conclude that the massive modularity view entails three claims: (1) 
cognitive processes are to some extent (if not completely) modular, (2) modules are 
functionally specialised and mostly automatic systems and (3) modules come in great variety 
and numbers. One of the reasons why the massive modularity thesis has been defended by 
Evolutionary Psychologists and others has been its assumed evolutionary applications. We 
will return to these applications in the next section (2.4.). Generally speaking, the reason why 
I find the modularity debate interesting is that it is connected to the way in which human 
behaviour is to be explained. The Fodorian scheme in which modules inhabit only the 
peripheral regions of the mind leaves much room for conscious reasoning and decision-
making, whereas massive modularity reduces this “wriggle room” considerably: most 
reasoning and decision-making processes are, according to this view, strongly constrained by 
automatic mechanisms. This is also a topic which we will take up later at length.    
With this preliminary sketch in mind, we can now argue that writers in the CSR insist 
that (1) there are specialised systems that have cognitive effects across the board from 
perceptual to conceptual processes that (2) most operations of these specialised systems are 
inaccessible to introspection and that (3) most specialised systems operate automatically. 
Apart from these claims, CSR writers have slightly different takes on modularity and 
especially the terminology. 
Sperber allies himself closely with Evolutionary Psychologists when he claims that 
there is no reason for us to presume that higher-level thought processes could not be, at least 
partially, modular. In his view, it is possible that there are modules that take conceptual input 
and produce conceptual outputs. The end result is that the architecture of the mind is quite 
complex: 
  
We are now envisaging a complex network of conceptual modules. Some conceptual 
modules get all their input from perceptual modules, other get at least some of their 
input from conceptual modules, and so forth. Every piece of information may get 
combined with many others across or within levels and in various ways (though 
overall conceptual integration seems excluded).116  
 
So, in Sperber's mind, there seems to be no central process, or one central cognitive system 
in the Fodorian sense. Rather, the mind is a mixed bag of more or less interconnected, semi-
                                                 
113 Carruthers 2006b, 7.  
114 Sperber (1994, 2005) shares Pinker's view of functional specialisation and massive modularity. For Sperber's 
arguments against Fodor, see 1996, 119-150. 
115 Cosmides & Tooby & Barkow 1992, xiv. 
116 Sperber 1996, 130.  
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automatic modules that all have their specialised functions and domain-specific input 
conditions.117  
Given the close relationship of Atran and Boyer to Evolutionary Psychology and 
Sperber's massive modularity view, it seems plausible to think that their view of modularity is 
close to the massive modularity thesis. Boyer's term of choice for a module is “inference 
system”, because he is especially interested in concept formation and in the way in which 
cognitive systems inform the process of acquiring and representing conceptual information: 
 
So the mind does not work like one general “let's-review-the-facts-and-get-an-
explanation” device. Rather, it comprises lots of specialized explanatory devices, 
more properly called inference systems, each of which is adapted to particular kinds of 
events and automatically suggests explanations for these events.118  
 
Again, the idea is that the architecture of the human mind is modular to a large extent, that 
is, the mind is a “bundle of explanation machines” that operate relatively independent of 
each other. Moreover, even the term “inference system” clearly implies that modular systems 
process not only perceptual input, but conceptual input as well. Similar assumptions about 
modular structure can be seen in Atran as well when he writes that    
 
[a] naturally selected, mental module is functionally specialized to process, as input, a 
specific domain of recurrent stimuli in the world that was particularly relevant to 
hominid survival. The module spontaneously produces, as output, groupings of 
stimuli into categories as well as inferences about conceptual relationships between 
these categories.119 
 
Furthermore, Atran uses the term “module” throughout his works quite consistently and 
connects it explicitly to the notion of massive modular architecture.120 This is especially clear, 
if one looks at Atran's anthropological works on folk taxonomies of biological species where 
he argues that such taxonomies exhibit cross-cultural similarity because they are all based on 
similar underlying assumptions. 
For Barrett, the central notions are those of a “mental tool” and a “specialised 
system”:  
  
The notion that the adult human brain possesses an array of specialized tools is 
scarcely debated anymore. Instead of having one powerful multipurpose mental tool, 
we have a number of specialized ones. Most of the mental tools operate automatically, 
without any conscious awareness. They efficiently and rapidly solve lots of problems 
without concentration or angst, much the same way that computer programs solve 
problems in a swift, effortless fashion.121 
 
                                                 
117 Sperber shares Pinker's view of modules as functionally specialised units.  Sperber (1996, 120) defines a 
module as “a genetically specified computational device in the mind/brain ... that works pretty much on its own 
on inputs pertaining to some specific cognitive domain and provided by other parts of the nervous system (e.g. 
sensory receptors or other modules)”. For Sperber's whole account, see his 1996, 119-134. 
118 Boyer 2001, 17.  
119 Atran 2002, 57.  
120 Atran (2002, 57-58) distinguishes four types of modules: (1) perceptual modules that process sensory input, 
(2) primary emotion modules that respond to particular stimulus-situations automatically by producing certain 
bodily states (fear, etc.), (3) secondary affect modules that produce “higher-level” emotions and (4) conceptual 
modules that have conceptual outputs of other modules as their inputs. 
121 Barrett 2004, 3.  
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Barrett seems to intentionally avoid using the term “module”. However, his idea of a “mental 
tool” summarises the notion of module quite well: tools are functionally specialised and 
independent of each other. Barrett also maintains that there are specialised tools working not 
only in perceptual processes, but in conceptual processes as well. In his view, there are three 
categories of mental systems: categorisers, describers, and facilitators. Categorisers are 
systems that process sensory input and their function is to determine what sort of thing we 
have perceived. The “agency detection device”, for example, looks for evidence of beings 
that act intentionally rather than only respond to stimuli. Describers are devices that 
automatically infer properties of any given object the categorizers have identified. Objects are 
automatically presumed to be solid, and bounded. For example the “agent describer system”, 
known also as the “Theory of Mind”, generates a host of intentional and mental descriptions 
of objects categorised as agents. Describers generate expectations even if the object itself is 
previously unknown. The third group of systems, facilitators, coordinates social activity and 
behaviour that depends in context and not merely on the identity of the things involved. For 
example the “social exchange regulator” tries to make sense of who owes what to whom.122 
The previous statements from writers in the CSR suggest quite clearly that their 
modularity does not correspond to the Fodorian modularity for at least two reasons. First, 
CSR writers assume that modules, or mental tools, can have conceptual inputs and outputs, 
that is, they are not “shallow” in the Fodorian sense. Second, they exist across the cognitive 
spectrum: modular processing can be found everywhere in cognition.  
The reason why I have dwelt on modularity this long is that the idea of modular 
architecture is crucial for understanding the notion of “domain specificity” which is, in turn, 
crucial for the CSR. Domain specificity can be understood as a claim about the way in which 
information is processed in the mind. Hirschfeld and Gelman summarise the idea very well: 
 
According to a long predominant view, human beings are endowed with a general set 
of reasoning abilities that they bring to bear on any cognitive task, whatever its 
specific content. Thus many have argued, a common set of processes apply to all 
thought, whether it involves solving mathematical problems, learning natural 
languages, calculating the meaning of kinship terms, or categorizing disease concepts. 
In contrast to this view, a growing number of researchers have concluded that many 
cognitive abilities are specialized to handle specific types of information. In short, 
much of human cognition is domain-specific.123 
 
The connection between domain specificity and modular architecture becomes obvious at 
this point: if a cognitive system has a modular structure, it is necessarily domain specific. 
Note, however, that domains and modules rarely coincide: although all modules have their 
own domain-specific input conditions, domains are usually held to be more general and 
broader than the domain of a single module. The term “domain” itself is defined as “a body 
of knowledge that identifies and interprets a class of phenomena assumed to share certain 
properties and to be of a distinct and general type.”124 This definition would allow domains 
such as physical entities and processes, substances, living kinds, numbers, artefacts, mental 
states, social types and the like. According to this understanding, domains (1) partition our 
world (classifying things, concept formation), (2) operate as functional and widely distributed 
devices (cognitive competencies arise to solve particular adaptive problems) and (3) have 
dedicated mechanisms (modules operate outside conscious awareness).125  
                                                 
122 Barrett 2004, 3-6. 
123 Hirschfeld & Gelman 1994, 3.  
124 Hirschfeld & Gelman 1994, 21.  
125 Hirschfeld and Gelman (1994) trace the roots of domain specificity to several developments in different 
fields: (1) Chomsky's theory of generative grammar in linguistics, (2) modular approaches to cognition, (3) 
39 
 
The domains that interest the CSR most are folk (or intuitive) psychology, folk 
biology and folk physics, because such domains of intuitive knowledge strongly constrain our 
acquisition and formation of representations. According to Boyer, cognitive domains, or 
ontological categories in his terminology126, form the background against which our 
categorisations of entities and processes in the natural world develop: 
  
Minds that acquire knowledge are not empty containers into which experience and 
teaching pour predigested information. A mind needs and generally has some way of 
organizing information to make sense of what is observed and learned. This allows 
the mind to go beyond the information given, or in the jargon, to produce inferences 
on the basis of information given. Complex inferences allow children and adults to 
build concepts out of fragmentary information, but inferences are not random. They 
are governed by special principles of the mind, so that their result is in fact 
predictable.127       
 
The special principles that govern inferences are codified in sets of domain-specific 
knowledge structures that are based on the modular architecture of the mind. When we are 
talking about religion, the most important categories are, according to Boyer, the following: 
PERSON, ANIMAL, PLANT, and OBJECT.128 The idea is that these categories correspond 
to inference systems that automatically produce expectations, that is, intuitions about entities 
and processes in the world and such intuitions guide and inform our learning.129 Boyer gives 
a simplified example. If we say to a child that “a zygoon is a predator of hyenas”, we do not 
have to tell to the child that “zygoons” eat, sleep, give birth to baby zygoons and so on, 
because the child automatically knows this. The reason is that the information “a zygoon is a 
predator of hyenas” activates inference systems dealing with the category ANIMAL and such 
inferences create a concept of “zygoon” based on default inferences of the category 
ANIMAL. Thus, intuitive knowledge – in this case, assumptions such as animals eat, sleep 
and give birth to babies similar to themselves – has a crucial function in creating new 
concepts.130  
The category of PERSON is the most important one for it features prominently in 
religions.131 The central idea here is that we have a large amount of cognitive machinery 
producing intuitions about persons as agents, their goals and their beliefs. As Atran puts it: 
 
Agents are entities that instigate and control their own actions as well as those of 
other objects and agents. Developmental and cognitive psychology have 
experimented with several related theories how humans come to make sense of one 
                                                                                                                                                  
constraint studies in psychology, (4) studies of intuitive (or common sense) theories, (5) expertise studies, (6) 
animal studies and (7) cross-cultural studies.   
126 Boyer's terminology is quite unstable. On the one hand, he talks about templates, concepts and ontological 
categories (in 2001). On the other hand, he talks about domain-level concepts and kind-level concepts (as in 
2002). Finally, in his earlier writings (1993, 1994) he does not refer to categories at all, but talks about 
conceptual structures. Nevertheless, the idea in all cases is the same: there are networks of pre-existing 
knowledge that inform and constrain the acquisition and formation of new knowledge and these sets of pre-
existing knowledge are largely independent of cultural influence.  
127 Boyer 2001, 42.  
128 Boyer 2001, 78. There can be different sets of possible categories: Boyer also mentions categories of 
NUMBER and TOOL.    
129 Boyer 2001, 99-101. When a certain sort of information enters the system, it automatically triggers all the 
systems whose input-conditions the information fills. This is what is meant when an object is said to belong in a 
certain category. For example, a perception of a solid object activates the system processing information about 
solid physical objects and a perception of an agent triggers the “Theory of Mind” systems. 
130 Boyer 2001, 57-61.  
131 Boyer 2001, 60-61, 95-96.    
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another. An overarching theoretical framework has emerged, known as 
folkpsychology, naïve psychology, or theory of mind. The central idea is that people, 
and perhaps other animated objects, are intentional agents who act, and cause others to 
act, on the basis of internal motivations.132 
 
Not only persons activate our folk-psychological machinery, but animals and other animate 
objects, such as dots on a screen do this as well.133 We will return to this topic in the next 
chapter where I will describe the way in which the CSR explains the prevalence of agent 
concepts in religions.  
Atran and Norenzayan have presented a useful matrix (table 1) of how to relate 
ontological categories to underlying domains of intuitive knowledge. Although it differs from 
Boyer with respect of the amount of categories, it indicates how ontological categories (and 
the modular systems that constitute them) are linked to domains of intuitive knowledge.    
 
Table 1. Ontological categories and domains of intuitive knowledge (Atran & Norenzayan 2004). 
 
 Domain of intuitive knowledge 
Ontological  
category 
Folk-physics Folk-biology: 
vegetative 
Folk-
biology: 
animate 
Folk-psycho-
logy: psycho-
physical 
Folk-psychology: 
epistemic 
person + + + + + 
animal + + + + - 
plant + + - - - 
substance + - - - - 
 
 
In the matrix, “+” represents an activation and “-” a non-activation134 of systems dealing 
with a particular domain in connection with a given category. For instance, when the 
category ANIMAL is activated, then several modular systems, such as folk physics, folk 
biology and folk psychology, start to produce inferences about animal bodies as physical 
objects and biological functions as well as goals and desires. We already described briefly 
how the category ANIMAL works in terms of folk psychological assumptions. Boyer gives 
further examples of how non-agent-like, solid objects, like rocks, trees, plants, and humans, 
activate folk physics. One of the basic systems of folk physics is a system specialised in 
generating intuitions about the behaviour of physical objects. In addition, there is a system 
specialized in physical causation between objects. The mind also contains a system that links 
together the function and properties of an object. For example, if an object‟s function is to 
beat something, it is automatically assumed that the object itself is harder than the things it is 
used to beat. It seems that animals possess some kind of mental tools that correspond to folk 
physics whereas only humans have highly advanced folk psychology. Humans, in general, are 
very efficient in representing the mental states of other humans and animals because humans 
                                                 
132 Atran 2002, 59. 
133 There are several extensive discussions going on about the nature of folk psychology. For an overview of the 
debate, see, e.g., Carruthers & Smith 1996. One strand of the debate concerns the mechanism by which folk 
psychology operates: Do we attribute goals and beliefs (and mental states in general) on the basis of simulation 
(imagining what we would do in similar circumstances) or on the basis of a certain kind of theory (inferring 
from abstract principles)? The debate here is between “simulation theory” and “theory-theory”. In the case of 
the CSR, at least Boyer and Atran seem to fall on the theory-theory side on the basis of their vocabulary. Other 
debates concern about how folk psychological terminology, such as the notions of belief, desire and goal, 
should be understood. Here the debate is mainly between realists and anti-realists. For a clarifying discussion of 
the notion of folk psychology, see Bermúdes 2005, 172-207. 
134 The most commonly used terms in CSR literature for the activation of an inference system (or a module or a 
mental tool) are “triggering” and “firing”.  
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are innately social. The mind includes a vast number of social systems, such as the “agent 
detector device” and the “agent describer system”. The function of folk psychology is to 
form representations of other people‟s representations, to attribute beliefs, desires and ideas 
to others in order to explain and predict their behaviour.135 
 Summing up the discussion so far, we can conclude that according to domain 
specificity the pre-existing structures of the human mind constrain acquisition and 
transmission of information in different domains. The mind is not a “blank slate” that simply 
copies all information around, the argument goes, but rather a collection of specialised 
subsystems that activate under certain conditions. Furthermore, the architecture of the mind 
is basically the same cross-culturally: when we are talking about how the mind works we are 
talking about systems that can be found in all normal human heads. The idea here is that the 
modular architecture and the domains of intuitive knowledge built upon them help 
organisms to adapt and understand the natural world in way which contributes to their 
survival. 136 This formulation points to evolutionary considerations which will be the topic of 
the next section.  
 
2.4. Evolutionary Roots of Cognition and Culture 
This section describes how CSR writers‟ ideas about cultural evolution and the modular 
architecture of the mind come together. Note, however, that not all writers have the equal 
amount of interest in this topic. Atran and Boyer put forward large numbers of evolutionary 
hypotheses whereas Barrett (and others) seldom pose(s) evolutionary questions. We will be 
focussing on Atran's and Boyer's ideas and as they have been strongly influenced by 
Evolutionary Psychology (EP) we will provide a very brief look into EP as well. The basic 
idea is that religious beliefs and behaviours are by-products of the modular cognitive systems 
and that each had an adaptive function in our ancestral environment. Rather than being an 
adaptation, religion is a by-product of systems selected for other functions.    
 At this point, it is very important to notice that evolutionary ideas are used in two 
different ways by CSR writers:  
 
(1) Cultural evolution is conceptualised and explained in terms analogous to those of 
biological evolution.  
(2) The emergence of the architecture of the human mind is explained in terms of 
natural selection. 
 
The first issue was discussed in section 2.2 where it was pointed out that epidemiological and 
other selectionist models are based on an analogy between natural selection and cultural 
selection. The latter issue, however, is separate from the former and it opens up another 
domain of discussion that is connected with EP. Some clarity can be achieved in this issue by 
                                                 
135 Boyer 2001, 96-98. Sometimes Boyer suggests that we could call our categories “minitheories” of the world. 
His idea (1994a, 66-67) is based on a certain theory of concepts usually called the “theory-based” theory of 
concepts. See, e.g., Keil 1989. According to this theory, concepts form networks through causal connections 
(inferences) between concepts. Not only do concepts carve the world into different classes, but their 
connections are based on assumptions about the natural world. In this scheme, concepts and their networks are 
not just tools to understand the world, but they also carry information about the world.   
136 Boyer even talks about domains of intuitive knowledge as being a sort of natural “metaphysics” that 
resembles Aristotelian genus-species metaphysics. He (2000b, 291-292) writes that “the evidence suggests that 
concept acquisition most likely does not require a sound epistemic attitude, but rather some robust 
metaphysical prejudices, supporting quasi-theoretical inference processes that are in principle defeasible but in 
practice extremely stubborn. If such prejudices are a plausible outcome of evolution through natural selection, 
‟natural metaphysics‟ is the outcome of a species‟ particular history and of the species-typical needs of its 
members, and is therefore natural only relative to that particular species.” 
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introducing a distinction between two interfaces that correspond to the interfaces of 
scientific disciplines and the interfaces of phenomena in the world. Although we will see later 
that equating of scientific disciplines with “levels” in reality is far from clear, we can 
nevertheless make use of such a distinction here. The first interface is between the human 
mind and cultural systems and the second between the human mind and biology. The latter 
interface is where EP comes in. Boyer and Atran, for example, introduce extensive 
evolutionary considerations on the latter interface – that is, the evolution of the human mind 
and culture – whereas Barrett does not seem to be interested in it at all. This distinction 
between these two interfaces reveals quite clearly that in order for CSR theories to function, 
they need only deal with the former interface, not with the latter.137    
 With these warnings in mind, we can begin by contrasting the “religion as a by-
product of adaptations” claim of Atran and Boyer with the “religion as an adaptation” 
claim.138 David Sloan Wilson, for instance, has argued for an adaptationist theory based on 
the idea of “group selection” in his Darwin's Cathedral: Evolution, Religion and the Nature of Society 
(2002).139 Wilson's group selection theory starts from the idea that group-level attributes 
might have significant effects on the transmission of genes. Although genes are the basic 
means of transmission of an organism's design, individuals and groups are vehicles for genes 
to act on. Natural selection, in Wilson's view, works on multiple levels: the fitness of groups 
can affect to the selection of genes as well as genes affecting the fitness of the group. The 
explanation of religion can be given in these terms in the following way. It is claimed that 
religious practices enhance altruistic behaviour in human groups and when altruistic 
behaviour increases, then groups become more cohesive and integrated. It follows, the 
argument continues, that religious groups have a selective advantage over non-religious 
groups. In the long run, this would result in religious groups outlasting the non-religious 
ones, because religious groups are the ones whose genes get transmitted. In this view, 
religion as an altruistic device would, therefore, be somehow build into our genes.140  
                                                 
137 One might even go so far as to claim that there are two interpretations of CSR's relationship to Darwinian 
evolution. According to the first interpretation, CSR does not need evolutionary biology and hence it does not 
need to take the evolutionary background of the human mind and human culture into account. In this view, the 
closest scientific partners would be found from cognitive psychology and developmental psychology. According 
to the second interpretation, evolutionary considerations and especially evolutionary psychology are crucial for 
the CSR: CSR has a story to tell about the evolution of religion and the evolution of the human mind. 
Evolutionary considerations are almost completely missing from the 1990s works in the CSR. Lawson and 
McCauley's Rethinking Religion (1990), for instance, does not even have the word “evolution” in its index. Even 
in the case of Boyer's early works, The Naturalness of Religious Ideas (1994) for example, evolution comes up only 
when it is connected to discussions about selectionist models of explanation; evolution of cognitive systems is 
not discussed at all. Although Boyer went on in 2000s to discuss evolution, the divide between evolutionary and 
non-evolutionary preferences remained. Atran and Boyer clearly find such considerations important whereas 
Barrett, Lawson and McCauley do not. Barrett (2007, 59) just mentions briefly that “evolutionary theoretical 
foundation is not strictly necessary” for CSR. Based on our distinction between the two interfaces, we should 
agree with Barrett, but at the same time acknowledge that if CSR theorising were to be linked with evolutionary 
considerations, it would increase its plausibility.       
138 Sometimes these two views are called “spandrelism” (or by-product theory) and “adaptationist theory”. The 
term “spandrel” comes from Stephen Jay Gould and Richard Lewontin who in their famous paper (1979) 
argued against the prevailing “adaptationism” of their time, namely, the claim that natural selection is the only 
driving force behind evolutionary change. Contrary to this view, Gould and Lewontin maintained that from the 
fact that an organism has in its current state an adaptive trait of some kind it does not follow that we should 
hold that trait as a product of natural selection. It may very well be an accidental by-product of an adaptation 
(or adaptations) or a product of some other non-adaptationist process (genetic drift, etc.).   
139 David Sloan Wilson should not be confused with the famous biologist Edward O. Wilson. Edward O. 
Wilson is very famous for his views on what he calls sociobiology (1975, 1998). Sociobiological accounts of 
religion are in fact continuous with group selection theories in the sense that they both explain religion in terms 
of its biological function. 
140 Wilson 2002. For group selection, see also Sober & Wilson 1998. There is an extensive discussion going on 
in the philosophy of biology about the possibility of different “units” or “levels” of selection. On the one 
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 There are two central methodological assumptions underlying Wilson‟s approach that 
are also shared by most adaptationist theories of religion. The first assumption is that 
societies, norms and belief systems can be explained in terms of adaptation and selection 
pressures. Societies and cultures are patterns in human behaviour, the argument goes, and as 
such they are parts of our biological nature and products of natural selection. The second 
assumption is biological functionalism, namely, the idea that practises and social structures 
can actually be seen as properties of groups rather than individuals. These properties in turn 
are seen to enhance the fitness of the group that has them.   
 Atran has the most elaborate critique of adaptionist theories of religion (mainly 
sociobiology and group selection). In his view, the two aforementioned methodological 
assumptions are crucially flawed. The problem with the first is that it lacks mechanisms that 
connect genetic traits and cultural systems whereas the problem with the second is that it 
postulates norms, rules, social structures, or beliefs as units of selection.  
 According to Atran, group selectionists do not provide a proper mechanism which 
would show how the designs encoded in our genes influence cultural systems. Thus, 
adaptationist explanations of cultural, social or religious practices “leapfrog the mind” or are 
“mind blind”. He writes that  
 
sociobiological accounts often invoke ordinary material causes (genetic adaptations 
for carnivorous behaviour) to explain ordinary material causes (cannibalism). 
Nevertheless, they fail to provide a hint of how the putative distal causes (genetic) 
enter into known material relationships with more proximate causes (mental and 
public representations) to actually produce the forms of behaviour to be explained 
(religious beliefs and practices are causally connected within and between human 
minds and bodies).141 
 
The root of the problem is that the explanatory scheme of biological functionalism jumps 
from the beneficial effects of cultural practices to genetic inheritance. Further, the 
functionalist usually presupposes that social institutions and systems are “extra-individual”, 
namely surpass individual psychology.142    
 The “mind blindness” of adaptationist theories of religion creates yet another 
problem, Atran argues. Even though adaptationist theories posit norms and rules as 
functional units of cultural selection, they fail to show how these norms and rules are 
represented in individual minds and how they causally produce behaviour. Atran argues that 
there is no psychological evidence for the existence of specially encoded knowledge 
structures that would correspond to norms or rules:   
 
Norms are not shared rules and human societies and cultures are not clustered and 
aggregated sets of rules that functionally determine some definitely bounded “social 
systems” or “cultural worldview”. At best, norms are public representations that help 
to orient causal analyses of cultural phenomena – for the person in the street as well 
as for the social scientist – by stereotyping those public exhibitions and performances 
whose recurring tokens are especially relevant to social communication and 
coordination.143 
                                                                                                                                                  
extreme, there are those, like D. S. Wilson, who argue for multi-level selection: selection can occur on many 
different levels, such as of the level ofgroups, societies and genes. On the other extreme, the “hard-liner” Neo-
Darwinians claim that only genes are the proper units of selection. For a useful overview of the debate and 
relevant literature, see Lloyd 2005. 
141 Atran 2002, 202.  
142 Atran‟s critique of both sociobiology and group selection theories can be found in Atran 2002, 199-236. 
143 Atran 2002, 234-235. Atran continues to emphasise that norms and group-level traits are abstract notions, 
not natural kinds. By this token, the idea of cultures as superorganisms promoting their own survival – that is, 
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Hence we should not consider norms and rules as units of selection, but as abstractions of 
cognitive functions. In this view, norms, rules and cultural as well as religious systems are no 
more than abstractions of vast numbers of cognitive processes. Further, they should not be 
used to explain anything causally because as abstractions they cannot have physical effects. 
Shared norms and rules are only signposts of behavioural tendencies; this applies even to 
norms and rules considered as absolute or sacred. The behaviour of individuals and groups is 
not regulated by abstract representations but by intuitively generated representations based 
on particular situations. Norms and rules are abstract descriptions of these intuitions and 
function as creators of group identity. Without sharp boundaries or clear reference, norms 
and rules cannot replicate themselves to any degree required by Darwinian genes, Atran 
concludes.144  
 Instead of adaptationist accounts of the emergence of religion (or culture), Atran and 
Boyer suggest a “by-product” account. The basic idea is that recurrent features in religious 
beliefs and practices are considered as by-products of cognitive systems that have originally 
evolved for some other tasks. So there are two questions here: (1) how did the modular 
architecture of the human mind come about and (2) how does it explain recurrence in 
cultural evolution?  
 Boyer begins by stating that the starting point of EP is the evolutionary past of 
cognitive architecture: 
 
Once we realize that different species have different takes of what is around 
(different categories and inference systems), it makes sense to consider that this must 
have to do with the history of these different species - in other words, with evolution. 
Our inference systems may be there because they provide solutions to problems that 
were recurrent in normal human environments for hundreds of thousands of years. ... 
This matters because we bear the traces of this evolutionary past in many features of 
our behaviour and most importantly in ways our minds are organized.145  
 
Cosmides and Tooby make the same point by claiming that the human mind/brain is a 
bundle of specialised modules and each module has been formed in the process of natural 
selection to solve a particular problem in our ancestral environment.146 Note how this 
formulation neatly highlights the connection between of innateness (nativism) and massive 
modularity: as adaptations, modules are innate in the sense that they develop automatically 
for all normal humans. However, Boyer points out that we should stay clear of “naive” 
accounts of innateness according to which humans are somehow born with adult cognitive 
capacities. Rather than being somehow “already in the brain” at the point of birth, the 
modular architecture develops from “skeletal assumptions and biases” if the environment is 
right: 
 
[a] normal environment is indispensible to development if you have the right genetic 
equipment that prepares you to use resources from that environment, to build your 
                                                                                                                                                  
increasing their “cultural fitness” – is vague because cultures are abstractions without sharp boundaries. 
144 Atran 2002, 199-235. For the same reasons Atran also rejects Dawkins‟ and Blackmore‟s Memetics. 
Memetics presupposes units of selection, “memes”, which inhabit human minds. According to Atran, 
memetics, therefore, presupposes that human communication is a process of copying information. This is not 
true, Atran continues, because communication is a process where information is constantly reconceptualised 
and transformed. Further, memetics does not explain why some ideas are better replicators than others because 
it is “mindblind” as well. See Atran 2002, 236-243. For Sperber‟s critique of memetics, see Sperber 1996, 100-
106; Sperber 2000.  
145 Boyer 2001, 116. 
146 Cosmides & Tooby 1997. 
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teeth out of normal nutrients and to build up your syntax out of normal linguistic 
interaction with competent speakers.147 
 
This is also the reason why, in Boyer‟s mind, it is futile to contrast nature and nurture: 
nurture does not produce anything without some material to work on and nature does not 
produce anything by itself. The end product (in this case adult cognitive capacity) is always a 
product of the interplay of many factors.148 
 The project of EP can be broken down into four stages. First, problems demanding 
adaptation in our ancestral environment are reconstructed. Second, hypotheses are 
formulated that deal with computational principles that allow the mind to solve these 
problems. Third, cognitive psychology and neurophysiology are used to test these 
hypotheses. Finally, theories that explain how specialised systems have developed from more 
general systems and how these systems provide selective advantages to those who have them 
are constructed.149 Pinker‟s metaphor of choice, “reverse engineering”, catches the basic idea 
very well: Scholars take the mind to pieces and try to find out how the different parts were 
created and for what purpose. Modern culture and ways we today use our minds and abilities 
that make everyday thinking possible are by-products of systems that were originally 
designed to solve different problems. Hence the slogan of Cosmides and Tooby is that “we 
have stone aged minds in our modern heads”.150 
 Now the question is how it is possible for modules that were selected for other 
purposes to function in our contemporary environment which is very different from the 
environment where these modules supposedly were originally born. The answer that 
Evolutionary Psychologists as well as Boyer, Atran and Sperber give is, roughly, that at some 
point of human evolution, modules developed the capability of transgressing their original 
domains of function.  
 Let us begin with Sperber‟s arguments again. According to him, the recurrent 
patterns in human cultural diversity can be explained in terms of massively modular cognitive 
architecture. The basic idea is that “a cognitive module is an evolved mechanism with a 
distinct phylogenetic history”151 In other words, every single module in the human mind has 
a distinct history and a specialised domain of function – this is what domain-specificity 
means. However, the original function of the module cannot be understood without 
accounting for the environment in which the organism lived. Thus, there must be a 
distinction between a module‟s proper domain and its actual domain.152 Sperber writes that 
 
The actual domain of a conceptual module is all the information in the organism‟s 
environment that may (once processed by perceptual modules, and possibly other 
conceptual modules) satisfy the module‟s input conditions. Its proper domain is all the 
information that it is the module‟s biological function to process.153  
 
Sperber goes on to point out that because humans constantly change their environment 
through culture and natural selection fails to keep up, it is unlikely that actual domains of 
conceptual modules correspond even approximately to their proper domains. It makes sense, 
in Sperber‟s view, to talk about cultural domains of modules in addition to actual and proper 
domains. A module‟s cultural domain is something that the module itself has created: 
                                                 
147 Boyer 2001, 114.  
148 Boyer 2001, 106-116. 
149 Boyer 2001, 118.  
150 Cosmides & Tooby 1997. 
151 Sperber 1996, 123-124 
152 Sperber 1996, 134-138. 
153 Sperber 1996, 136.  
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A cognitive module stimulates in every culture the production and distribution of a 
wide array of information that meets its input conditions. This information, being 
artefactually produced or organized by people themselves, is from the start 
conceptualized, and therefore belongs to conceptual domains that I propose to call 
the module‟s cultural domain(s). In other words, cultural transmission causes, in the 
actual domain of any cognitive module, a proliferation of parasitic information that 
mimics the module‟s proper domain.154 
 
Sperber‟s point here (buried under his rather obscure terminology) is that recurrent patterns 
in cultural evolution are by-products (or “parasites”) of modules. Take music, for instance. It 
is highly plausible, in Sperber‟s view, that humans have modules that identify complex sound 
patterns, rhythms and pitch variation for the purpose of speech recognition. The proper 
domain of these modules is hence the acoustic properties of human communication. 
However, the input-output conditions of the proper domains of such modules can be 
stimulated artificially by other man made sounds that are more distinct such as steady 
rhythms and regulated pitch variations, thus giving birth to a rich cultural domain called 
music. In this way, music as a cultural domain (and actual domain of some of our modular 
systems) is a by-product (or a “parasite”) of our modular architecture.155   
 When explaining how cultural variation could arise from massively modular 
architecture, Sperber also introduces the notion of “metarepresentation”. The idea is that 
“humans can mentally represent not just environmental and somatic facts, but also some of 
their own mental states, representations and processes”156. Thus metarepresentations are 
understood as representations about the products of other conceptual modules.157 The 
reason why metarepresentations are so important is that without them massive modularity 
theorists would not be able to explain why it is the case that most of our thinking and 
believing involves content that is not simply an outcome of one module or restricted to one 
domain of thinking. Writers in CSR use the notion of metarepresentation in different ways 
and employ different terminologies, but the basic idea is roughly the same, namely, that 
metarepresentational ability is crucial for the development of culture because it makes it 
possible for modules to be used radically outside their proper domains.  
 Boyer takes up Sperber‟s idea of metarepresentation when he talks about “decoupled 
cognition”. He claims that humans can easily “decouple” cognitive processes from their 
standard inputs and outputs and use those systems to generate imaginary scenarios, form 
representations of fictional situations and characters and plan and predict the future, to name 
just a few. Further, communication (representing the intentions of others) and public and 
material representations (drawings, pictures, signs) depend on metarepresentational abilities. 
The ability to decouple cognitive systems from their original functions makes it possible to 
arouse these systems through mimicking their input conditions. Material art, for example, 
stimulates modules that are geared to discover shapes in the natural world by presenting 
distinct geometrical shapes and perfect symmetry that is not found in nature.158  
                                                 
154 Sperber 1996, 141.  
155 Sperber 1996, 138-146. For more examples, see Boyer 2001, 131-134.  
156 Sperber 1996, 71.  
157 Sperber holds that metarepresentational ability is a product of a specialised module which also provides the 
capability to ascribe mental states to other people, that is, folk psychology (or theory of mind). Hence 
metarepresentational abilities would be by-products of folk psychology. See Sperber 2000a.   
158 Boyer (2001, 129-131) and Atran (2002, 107-112) give numerous examples of how metarepresentation is 
necessary for “higher-order” cognitive functions.  Boyer also refers to the archaeologist Steven Mithen (1996) 
who claims that about 75 000 years (give or take 10 000) a “symbolic explosion” happened and certain 
evolutionarily “useless” behaviours and objects such as burying rituals, rock paintings and statues started to 
appear. According to Mithen, the symbolic explosion was the latest human evolutionary step and this step 
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 Boyer concludes that information and behaviour that mimic or stimulate the proper 
input-output conditions of our modular systems can easily be acquired and transmitted and 
thus becoming salient “cultural gadgets”:  
 
[t]hese activities [cultural gadgets] recruit our cognitive capacities in ways that make 
some cultural artifacts very salient and likely to be transmitted. These salient 
cognitive artifacts can be extraordinarily primitive, like glass beads or pieces of shiny 
metal whose only merit is to provide unusual visual stimulus. But ideas too and their 
abstract relations can constitute such artifacts. ... Once we understand how brain 
evolution resulted in the design of a brain with these particular inference systems, we 
can better understand why humans are sensitive to these particular artifacts rather than 
others. That there are pure tones in music and symmetries in visual art is certainly no 
coincidence, given the way our brains were designed by evolution.159 
 
In short, the explanation for recurrent cultural patterns, in Boyer‟s, Atran‟s and Sperber‟s 
view, is the evolutionary history of our species and especially our brains.  
 This section has discussed several topics. We began by looking at the critiques that 
the advocates of the by-product account have directed against the adaptationist accounts of 
the emergence of religion. The main critical point was that adaptationist accounts of cultural 
evolution do not explain how genetic traits have effects on cultural systems. To remedy this 
defect, the advocates of the by-product account suggest that the massively modular 
architecture of the human mind, which is itself a bundle of adaptations, gives rise to all 
cultural forms – religious or otherwise.   
 
2.5. Evolutionary Landscape 
In the previous four sections, we have looked into the auxiliary theories and hypotheses of 
CSR writers. My reason for all this has been to explicate and systematise the more or less 
implicit methodological assumptions of CSR writers. We examined the background 
commitments of CSR writers by looking at the first four methodological choices presented 
by Boyer. Section 2.1 described how CSR writers usually contrast their own approach with 
interpretative approaches and emphasise the role of causal explanation. The motivation 
behind this insistence, as we saw, was the assumption that there is no essential difference 
between the sciences and the humanities. Further, CSR writers also insist that religion is not 
sui generis in the sense that natural and behavioural sciences are totally unable to grasp it. On 
the contrary, they claim that natural and behavioural sciences may be highly relevant for the 
study of religion. In section 2.2, we examined how CSR writers understand the relationship 
between cognition and culture. The question was whether culture should be seen as a level of 
reality. The argument of CSR writers was that the socio-cultural “realm” or “level” should 
not be viewed as independent of the natural “realms”. Again, it was argued that explanations 
for recurrent patterns in cultural evolution should not be sought at the socio-cultural level, 
but rather at the micro-level processes of human cognition. The section also provided a brief 
                                                                                                                                                  
involved the emergence of the ability to transcend the borders of ordinary cognitive domains, what he calls 
symbolic thinking. This symbolic thinking (metarepresentation in Sperber‟s and Atran‟s terms and decoupling in 
Boyer‟s terms) creates the necessary background for the emergence of abstract thinking, signs and symbolic 
communication (language) and so on. See, e.g., Boyer 2001, 322-324. This is also the reason why, according to 
Boyer and others, the search for “a primitive” or original religion is futile. There is no primitive religion because 
there is no single moment of emergence of religion. As long as there has been symbolic thinking, there have 
been representations that can develop into religions. For discussion of origin scenarios, see Anttonen 2002 and 
Guthrie 2002.  
159 Boyer 2001, 133.  
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look into epidemiological models and their underlying ontology. Section 2.3 examined the 
two core ideas behind CSR‟s theory of mind, namely, the notions of modularity and domain 
specificity. CSR writers claim that we should not take the socio-cultural sciences as our 
source of data about the human mind. Rather, they argue that we should look to the 
cognitive sciences according to which the human mind is a collection of specialised systems 
that operate largely outside of our awareness. Finally, section 2.4 described the different uses 
of evolution in CSR arguments. We pointed out how Boyer‟s and Atran‟s understanding of 
the evolutionary background of cognition, culture and religion contrasts with adaptationist 
models. We also noted how closely they were linked to those of Evolutionary Psychology.  
 To sum up the discussion so far, we can say that CSR writers give an outline of a 
naturalistic and multi-disciplinary research program that is situated somewhere in between 
the disciplines of cognitive sciences, anthropology and the study of religion. This research 
program is committed to explaining recurrent patterns in religious thinking and behaviour as 
by-products of non-religious cognition. Atran highlights this basic idea neatly with his 
metaphor of a “evolutionary landscape”: 
 
Think metaphorically of humankind‟s evolutionary history as a landscape formed by 
different mountain ridges. Human experience that lies anywhere along this 
evolutionary landscape converges on more or less the same life paths, just as rain that 
falls anywhere in a mountain landscape converges towards a limited set of lakes or 
river valleys.160  
 
He then goes on to show how we could understand the biology of human beings – their 
bodies and their brains – and their environment forming the ridges of the landscape. Human 
thinking and behaviour - human cultures and religions included - adapt themselves to 
biological and ecological constraints. The result is that all human thinking and behaviour 
converge in the valleys of the landscape like falling rain. In this landscape, cognitive 
constraints form several different ridges: given enough time, cognitive systems, such as folk 
psychology, social interaction schemas and folk physics, channel the possible cultural and 
religious expressions towards certain convergent forms.161  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
160 Atran 2002, 10-11.  
161 Atran 2002, 10-13. 
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Table 2. Approaches in the study of religion 
 
Approach Methodology Explanatory 
strategy 
Ontology Religion Interest 
Interpretative  
approaches: 
Geertz, Eliade. 
Dualism or 
pluralism: 
interpretation 
as a method. 
Folk 
psychology: 
intentional 
explanation 
Pluralism Religion as a 
spiritual and 
personal 
creation 
Increased 
understanding; 
less tension 
between 
groups. 
Sociology  
of Religion: 
Durkheim. 
Monism: 
methods from 
the natural 
sciences but 
different 
scopes 
Macro-level: 
functionalism; 
micro-level: 
folk 
psychology. 
Holism 
Dualism: socio-
cultural facts 
are 
independent of 
natural facts 
Religion as the 
glue of society 
Predictive 
improvement; 
better social 
structures 
Religion as  
adaptation: 
D.S. Wilson  
(group-
selection). 
Monism: 
same 
methods, 
same scope 
Evolutionary 
biology, 
methodologica
l individualism 
Monism: 
everything is 
material or 
reducible to 
material 
causes 
Religion as an 
adaptation 
increases 
social cohesion 
Advance of 
scientific 
knowledge 
Religion as  
by-product: 
CSR, EP.  
Monism: 
same 
methods, 
same scope 
Cognitive 
psychology, 
methodologica
l individualism 
Monism: 
everything is 
material or 
reducible to 
material 
causes 
Religion as a 
by-product of 
ordinary 
cognition 
Advance of 
scientific 
knowledge 
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 We can now sum up the similarities and differences between the approaches that we 
have considered in the preceding sections. Recall that our discussions are by no means 
complete or exhaustive: there are many approaches to the study of religion that have not 
been discussed here at all. First, we should highlight the similarities between CSR and other 
approaches. We have already noted that some CSR writers, such as Atran and Boyer, seem to 
align themselves quite closely with Evolutionary Psychology, whereas others, such as Barrett, 
do not. However, it is still quite plausible to claim that even though we should not equate 
CSR with EP as some do162, we should see EP as the closest ally of CSR in its current form 
because they share several background assumptions, such as domain-specificity, massive 
modularity and connect cognition and culture in similar ways. Further, the fact that CSR has 
much common ground with approaches, that view religion as an adaptation, can easily be 
overlooked due to the heated debates back and forth.163 Underlying the debates, however, is 
a considerable body of shared assumptions concerning the nature of the scientific study of 
religion and the relationship between socio-cultural sciences, behavioural sciences and the 
natural sciences. CSR, EP and “religion as an adaptation” approaches all share the idea that 
the scope of natural and behavioural sciences can and should be extended to domains 
previously regarded exclusive as the domain of the socio-cultural sciences. Third, the most 
prominent concern in CSR, EP and “religion as adaptation” approaches is to produce 
theories that connect religious behaviour and thinking to a broader naturalistic framework, 
rather than providing religious insights or guidelines for organising society. Nor do they 
attempt to provide theories that religious people themselves can appropriate or even accept. 
These kinds of interests are not usually shared by those working in the interpretative 
tradition, for instance, since they emphasise the more personal and personally edifying 
function of interpretation. Finally, CSR falls clearly on the naturalist side of the 
naturalism/religionism debate in its critique of the sui generis assumption. In this regard, it is 
actually in the same boat with many socio-cultural approaches, such as Durkheim‟s theory of 
religion.  
 Although CSR shares a lot of common ground with other naturalistically oriented 
approaches to religion, there is one major difference: the emphasis on cognitive psychology. 
Most traditional theories of religion, CSR writers claim, operate on folk psychological, rather 
than scientific, assumptions of how the human mind works. In interpretative approaches, 
meaning attribution cannot be construed as a causal process at all. The same goes for action: 
an individual action cannot be identified and understood without references to the conscious 
goals and beliefs of rational individuals. In Durkheim‟s sociology, it is the society that 
explains human action: the norms and ideologies of the surrounding society are acquired by 
the individuals in the process of “socialisation”. No reference to individual psychology is 
needed. The argument of CSR writers is that other approaches (not including EP) either 
                                                 
162 Theologian Niels-Henrik Gregersen, for instance, considers CSR as a part of Evolutionary Psychology in his 
2006 article What Theology Might Learn (and Not Learn) from Evolutionary Psychology: A Postfoundationalist Theologian in 
Conversation with Pascal Boyer. 
163 Jeffrey Schloss (2009) emphasises this point and argues that cognitive approaches and adaptationist 
approaches should not be viewed as rigid alternatives for several reasons. First of all, the fact that X is an 
adaptation is a matter of degree and a matter of considerable debate as the notion of adaptation is not as clear 
as it first seems. Second, cognitive explanations of religion seem to be on a different level than the evolutionary 
ones since they mostly describe proximate mechanisms of religion whereas evolutionary explanations deal with 
ultimate causes. For these reasons, Schloss suggests that rather than seeing spandrelist and adaptationist 
explanations of religion as competitors, they can be seen as complementary. Richerson & Newson (2009, 177) 
make also the same point when they write that “[i]n the face of biological and cultural complexity and diversity, 
phenomena like religion are unlikely to support sweeping generalizations about adaptation versus 
maladaptation.” Despite Schloss‟ well meaning points, arguments between spandrelists and adaptationists are 
still quite common. Writers like Atran, Barrett and Boyer go for spandrelism whereas others, e.g., Bulbulia 
(2004, 2009a) and Richard Sosis (e.g., Sosis 2004; Sosis & Alcorta 2003; Alcorta & Sosis 2005) go for more 
adaptationist models.  
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exclude psychological notions a priori (the interpretative approach) or consider them as 
irrelevant for explaining socio-cultural systems (holistic sociology). A similar exclusion of 
psychological notions is also characteristic of “religion as adaptation” approaches in which 
genes exert influence over the behaviour of individuals in a direct manner without any 
account of the mediating mechanisms at the cognitive and neuronal level. What the 
evolutionists are doing wrong, from the CSR point of view, is that they fail to describe the 
exact manner in which our genetic inheritance influences behaviour.   
 The discussions in this chapter have also revealed the diversity of terms and 
background assumptions of CSR writers. We pointed out that the biggest differences could 
be seen in the use of evolutionary considerations: Atran and Boyer have much to say about 
the evolution of the human mind whereas Barrett and others seldom refer to evolution. This 
also betrays another difference with regards to Sperber: Atran and Boyer openly 
acknowledge themselves as Sperberians whereas Barrett only makes very general references 
to “selectionism”. These differences suggest that we should resist the temptation to describe 
the CSR as a theory or even a “tightly-knitted” paradigm. Rather, we should acknowledge the 
differences between writers and note that their methodological convictions allow different 
kinds of positions. One could even say that these convictions are quite general “rules of the 
thumb” rather than being axioms from which a program is deduced. However, the 
differences between writers should not be overplayed to the point where CSR writers would 
be represented as having no common ground at all.  
 We should also note the provisional nature of CSR theorising. This provisional 
nature is a result of the links that CSR theorising has to its auxiliary theories and disciplines: 
if the auxiliary theories, such as domain specificity, were to lose their plausibility as working 
hypotheses, then CSR theories would face considerable pressure of reformulation or even 
elimination. For this reason, it seems peculiar that CSR writers accept their auxiliary theories, 
such as computationalism, epidemiology and massive modularity, relatively uncritically. The 
various criticisms of these auxiliary theories, their different interpretations and their 
competitors are largely ignored or downplayed (especially in more popular works) to give the 
impression that the auxiliary theories are irrefutable scientific truths.     
 These discussions highlight CSR‟s ambivalent relationship to other approaches to 
religious phenomena. On the one hand, CSR writers seem to be quite critical and even 
dismissive towards other approaches to religion, such as phenomenology or sociology of 
religion. On the other hand, when Boyer is stating his methodological claims, he 
acknowledges that “the cognitive framework is not the only rational option”164. Nevertheless 
it is difficult to see how exactly CSR extends or complements other approaches whose 
methodological background assumptions it strongly criticises. My point here is that if CSR 
really wants to collaborate with other approaches rather than to replace them, it should 
engage more seriously with the results of other approaches and clarify the scope and nature 
of its own explanations in discussion with others. This lack of proper engagement with 
others seems to be the reason why the intentions of CSR writers are often misinterpreted 
either as wanting to take over the whole field of the study of religion or as being inherently 
anti-religious. Perhaps the dismissive and critical attitude of some CSR writers towards other 
approaches can be seen as an attempt to create “elbow room” in the academy. If this were 
the case, then we should expect CSR writers to turn to other approaches for positive 
engagement after they have established themselves.  
 Finally, we can raise another critical point. So far we have dealt mostly with the 
auxiliary theories of CSR, rather than its own theoretical contributions. CSR can be subjected 
to the same criticism originally directed against these auxiliary theories such as 
                                                 
164 Boyer 1993a, 8. Pyysiäinen (2009, 126) agrees with Boyer when he states that “[t]he recent cognitive theories 
of religion, for example, should be seen as extending the more traditional social scientific explanations, rather 
than eliminating and replacing them”. 
52 
 
computationalism and neighbouring disciplines such as EP. Discussions concerning EP are 
especially relevant here because many of its central assumptions have been fiercely criticised 
and some of those central assumptions are shared by CSR as well.165 Philosophical 
discussions surrounding both cognitive science and EP are so extensive that it is impossible 
to deal with them all in the course of this work. We must be content here to offer just a brief 
look into some critical points. One of the most high-profile opponents of EP, David Buller, 
claims that EP suffers from several crucial flaws. First, Buller claims that the massive 
modularity thesis is not plausible because recent studies in brain development suggest that 
blueprints of psychological modules are not genetically determined. If all modules were 
adaptations, they would have to be genetically based, but this does not seem to be the case. 
Secondly, human brains seem to develop more plastically than EP would allow. Buller writes 
that 
  
[h]uman psychological adaptation does not consist in “hundreds or thousands” of 
“genetically specified” modules. Rather, the fundamental adaptation is the brain's 
developmental plasticity, which is capable of producing a wide variety of problem-
specialized information-processing structures. Additional adaptations lie in the 
minimal learning biases instantiated in the early stages of brain development.166 
 
This point, if true, challenges the way in which massive modularity theorists, such as Sperber, 
link modularity with evolution. Thirdly, Buller claims that there is no reason to assume that 
human brains have not developed from our hunter-gatherer days. And even if there would 
not have been any development, we would not be justified in assuming that our cognitive 
systems have remained the same because of the brain‟s plasticity. Finally, Buller points out 
that all of the preceding considerations decrease the plausibility of a uniform human nature. 
In his view, adaptations are not necessarily species-general, which means that we should not 
presume that all human beings have similar cognitive architecture.167  
 We can easily see how relevant these critical points are for the CSR. If the massive 
modularity hypothesis and the hypothesis of the uniformity of species-general cognitive 
architecture turn out to be problematic, then the whole CSR project would be severely 
undermined. If there is no extra-cultural cognitive underpinning, there can be no extra-
cultural cognitive constraints. CSR writers can bypass some of the critique directed towards 
EP by claiming that CSR need not be committed to massive modularity or adaptationism in 
the first place. We have already noted that although evolutionary considerations feature 
prominently in both Boyer and Atran, some writers, such as Barrett, are of the opinion that 
they are not strictly speaking necessary. Further, it is true that although CSR writers seem to 
have a shared commitment to some sort of massive modularity and it is explicitly defended 
by Atran and Boyer (and Sperber) they could perhaps manage with more modest 
assumptions. Bypassing these criticisms in this way would be quite effective against the 
critique of EP but they would lead to radical changes in CSR theorising as it is now being 
done. So if, therefore, it turns out, as Buller claims, that the developmental plasticity of the 
human brain is so great that conceptual systems vary significantly cross-culturally, then it is 
difficult to see how the current CSR theories could be left standing.   
                                                 
165 Most of the criticism has come from two directions: philosophers of biology and other forms of 
evolutionary psychology. The main criticisms have been that Evolutionary Psychologists (1) operate with a too 
rigid form of adaptationism, (2) reduce all social and cultural structures to psychological structures too 
straightforwardly, (3) put too much faith on the massive modularity hypothesis and (4) have too loose a concept 
of fitness. For critical discussion, see, e.g., Sterelny 2003; Sterelny & Fitness 1999; Richardson 2007. Buller 
2005a summarises all the main critical points. For shorter spin-offs of Buller's extensive critique, see Buller 
2000, 2005b; Buller et al. 2005.  
166 Buller 2000.  
167 For more discussion, see Woodward & Cowie 2004.  
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3. Religion and Cognition 
 
The previous chapter dealt with the level of auxiliary theories and assumptions of CSR 
writers. Now it is time to turn our attention towards their actual core contributions which 
deal with cognitive mechanisms that make religious ideas easier to learn and transmit than 
other ideas. Recall that according to Boyer‟s fifth methodological claim religious 
representations differ from everyday representations to the extent that we can justifiably 
identify a category of “religious” ideas. The basic notion is that religious representations 
include “counter-intuitive” elements which at the same time make religious representations 
salient but also easy to learn. The notion of counter-intuitiveness is used to signify a special 
relationship between particular representations and the domains of intuitive knowledge. The 
idea of counter-intuitiveness is described and discussed in section 3.1. However useful the 
notion of counter-intuitiveness might at first seem, it is not a sufficient (and not perhaps 
even a necessary) condition for a representation to be religious, for there are many counter-
intuitive representations that are not associated with religious ideas. CSR writers bring in the 
notion of agency – especially supernatural agency – at this point: religious representations 
refer to supernatural or counter-intuitive agents with special powers such as invisibility and 
omniscience. Supernatural agents are the topic of section 3.2. Finally, when representations 
of supernatural agents are connected with certain events in ordinary social life and they 
spread across the population, a religion is born. Section 3.3 looks into the additional factors 
that CSR writers use to explain how these developments happen. It will, therefore, be argued 
that CSR writers see religion as characterised by minimally counter-intuitive representations 
with reference to supernatural agents that are subsequently linked with episodes and 
representations about morality, social interaction, misfortune and death.168 
 
3.1. Counter-Intuitiveness  
One (if not the one) core contribution of CSR writers has been the notion of counter-
intuitiveness. Simply put, the idea is that representations that are slightly or minimally 
counterintuitive are transmitted and acquired more successfully than merely intuitive 
representations and representations that are highly counterintuitive. In the case of intuitive 
representations, minimally counterintuitive representations (MCI) are more salient and 
attention-demanding, and in the case of highly counterintuitive representations, MCI 
representations do not overload our cognitive systems that much. Subsequently, the notion 
of counter-intuitiveness has become a sort of flagship of CSR theorising and it has claims to 
                                                 
168 Notice that CSR writers do not really define religion any more specifically than this general description. Take 
Atran for example who distinguishes four aspects of religion which demand an explanation. He states (2002, 
13-15) that the aim of his project is to explain the existence and prevalence of (1) widespread counterfactual 
belief in supernatural agents (gods, ghosts, goblins, etc.), (2) hard-to-fake public expressions of costly material 
commitments to supernatural agents, that is, sacrifice (offerings of gods, time, other lives, one's own life, etc.), 
(3) a central focus on supernatural agents dealing with people's existential anxieties (death, disease, catastrophe, 
pain, loneliness, injustice, want, loss, etc.) and (4) ritualised and often rhythmic coordination of (1), (2), and (3), 
that is, communion (congregation, intimate fellowship, etc). For discussion, see Atran & Norenzayan 2004 and 
especially the comments. In Atran‟s view, it is not enough to explain the first aspect and focus on the 
widespread nature of religious ideas. Rather, one should also aim to explain why people hold counter-intuitive 
representations worthy of commitment in terms of time and effort. He actually accuses “pure cognitive 
theories” (such as those of Boyer) of falling prey to the “Mickey Mouse problem”: they cannot explain the 
difference between fictional and mythical entities (such as Mickey Mouse) and entities, such as gods and spirits, 
that are objects of religious worship.  
54 
 
be seen as one of the most foundational notions of the field.169 It is Boyer who introduced 
the notion originally so we will follow his lead.  
 Boyer stipulates that 
 
[r]eligious representations are particular combinations of mental representations that 
satisfy two conditions. First, the religious concepts violate certain expectations from 
ontological categories. Second, they preserve other expectations.170 
  
We already have the necessary conceptual tools in place to understand this statement. 
Humans, according to this view, possess large domains of intuitive knowledge pertaining to 
different domains of life such as social relations, physical objects and mental states of others. 
As we saw in section 2.3., these domains of knowledge are based on a rich array of modular 
machinery of the human mind that produces domain-specific intuitions automatically. Now, 
the twist with religious representations, according to Boyer, is that the events, agents and 
things that they represent include violations to the intuitions of the specific category or 
domain that they activate.171  
 Some examples should clarify the matter. Take the notion of an “all-knowing God”, 
for instance. Such an idea, according to Boyer, is represented by activating the ontological 
category of PERSON and adding the violation “special cognitive capacities” in the following 
way: 
 
PERSON + VIOLATION: OMNISCIENCE (special cognitive capacities) = all-knowing 
God     
 
The result is a representation about a certain type of person: a person that is otherwise a 
person just like any other, but who nevertheless knows everything. The notion of spirit is 
also very common in religious traditions and it can be analysed in a similar way: 
 
PERSON + VIOLATION: INVISIBILITY = spirit 
 
Spirits and gods involve violations of the category of PERSON, but counter-intuitive 
representations, according to Boyer, can also involve a transfer of properties from one 
domain to another. This is the case when mental properties are attributed to inanimate 
objects. Take the notion of a statue that listens to conversations:  
 
ARTIFACT + VIOLATION: COGNITIVE FUNCTIONS = listening statue 
 
                                                 
169 For accounts of counter-intuitiveness, see, e.g., Pyysiainen 2002, 2005a; Norenzayan et al., 2006; Tremlin 
2006; Tweeney, et al., 2006; Upal, et al. 2007.  
170 Boyer 2001, 62.  
171 Boyer 2001, 62-65. See also Boyer 2003, 119-120; Boyer & Ramble 2001, 537; Barrett 2004, 22-24 and Atran 
2002, 95-100. Atran (2002, 96) provides the following definition: “Religious beliefs are counterintuitive, hence 
also necessary counterfactual, because they violate innate, modular expectations about basic ontological 
categories, such as those of LIVING KIND (ANIMATE [PERSON, ANIMAL], PLANT) and STUFF 
(ARTIFACT, SUBSTANCE). ... Religious representations nonetheless remain integrally bound to factual, 
commonsense beliefs and inferences. ... As a result, religious concepts need little in the way overt cultural representation or 
instruction to be learned and transmitted. A few fragmentary narrative descriptions or episodes suffice to mobilize an 
enormously rich network of implicit background beliefs.” Barrett (2004, 22) describes the idea in a similar, 
albeit more commonsensical, fashion: “These MCIs may be characterized as meeting most of the assumptions 
that describers and categorizers generate – thus being easy to understand, remember, and believe – but as 
violating just enough of these assumptions to be attention demanding and to have an unusually captivating 
ability to assist in the explanation certain experiences. These MCIs commonly occupy important roles in 
mythologies, legends, folktales, religious writings, and stories of peoples all over the world.” 
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 Boyer gives numerous examples of different kinds of minimally counter-intuitive 
representations, but the basic idea is always the same: successful religious representations are 
neither oddities (highly counterintuitive) nor simply intuitive representations.172 We can now 
return to Atran‟s matrix again (table 1.). A violation can be created by replacing “+” with “-“ 
or vice versa. The more changes, the more counterintuitive a representation becomes. It is 
also possible to include “super” attributes such as omnipotence (super folk psychology) that 
could be described as adding “++” to our matrix.173  
 
 
Table 1. Ontological categories and domains of intuitive knowledge (Atran & Norenzayan 2004). 
 
 Domain of intuitive knowledge 
Ontological  
category 
Folk-physics Folk-biology: 
vegetative 
Folk-
biology: 
animate 
Folk-psycho-
logy: psycho-
physical 
Folk-psychology: 
epistemic 
person + + + + + 
animal + + + + - 
plant + + - - - 
substance + - - - - 
 
 
 The most important thing to note here is that violations are meaningful only to the 
extent that cross cultural categories and domain of intuitive knowledge exist. Without these 
intuitive “backgrounds”, such as folk psychology, folk physics and folk biology, religious 
representations would not be possible at all. This brings us the second part of Boyer‟s 
definition, namely, that “[t]he religious concept preserves all the relevant default inferences 
except the ones that are explicitly banned by the counterintuitive element.”174 Although such 
representations are counterintuitive, they are easy to understand because they only include 
only one violation. A spirit is still a person with all kinds of beliefs, goals and desires and can 
usually be located in some space even though it does not have a body. Spirits can also 
remember, know and intend to achieve things just like a normal person. We can illustrate the 
idea further with the concept of a zombie. A zombie can be analysed in the following way: 
 
PERSON + VIOLATION: NO FOLK PSYCHOLOGY = zombie 
 
Thus, zombies are represented as persons without beliefs or conscious awareness. However, 
there are a lot of things we can know about zombies, according to Boyer, even if they do not 
have higher cognitive functions. These include that zombies are physical objects and adhere 
to the laws of physics (folk physics), that they are living beings (folk biology)175 in the sense 
that they move around, pick things up and their body parts can be cut off (or blasted away 
with a well-aimed shotgun shot) and so on. In any case, the point of this example is to show 
that most of the intuitions concerning the category of PERSON as well as folk physics and 
biology still hold despite the one counterintuitive violation.176 Therefore, according to Boyer, 
the catalogue of successful religious representations is actually quite limited. Most of them 
involve either a breach of the intuitive expectations of the category of PERSON, or 
                                                 
172 For more examples, see, e.g., Boyer 2001, 63-64, 71-72.   
173 See Atran 2002, 98.  
174 Boyer 2001, 73.  
175 This depends on your chosen definition of a zombie. What is usually known as “a philosophers‟ zombie” is a 
total replica of an individual human being who at the same time lacks all conscious experience. The second kind 
of zombie – the zombie that Boyer seems to have in mind – is something like “a living dead zombie”, that is, a 
body that walks around eating flesh even though “the person” is dead.   
176 Boyer 2001, 71-75. 
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transference of mental properties (that is, properties normally attributed to PERSON 
category) to other categories.  
 
 
Figure 3. The catalogue of supernatural templates according to Boyer. 
 
 
 
 
 After this initial overview of the notion of counter-intuitiveness, we will clarify some 
points about the way in which Boyer and others understand the idea. First of all, counter-
intuitiveness should not be taken to refer simply to strangeness or “oddity”. Boyer brings the 
point home by insisting that  
 
[c]ounterintuitive is a technical term here. It does not mean strange, inexplicable, 
funny or extraordinary. What is counterintuitive here is not even necessarily 
surprising. That is, if you have the concept of cologne-drinking, invisible persons, 
and if everyone around you talks about these visitors, you cannot really register 
puzzlement or astonishment every single time it is mentioned. … But these concepts 
are still counterintuitive in the precise sense used here, namely “including 
information contradicting some information provided by ontological categories.”177  
 
By the same token, counter-intuitiveness does not refer to falsehood, he claims. Religious 
representations feel perfectly normal and ordinary for those who use them. Counter-
intuitiveness, in Boyer‟s view, should be understood as a purely technical term and does not 
imply that religious representations are false in the way that they represent reality. Religious 
representations are counter-intuitive because they include information that contradicts the 
intuitive expectations of the activating ontological category.178   
 Furthermore, Boyer emphasises that people who form counter-intuitive 
representations or commit to them have the same everyday ontology as anyone else. He 
writes that  
 
[t]hese people do not have a fantastic ontology in which mountains in general are live 
organisms with digestion, in the same way than llamas, people and goats. The 
                                                 
177 Boyer 2001, 65. 
178 Boyer suggests that the term “counter-ontological” would be more appropriate but rejects it “as too heavy”. 
Note also that the term “ontology” as it is used here by Boyer and others refers to everyday ontological 
assumptions – that is, to our largely implicit everyday assumptions about the constitution of our world - rather 
than to any philosophically reflected ontological position. 
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supernatural concept specifies that this mountain has some physiological features. The 
other mountains are inanimate objects like rocks and rivers quite literally goes without 
saying in the Andes as it does everywhere else in the world. Indeed, the notion of one 
mountain having physiology is attention-grabbing only against this intuitive 
background.179 
 
The point is that counter-intuitive representations refer only to some special entities with 
counterintuitive properties and thus such entities are always exceptions from normal states of 
affairs.  
 The reason why the notion of MCI representations is crucial for CSR writers is that 
MCI representations are “cognitively optimal” for cultural transmission. Barrett describes the 
idea in the following way: 
  
MCI‟s, then, constitute a special group of concepts – concepts that largely match 
intuitive assumptions about their own group of things but have a small number of 
tweaks that make them particularly interesting and memorable. Because they are 
more interesting and memorable, they are more likely to be passed on from person to 
person. Because they readily spread from person to person, MCIs are likely to 
become cultural (that is, widely shared) concepts.180  
 
To understand why MCI representations are attention-grabbing, we need to recall the idea of 
“relevance” introduced in section 2.2. The basic idea was that the more positive cognitive 
effects (e.g. applicable in many domains and contexts) a piece of information has the more 
relevant it is. On the other hand, the more cognitive processing effort a representation 
requires the less relevant it will be. A cognitively optimal representation requires minimal 
processing effort and at the same time has extensive cognitive effects. According to Boyer,  
 
[i]n order to create religious representations that have some chance of cultural 
survival, that is, of being acquired, memorized, transmitted, one must strike a balance 
between the requirements of imagination (attention-demanding potential) and 
learnability (inferential potential). If religious concept comprises only counterintuitive 
claims, it will fail on the second criterion. ... Conversely, a concept that confirms only 
intuitive ontologies is, ipso facto, nonreligious and has little attention-demanding 
power. One of the optimal ways of striking the balance is to take all intuitive 
ontologies as confirmed, except a few assumptions that are then explicitly described 
as violated in the case of the religious entity.181 
 
According to this view, a representation that includes a single violation of some domain of 
intuitive knowledge is extraordinary, but easily understandable at the same time. 
Extraordinary knowledge is always more relevant than ordinary knowledge because the 
human mind is geared to find new information about its context.182 
 Based on this assumption concerning the cognitively optimal nature of MCI 
representations, Boyer and others can hypothesise that highly counter-intuitive 
representations rarely achieve cultural level distribution compared to MCI representations. 
                                                 
179 Boyer 2001, 66.  
180 Barrett 2004, 23.  
181 Boyer 1994a, 121-122.  
182 Note that, as with all selection explanations, the thing which gets selected is only selected in favour of 
something else. In this case, MCI representations are salient and easy to learn only in contrast with fully 
intuitive representations and highly counter-intuitive representations. Although Boyer and others talk about 
easiness and salience, what they mean is that MCI representations are “easier” and “more salient” than others.  
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The memory recall and identification of counter-intuitive representations have been 
empirically tested. Boyer, Atran, Pyysiäinen and especially Barrett, have conducted several 
experiments to test the hypothesis that MCI representations have better recall than intuitive 
concepts and “weird”, highly counter-intuitive concepts. Some experiments showed that 
counter-intuitive representations with minimal violations had an advantage in recall above 
highly counter-intuitive and intuitive representations cross-culturally. The best recall 
occurred when MCI representations were embedded in stories and tales that included mainly 
intuitive representations.183 However, it has recently been pointed out that the results are far 
from conclusive and some studies have failed to produce the effect.184   
 One major factor that seems to support the cognitive optimum hypothesis is 
Barrett‟s “theological correctness” effect.185 The basic idea here is that more complex, that is, 
more counterintuitive, notions of gods are more difficult to process than MCI 
representations. Barrett noticed that although religious people reflectively affirm that they 
believe God to be omniscient, omnipresent and all-powerful, they still tend to revert to more 
intuitive, that is, anthropomorphic understandings of God in situations that demand rapid 
inferences. For example, when asked about the attributes of God, Christians normally offer 
“theologically correct” attributes such as omnipresence. However, in situations that demand 
rapid inferences the same people tend to use god-concepts that are easier to process with the 
category of PERSON, that is, god-concepts that include less counter-intuitive properties 
than theologically correct ones. In the case of omnipresence for instance, God is represented 
as being in one place at one time, rather than being everywhere all the time, as the notion of 
omnipresence requires. Barrett concludes that although highly complex counterintuitive 
concepts can be distributed through teaching and learned through reflection to achieve a 
high level of distribution, they still depend on the intuitive support of our automatic 
systems.186 The theological correctness effect highlights how our normal cognitive 
capabilities constrain our religious representations and thus create a tendency for god-
concepts to evolve towards MCI forms.        
 The human capability to form counter-intuitive representations is based on the 
existence of two different kinds of information processing strategies in the mind. We have 
touched on these in section 2.4 where we discussed the notions of metarepresentation and 
decoupling. Again, Barrett‟s theological correctness effect reveals this neatly: people can have 
consciously formed highly counter-intuitive representations of God, for instance, but in 
situations that demand rapid inferences more intuitive representations kick in. Thus, it seems 
that there are at least two information processing strategies and corresponding sets of beliefs 
at work in these cases: (1) the theological strategy that is based on reflective reasoning and (2) 
the basic strategy that is grounded in our automatic systems. On the one hand, the 
theological and reflective strategy produces complex beliefs that are explicitly held and 
verbally reported but such representations are abstract and hence slow to process. On the 
other hand, basic level strategy produces intuitive beliefs that are normally implicitly held, 
simple and are usually about objects in our everyday life. Such representations are relatively 
easy to process because they closely coincide with our automatic cognitive systems. The 
                                                 
183 Barrett 2004, 24-25; Boyer 2001, 78-87. For experiments, see Boyer & Ramble 2001; Boyer 2000; Barrett 
2001; Pyysiäinen & Lindeman & Honkela 2003; Atran & Norenzayan 2004. For discussion, see Pyysiäinen 
2002.  
184 Knight et al. 2009.  
185 Barrett & Keil 1996; Barrett 1998, 1999. See also Slone 2004.  
186 Barrett (2004, 11) writes that “People seem to have difficulty maintaining the integrity of their reflective 
theological concepts in rapid, real-time problem solving because of processing demands. Theological properties 
such as being able to be in multiple places at once, not needing to perceive, being able to attend to an infinite 
number of problems at once, and not being bound by time, importantly deviate from the nonreflective beliefs 
that mental tools freely generate. As such, these reflectively held concepts are more difficult to use rapidly than 
nonreflective beliefs.” 
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theological or reflective strategy produces reflective beliefs and the basic or intuitive strategy 
produces intuitive beliefs. The distinction between these two types of beliefs is crucial for 
CSR writers since they emphasise the role of implicit cognitive processing (intuitive beliefs) 
in explaining why people tend to form certain types of reflective beliefs.187 
 
 
Table 3. Dual-process model of religious reasoning according to Barrett & Keil (adapted from Tremlin 
2006, 174). 
 
 Theological level Basic level 
Representation 1. Explicit 
2. Analytical 
3. Abstract 
1. Implicit 
2. Intuitive 
3. Inferentially rich 
Computation 4. Slow 
5. Reflective 
6. Conscious 
4. Fast 
5. Reflexive 
6. Automatic 
 
 
 Barrett attempts to clarify the notions of intuitive and reflective beliefs and he begins 
by highlighting the differences between these two types of beliefs.188 Intuitive beliefs are 
generated rapidly in everyday circumstances, whereas reflective beliefs take time to form. 
Further, intuitive beliefs are generated automatically in every situation without conscious 
effort while reflective beliefs, on the other hand, are formed only when conscious decisions 
or solutions to specific problems are needed. When people give verbal statements of their 
beliefs, they are usually reporting their reflective beliefs, rather than their intuitive ones. 
However, intuitive beliefs can easily become reflective beliefs if someone asks us to report 
what we currently see before us, for example. Barrett also points out that as reflective beliefs 
are produced by conscious reflection and learning they are highly dependent on culturally 
transmitted information, personal experiences and subject‟s other beliefs. It follows that 
there can be dramatic differences between sets of reflective beliefs between individuals and 
cultures. By contrast, intuitive beliefs show little variation from culture to culture or person 
to person. Finally and most importantly, reflective beliefs do not necessarily have a bearing 
on the subject‟s behaviour at all, Barrett claims. For example, people usually believe 
                                                 
187 What seems to be emerging here is a “dual processing model” of cognition which has received much 
attention in the study of social cognition. See, e.g., Deutsch & Strack 2006; Smith & DeCoster 2000. For an 
overview, see Tremlin 2006, 172-192. Consider an example from Barrett. He tells a story about a man called 
Doug who was cleaning his grain silo when the silo exploded due to the leaking propane tank. At first he was 
trapped in the burning silo and realising that there was no way out he prayed to God to “take him home”. 
Suddenly he heard a voice saying “not yet” and felt that he was thrown out of a window that was higher than he 
was able to jump and landed safely outside the silo. Immediately afterwards, the silo exploded into pieces. After 
the incident Doug was sure that God had sent angels to help him, in other words, he was sure that God had 
interfered. What interests us here is that Doug‟s reflective belief in the existence of angels is irrelevant. It 
suffices that Doug had the concept of an angel or a god, not that he would hold the existence of such agents 
true. According to Barrett, his automatic cognitive systems would use the concept of an angel anyway as a 
plausible candidate for the instigator of Doug‟s supernatural rescue: “When reflectively forming a belief, angels 
made intuitive sense as the most likely explanation for the event. Thus, reflective belief in angels was 
strengthened.” (Barrett 2004, 35)  Barrett‟s example highlights the dual-process nature of religious thinking: 
even in the case where Doug does not hold religious ideas plausible reflectively, his intuitive machinery 
continues to produce material that enhances the plausibility of religious ideas.  
188 The terms were originally introduced by Sperber (1996, 146-150). The intuitive/reflective distinction pops 
up in CSR literature under different headings and in different terms but the basic idea does not change. Boyer 
(e.g. 2001, 305) makes the same point by highlighting the difference between intuitive and reflective processing. 
Finally, Barrett talks about “nonreflective” and “reflective” beliefs. In what follows, I will be using the terms 
“intuitive” and “reflective” as they are the shortest and correspond to Sperber‟s original presentation. For 
discussion, see Pyysiainen 2004b.  
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reflectively that “beauty is only skin deep” but at the same time psychological experiments 
show that people have a strong tendency to overestimate the social and intellectual abilities 
of physically attractive children. The theological correctness effect is another example of an 
effect of this sort.189    
 The reason why the intuitive/reflective distinction is relevant here is that it is one 
way to explicate the relationship between automatic processes and conscious reflection. 
Barrett further elaborates the idea by describing how intuitive beliefs can influence the 
formation of reflective beliefs. First of all, intuitive beliefs act as defaults for reflective 
beliefs. What Barrett means by this is that our conscious belief formation process “reads” the 
output of our implicit mental systems and forms a reflective belief based on the output of 
these implicit systems. Second, intuitive beliefs make some reflective beliefs more plausible 
and others implausible. When an explicitly formed belief “fits” with our intuitive beliefs, it 
feels more reasonable. Finally, intuitive beliefs shape our experience and memory. The 
human memory, Barrett emphasises, does not just save information about the environment 
but combines elements and processes them: there is no “pure” perception or “complete” 
informational structure in memory. Memories are already processed by the systems that 
produce intuitive beliefs.190 In sum, Barrett claims that intuitive beliefs and intuitive 
knowledge form the background for reflective and conscious processing. This makes it 
possible, in his view, to explain the plausibility of certain reflective beliefs, such as religious 
beliefs, by referring to intuitive and implicit processing.191   
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
189 Barrett 2004, 7-9. See also Boyer 2001, 305-306. We must remember that the intuitive-reflective distinction 
does not have any bearing on the truth-value of the beliefs in question: both can be true or false. In fact, 
reflective beliefs are more often false than intuitive beliefs that are usually true or at least practical. Intuitive 
beliefs are generally reliable because they are produced by systems that have maintained humans over 
considerable period of time. However, Barrett points out that in the end mental systems produce only “best 
guesses” about the identities and properties of objects and cause-effect relationships in our everyday 
environment. Mental systems are geared for everyday things, rather than for quantum physics or philosophy. 
190 Barrett 2004, 11-17. One interesting result of the distinction between intuitive and reflective processing is 
that some intuitive assumptions are extremely persistent in everyday life and behaviour. All ideas (intuitive and 
reflective) can be meaningfully challenged in a debate but most intuitive ideas cannot be ignored in the practices 
of our everyday lives. A philosopher can, if she wishes, declare that she does not believe in the independent 
existence of the world, but she cannot stop behaving in a way that implies it. A belief that “there exists a world 
independent of my conceptions of it” is a reflective belief but it receives considerable intuitive backing from 
our everyday intuitions. Such a belief can be rejected by reflective reasoning that is based on arguments (and 
many have rejected it) but the intuitions produced by our mental systems cannot be shut down.  
191 Some philosophers have also made the same distinction by distinguishing direct (or non-inferential) and 
indirect (or inferential) knowledge: direct knowledge is knowledge that is not consciously inferred from any 
other type of knowledge, whereas indirect knowledge is based on inference. In some theories, perceptual 
knowledge of everyday objects is considered direct knowledge. A good example of indirect knowledge is 
knowledge obtained through reasoning. However, the details of the direct/indirect distinction are under 
considerable debate in epistemology (especially in the context of perception). Some theorists argue that 
knowledge obtained through perception is also indirect: it is knowledge about sense-data or the like whereas 
other theorists are of the opinion that our knowledge of the objects of perception is direct, namely, not 
mediated. For an overview of the debate see BonJour 2002, 125. In the CSR‟s scheme indirect knowledge, such 
as reasoning, would correspond to reflective beliefs that are acquired through conscious deliberation and 
learning. Our opinions are mostly reflective as well as our knowledge of general facts like the fact that “Moscow 
is the capital of Russia”. In this sense, reflective beliefs are what we in our everyday context simply call “beliefs” 
whereas intuitive beliefs are seldom called beliefs at all. Intuitive beliefs such as “if I throw something in the air, 
it will fall back down” or “if I am hungry, I should eat” are rarely consciously inferred or generated.  
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Table 4. Intuitive and reflective beliefs according to Barrett (adapted from Tremlin 2006, 137).  
 
Intuitive beliefs Reflective beliefs 
Concrete, commonsense description of the world Explanations and interpretations of the world. 
Perception and spontaneous inference Deliberate thought and sources of authority 
Usually implicitly held Usually explicitly held 
Support conscious reasoning and guide behaviour Embedded in intuitive beliefs and other reflective 
beliefs 
Universal, homogenous and consistent Local, heterogeneous, and variable 
 
 
 At this point it should be noted that when CSR writers use terms like “intuition”, 
“counter-intuitiveness” and “belief”, these terms are used rather differently than 
philosophers tend to use them. In philosophical discussions, belief is usually analysed as an 
attitude of assent towards a certain proposition.192 Given this definition, it is rather 
misleading to call intuitive beliefs beliefs in the first place. Moreover, the notion of 
“intuition” in philosophy has a long and problematic history. Usually intuition refers to 
something like an immediate apprehension understood as absence of conscious inference, 
cause or justification. Again, CSR writers‟ notion of intuition is somewhat different. In 
addition to the fact that intuitions are preceded by unconscious inferences, CSR writers see 
intuition as something like an apprehension of the plausibility of a representation. One could 
say that intuition understood in this way verifies or disconfirms a particular propositional 
content. The existence of an intuition or intuitions can present itself as a subjective feeling of 
an immediate apprehension of something or as a feeling about the plausibility of a claim. If 
this is the case, one could ask whether intuition involves propositional knowledge. CSR 
writers do not really discuss this, but it seems quite plausible to me to understand intuitions 
as probabilities of acquiring certain types of beliefs.  
 As counter-intuitiveness and the cognitive optimum hypothesis are so prominently 
featured in CSR literature, they have also been the subject of much criticism. One criticism 
levelled against the notion has been that it assumes that religious ideas must be false. Leo 
Näreaho, for instance, speculates in his critical article Cognitive Science of Religion: Philosophical 
Observations (2008) whether religious representations of supernatural agents would be 
counter-intuitive if such supernatural agents actually existed. Näreaho seems to be concerned 
that the notion of counter-intuitiveness carries with it an implication of falsehood. Based on 
the way in which Boyer and others present the notion, it would seem to me that at least prima 
facie counter-intuitiveness does not imply falsehood since it can be easily argued that many 
scientific representations are also counter-intuitive. Nevertheless, the matter is not perhaps as 
simple as this. We will return to this topic later, but to anticipate, we could say that the views 
of some CSR writers are difficult to make out. Atran, for instance, seems to think that 
counter-intuitiveness implies counterfactuality. Further, he claims that as religious ideas are 
                                                 
192 For discussion, see, e.g., Benson Saler‟s article What We May Believe about Beliefs (2001). Saler argues that there 
have been two main theories about beliefs: the sentential theory and the behavioural theory. According to the 
sentential theory, beliefs are affirming attitudes towards propositions. Sentential theory thus commits us to the 
existence of mentally represented states of affairs. The behavioural theory (or dispositional theory) does not 
include such commitments since it analyses a belief in terms of behavioural tendencies. According to this 
theory, to believe something is to be likely to behave in a certain way. More specifically, if we ascribe a belief 
that X to a person A, what we mean is that person A has a disposition to exhibit behaviour (linguistically or 
otherwise) congruent with believing that X. Note that believing in this sense does not require any reference to 
internal mental states or any “idealised” entities. Saler claims that although the behaviourist theory enjoyed 
some success among philosophers in the first part of the 20th century, the advance of the cognitive and 
psychological sciences have again vindicated the more traditional – sentential – theory of beliefs. 
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counterintuitive their content is necessarily “quasi-propositional”.193 Others, such as Barrett 
(and Boyer in some moods), do not seem to have any difficulty in regarding religious ideas as 
at the same time counterintuitive and proper candidates for being true.194  
 Another critical point comes from “inside the house”. In his recent article Coding and 
quantifying counterintuitiveness: theoretical and methodological reflections (2009), Barrett claims that 
empirical studies of MCI representations have tended to presuppose different views of how 
to identify and generate public representations of counterintuitive concepts and as a 
consequence have mixed views of what counter-intuitiveness actually is and where it is 
situated. Barrett points out that when we are trying to identify MCI representations we are 
trying to guess how public representations are represented privately. The reason why this is 
important is that even though a public representation of X may be classified as 
counterintuitive, it does not necessarily mean that the private representation of the same X in 
the head of a person A is counterintuitive. Barrett suggests a heuristic with six steps for 
quantifying how counterintuitive an idea is.195 We can skip the details of Barrett‟s proposal 
here; suffice it to say that the notion of counter-intuitiveness is not without its problems and 
future work is needed to analyse its exact function.  
 The usefulness of counter-intuitiveness as a diagnostic tool for identifying religion is 
limited by the fact that not all counter-intuitive representations are considered religious. 
Dreams and fairy-tales include MCI representations, but are not necessarily associated with 
religion. Highly abstract scientific representations can be considered counter-intuitive as well. 
CSR writers have suggested different answers to this problem. Boyer, for instance, suggests 
that what distinguishes religious MCI representations from other counter-intuitive 
representations is that they are concerned with violations or transference of attributes of the 
category of PERSON and that they are associated with morality and other aspects of social 
and practical life. Boyer writes that  
 
[l]egends about Santa Claus or the Bogeyman are interesting, even arresting, but they 
do not seem to matter that much, while people‟s notions of God seem to have direct 
and important effect in their lives. We generally call supernatural concepts “religious” 
when they have such important social effects, when rituals are performed that include 
these concepts, when people define their group identity in connection with then, 
when strong emotional states are associated with them, and so on. These features are 
not always present together, but in most places one finds these two registers: a vast 
domain of supernatural notions and more restricted set of “serious” ones.196 
                                                 
193 Atran (2002, 95) states that “Religious quasi-propositions may have truth value but they are not truth 
valuable in the sense of being liable to verification, falsification, or logical evaluation of the information”. 
194 See, e.g., Barrett 2004, 122-123. The fact that counter-intuitiveness is not necessary connected to falsehood 
is implied by Boyer (2001, 68) when he states, e.g., that “Many aspects of the real natural world are in fact 
counterintuitive relative to our biological expectations.”  Barrett (2009) points out that what is intuitive (and 
thus what is also counterintuitive) depends on the empirical study of domains of intuitive knowledge. If 
empirical studies at some point in the future change our understanding of the domains of intuitive knowledge, 
then the notion of counter-intuitiveness also changes. 
195 First, one should identify the basic level membership of an entity. Basic level membership is usually 
recognised as the first-learned label for an object, such as “dog”, “book” or “chair”. Second, one should 
identify the ontological category or categories. Barrett offers five ontological categories: (1) spatial entities, (2) 
solid objects, (3) living things, (4) animates and (5) persons. They correspond to activations of five different 
expectations sets: (1) spatiality, (2) physicality (folk physics), (3) biology (folk biology), (4) animacy (folk 
psychology: psycho-physical) and (5) mentality (full folk psychology). Third, one should note transfers of 
attributes from one domain to another. As noted before, counterintuitive representations sometimes transfer 
intuitions from one domain to another such as in the case where mental properties are attributed to inanimate 
objects. Fourth, one should note breaches or violation of intuitions. Finally, one should note that there can be 
breaches within breaches.  
196 Boyer 2001, 90.  
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This can be explained by the fact that the idea of an agent (or mind) has tremendous 
“inferential potential”, as Boyer puts it. When some object is classified as an agent, a massive 
amount of information becomes available. Further, representations of agents are extremely 
relevant for two reasons: the first reason is that the possible presence of an agent affects the 
behaviour of the subject and the second reason is that information concerning agents is easy 
to produce. The human mind has a tendency to form representations of agents and this 
tendency makes representations of supernatural agents very relevant.197 This leads us to our 
next topic: supernatural agents.  
 
3.2. Supernatural Agents: HADD and Social Cognition 
This section and the subsequent section examine the notion of supernatural agency and how 
CSR writers explain the prevalence of supernatural agent representations in religious 
traditions. The basic idea of such explanations is that representations of supernatural agents 
are highly relevant for individuals and groups in everyday contexts of social relations, 
morality, death, misfortune and ritual. This is because supernatural agent representations 
activate multiple cognitive mechanisms that deal with different domain of intuitive 
knowledge.  
 The notion of a “supernatural agent” is highly important to CSR writers because the 
notion makes it possible to distinguish those MCI representations that are usually not 
associated with religion from those that are. Boyer makes the point in claiming that 
“[r]eligious concepts are those supernatural concepts that matter. The world over, people 
entertain concepts of beings with special qualities and special powers”.198 Barrett makes a 
similar point when he writes that  
 
[f]or MCIs to successfully compete for space in human minds and thus become 
“cultural”, they must have the potential to explain, to predict, or to generate 
interesting stories surrounding them. In short, MCIs must have good inferential 
potential. ... Concepts that are most likely to have strong inferential potential, 
activating large numbers of mental tools and exciting reasoning, are those that qualify 
as intentional agents.199  
 
The fact that representations of agents are relevant explains why supernatural agent 
representations are found in all human groups. The relevance of supernatural agent 
representations also increases the likelihood of such representations being held true. Here we 
encounter the principle of relevance again: the more cognitive systems a representation 
activates the more likely it is to be held true.200  
 Before we go into this idea in detail, we should remember that CSR writers do not 
view religion as a cultural system or a systematically constructed world-view. On the 
contrary, religious beliefs are usually considered to be very much practical, rather than 
theological or theoretical. Boyer writes that  
 
[f]or now, let me just emphasize that doctrines are not necessarily the most essential 
or important aspect of religious concepts. Indeed many people seem to feel no need 
for a general, theoretically consistent expression of the qualities and powers of 
                                                 
197 Boyer 2001, 70. 
198 Boyer 2001, 137. 
199 Barrett 2004, 25.  
200 Boyer 2002, 68; 2003, 120.  
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supernatural agents. What all people do have are precise descriptions of how these 
agents can influence their own lives, and what to do about that.201 
 
Boyer‟s point is that religious representations are associated with particular situations and 
types of situations in ordinary life such as morality, social behaviour and death. The home of 
religion is social life rather than metaphysical or cosmological speculation.202  
 In the following, we will examine four ways in which CSR writers hold that cognitive 
mechanisms associated with representing agents and social situations support religious 
representations.203 First, religious representations evoke systems that have evolved with 
attempts to survive in the presence of predators. One of these systems is the aforementioned 
hypersensitive agent detection device (HADD). Second, religious representations activate 
systems that have evolved to regulate social interaction and to represent mental states of 
agents (that is, theory of mind) and these systems give an enormous amount of inferential 
potential to supernatural agent representations. Third, supernatural agent representations are 
associated with moral intuitions generated by folk psychology and related mechanisms.  
Finally, supernatural agent representations are associated with episodes of misfortune, death, 
ritual and other anxieties. We will examine the first two in this section and last two in the 
next section.  
 Barrett argues that the human cognitive system is biased towards representing its 
environment as human-like. He writes that  
 
our ADD [agent detection device] suffers from hyperactivity, making it prone to find 
agents around us, including supernatural ones, given fairly modest evidence of their 
presence. This tendency encourages the generation and spread of god concepts and 
other religious concepts.204 
 
Experimental evidence suggests that agent detection needs only that an object moves by 
itself in a way that implies a goal. When an object is perceived violating folk physics and to 
behave in goal directed manner, then the agent detection device fires and the object is 
automatically categorised as an agent. If agent detection is positively completed, then folk 
psychology is triggered. Barrett describes this process in a following way: 
 
When HADD perceives an object violating the intuitive assumptions for the 
movement of ordinary physical objects (such as moving on non-inertial paths, 
changing direction inexplicably, or launching itself from a standstill) and the object 
seems to be moving in a goal-directed manner, HADD detects agency.205 
 
It must be noted, however, that there is no need for the actual object to be perceived in 
order for HADD to detect agency, since HADD can also detect traces of agency. When an 
event occurs that folk physics or folk biology cannot account for, then agent detection kicks 
in seeking evidence of agents that could have caused the event. Supernatural agents are good 
candidates for causes of unusual events, Barrett hypothesises, because they satisfy intuitions 
that postulate agency and their presence or activities cannot be directly perceived. In this 
sense, they are cognitively more relevant than normal persons or complex naturalistic 
explanations of folk physics and folk biology. Finally, Barrett points out that there is an 
evolutionary rationale for the hypersensitivity of HADD: as it was developed in the course of 
                                                 
201 Boyer 2001, 140. 
202 Boyer 2001, 137-142.  
203 This classification is presented by Boyer (2002, 70-71). 
204 Barrett 2004, 31.  
205 Barrett 2004, 33. 
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predation and evasion behaviour, “false positives” were evolutionary speaking a small evil 
compared to one missed predator. A person can be mistaken nine times out of ten about a 
tiger sneaking around, but if one is wrong even once, then one ends up as tiger food.206  
 Barrett‟s account of agency detection develops Stewart Guthrie‟s idea of 
anthropomorphism as a central feature of our cognitive system. Guthrie argues that 
anthropomorphism is a functional strategy for human minds because they are designed to 
produce as much relevant information as possible about the environment. Again, we see here 
the emergence of the principle of relevance. Guthrie points out that persons and agents are 
the most complex objects that our cognitive systems know because we have a massive 
number of cognitive systems for processing social interaction.207 Boyer explains our 
anthropomorphic tendencies by natural selection: agents are more relevant for self-
preservation and adaptation than objects or artefacts. Another reason for this hyperactivity is 
that if an object is categorised as an agent (a person or an animal), then folk psychology kicks 
in and provides a multitude of assumptions that can be tested. Therefore, in order to acquire 
new information about the environment, it is economical to categorise agents as much as 
possible.208  
 The exact scope of the HADD hypothesis is somewhat ambiguous since it seems 
that it is sometimes used to explain the high frequency of the formation of supernatural 
agent representations, that is, to explain the origin of supernatural agent representations, 
whereas sometimes it is used to explain why supernatural agent representations persist.209 
Barrett himself seems to think that rather than contributing to the formation of supernatural 
agent representations, HADD is just one factor that reinforces their plausibility.210 Barrett 
notes that there is also another reason why HADD‟s explanatory force is not very strong, 
namely, its hypersensitivity:  
 
Indeed, HADD may be most likely to find agency if given ambiguous inputs in 
urgent or frightening contexts, and HADD‟s agent detection may be subsequently 
disengaged or left without identifying a satisfactory agent (Hmm, I thought someone 
was there …).211 
 
HADD is constantly producing intuitions that are in almost all cases “false positives” and 
quickly disconfirmed by reflective reasoning.212  
 In sum, Barrett and other CSR writers argue that the HADD system which evolved 
in the course of natural selection for evading predators increases the plausibility of 
representations of supernatural agents. The agent detection device creates a strong bias in the 
human mind towards agent-driven concepts. Supernatural (counter-intuitive) agent concepts 
exploit this fact: sudden changes in the environment, unidentified noises and the like 
function as evidence for the presence of invisible agents.  
 Now we will turn to the second way in which supernatural agent representations 
work: they activate systems that have evolved to regulate social interaction and represent 
                                                 
206 Barrett 2004, 32-39. For studies and discussion of attribution of agency, see, e.g., Barrett 2000; Barrett & 
Johnson 2003; Scholl & Tremoulet 2000. 
207 Guthrie 2002, 56-61. See also Guthrie 1993.  
208 Boyer 2001, 142-144. See also Barrett 2004, 31-44. According to Atran (2002, 67), developmental studies 
suggest that hyperactive agency detection is a result of natural selection that has formed our brain to provide 
rich information about the environment based on fragmentary and poor data. Further, developmental studies 
have provided evidence for the fact that an agency detection system is already present and active in children 
under one year of age.  
209 This point is made in Knight, et al. 2009.  
210 Barrett 2004, 39-39.  
211 Barrett 2004, 41. 
212 Atran 2002, 59-71; Barrett 2004, 41-44; Boyer 2001, 146-148; 2002, 76-77.  
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mental states of agents. These systems, CSR writers claim, play a major part in explaining the 
high distribution rate of supernatural agent representations. Further, the operations of these 
systems explain why supernatural agent representations tend to develop towards certain 
forms. The numerous cognitive systems involved in social interaction are constantly active 
and providing new information about all agent representations, both real and fictional alike.  
 Boyer argues that humans have a highly developed social mind: humans are very 
good in activities such as monitoring social exchange, representing other people‟s 
personalities, representing and building social hierarchies, building and maintaining coalitions 
and transmitting information about surrounding social networks. Boyer cites psychological 
evidence for the existence of functional systems that do precisely these things.213 The details 
need not concern us here; it is sufficient to note that all agent representations, irrespective of 
whether those agents are real, fictional, religious, or something else, can be processed 
through the same cognitive systems that provide intuitions about intentions, beliefs, goals 
and emotions of such agents. When talking about social cognition, Boyer writes that  
 
[a]lthough we are not aware of it, the inference systems that manage our interaction 
with other people are full-time workers. We constantly use intuitions delivered by 
these systems. Indeed, we also use them when we are not actually interacting with 
people. ... In fact, we can run such decoupled inferences not only about persons who 
are not around but also about purely imaginary characters.214 
 
Boyer points out that even a small child can interact with fictional characters and give 
personal features to inanimate objects like teddy-bears. The same systems make it possible 
for us to make inferences about the beliefs, emotions, desires and other mental states of 
supernatural agents.215    
 Another factor that contributes to the relevance of supernatural agent representations 
is that supernatural agents can be represented as having a large amount of information 
concerning the social context where the individual is situated. According to Boyer, 
 
information that feeds to the social mind systems is only part of the information 
handled by the mind. It makes sense to distinguish between this socially neutral 
information and the specific information that activates the social mind inference 
systems. So here is a general definition: Strategic information is the subset of all the 
information currently available (to a particular agent, about a particular situation) that activates the 
mental systems that regulate social interaction.216 
 
Note that this definition of “strategic information” entails that what information is 
considered as strategic changes relative to the context and the persons involved. For 
example, the combination of representations whose content is that “Cardinal Ferrari drives a 
red sports car” is strategic information for me in contexts where the social status of Cardinal 
Ferrari is relevant for my behaviour in my social network. Next, Boyer claims that ordinary 
agents are represented as having imperfect access to strategic information: we assume that 
                                                 
213 For Boyer‟s overview of different social systems, see Boyer 2001, 122-129.   
214 Boyer 2001, 149. 
215 Boyer 2001, 130-131; Boyer 2002. Barrett (2004, 46) makes a similar point by claiming that in addition to 
folk psychology “anthropologists and psychologists have also suggested that we have mental tools responsible 
for such activities as moral reasoning, identifying who has high social status so we might learn from them to 
improve our own activities, and reasoning about other as members of groups and classes and not just 
individuals. We may also have a mental tool responsible for social exchanges and activities conditional on social 
qualifications. ... These social mental tools have no difficulty reasoning about gods, even when the gods are 
never seen.” 
216 Boyer 2001, 152. 
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normal humans know things that they have some sort of access to.217 Back to Cardinal 
Ferrari. If I remove the keys to his Ferrari from his pocket when he goes to the toilet, then I 
assume that he does not know about the missing keys. I do not have to think about this 
reasoning at all because, as Boyer claims, we have our folk psychological systems that do 
such inferences for us. Now, Boyer claims that “[i]n interaction with supernatural agents, 
people presume that these agents have full access to strategic information.”218 So if some 
piece of information is strategic for me in a particular situation, then supernatural agents 
know it. The point that Boyer wants to make here is that full access to strategic knowledge is 
both highly relevant and easier to process than agents represented as having restricted access 
or agents having access to all possible information (omniscience). Normal agents or 
omniscient agents take cognitive effort to represent. First, one must figure out what a normal 
agent knows by analysing agent‟s social context and so on. Second, omniscient agents are 
hard to process because they know too much: a large part of the information that an 
omniscient agent possesses does not have any consequences for my behaviour. Even if 
official theologies were to promote belief in omniscient agents, people in everyday situations 
that demand rapid inference have a tendency to represent omniscient agent‟s knowledge only 
to the extent that it is relevant for their behaviour.219 
 Barrett summarises Boyer‟s reasoning when he claims that supernatural agents who 
have full (or perfect) access to strategic information are highly relevant for the behaviour of 
individual and groups for three reasons. The first reason is that when a supernatural agent 
knows so much about us and others, then it has the potential to become a powerful ally or a 
dangerous enemy. The second reason is that humans automatically pay more attention to 
people of high social status and supernatural agents qualify for high social status because 
their superior access to relevant information makes them highly attention-demanding. 
Finally, agents with full access to reasons of individuals and relevant background knowledge 
can operate as guarantors of morality.220 With this last point, we come to morality and 
supernatural agents that are the subjects of the next section. But still there is one further 
matter to be addressed.   
 So far we have dealt with supernatural agents that are more closely related to gods, 
ancestors and spirits, that is, supernatural agents that are MCI representations with just one 
or two violations. As the aforementioned theological correctness effect shows, the theistic 
concept of God seems to be highly counterintuitive on account of its “omni-attributes” such 
as omniscience and omnipresence. However, Barrett has argued that the theistic concept of 
God is not actually as counterintuitive as it first seems. This “preparedness hypothesis” (or 
“intuitive theism hypothesis”) is true especially in the case of small children who seem to be 
able to think and reason about the God of theism quite easily.221 In Barrett‟s words, the basic 
idea is that 
 
                                                 
217 Boyer (2001, 155) writes that “In social interaction, we presume that other people’s access to strategic information is neither 
perfect nor automatic. ... Humans generally spend a great deal of time and energy wondering whether other people 
have access to some information that is strategic from their own standpoint, wondering what inferences, 
intentions, plans, etc. these other people draw from that information, trying to control their access to such 
information, trying to monitor and influence their inferences on the basis of such information.”  
218 Boyer 2001, 156. 
219 For Boyer on strategic information, see Boyer 2001, 150-167. 
220 Barrett 2004, 49-52. 
221 For discussion and empirical work, see Barrett & Richert, & Driesenga 2001; Richert & Barrett 2005; Barrett 
& Newman & Richert 2003; Knight et al. 2004; Makris & Pnevmatikos 2007. The discussion is usually framed in 
terms of Jean Piaget‟s (1960) “anthropomorphism” hypothesis which states that children represent god by first 
representing human persons and adding “super” attributes to those representations. The preparedness 
hypothesis opposes itself to Piaget in claiming that folk psychological systems attribute “super” attributes to 
most agents before a certain age.   
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[e]arly-developing mental tools (such as the Theory of Mind [ToM]) are not 
specifically for representing humans and, in fact, actually facilitate the acquisition and 
use of many features of God concepts of Abrahamic monotheisms.222 
 
The result is, Barrett claims, that  
 
[t]he godly properties of infallible beliefs, superknowledge, superperception, creative 
power, and immortality are quite intuitive, at least for young children. Concepts of 
God are easily accommodated because they play on many on these default 
assumptions rather than violate them.223 
 
 Take what Barrett calls “superknowledge” as an example. He claims that in 
developmental psychology there is a widespread consensus about the fact that children 
younger than four years have difficulties understanding false beliefs. At the age of five, such 
reasoning does not pose a problem for children anymore. There seems to be development 
whereby children pass from the assumption that everyone has the same beliefs as the child 
herself to understanding that people‟s beliefs are representations of what might be the case. 
If this is true, it would make the assumption of a superknowing or infallible agent intuitive 
rather than counterintuitive for children under the age of four.224 In addition, Barrett points 
out that some psychological results suggest the existence of an “intelligent design bias” of 
some sort in children:  
 
[s]tudies have led many psychologists to suspect a bias, arising in childhood, to accept 
the natural world as created by nonhuman superbeing. Kelemen has even raised the 
possibility that children naturally develop as “intuitive theists,” and religious 
instructions merely fills in the forms that already exist in children‟s minds.225 
 
The idea here is that complex natural things, such as trees and leaves, are easily understood 
by children as not having being made by humans since they rarely mistake natural things with 
human made artefacts.  Further, children account for the properties of natural objects, and 
especially their functional properties, by invoking God‟s intentions which creates a tendency 
to see purpose and design in nature. 226 It is, therefore, clearly the case, Barrett argues, that 
children can represent God as having nonanthropomorphic creative powers. Barrett 
concludes that 
 
[a] tendency to see the world as created by a nonhuman superbeing and the ease with 
which children understand God as the cause of the natural world make acquiring a 
God concept including supercreative power fairly easy for children. Consequently, a 
God concept with these powers stands a strong likelihood of successful vertical 
transmission, ensuring its survival across generations. Further, these early-emerging 
biases may make a God who has created the world very intuitive and easy to believe 
in, both in childhood and in adulthood.227 
                                                 
222 Barrett 2004, 77.  
223 Barrett 2004, 77. Barrett‟s whole argument can be found in Barrett 2004, 75-93.  
224 For an overview of the discussion concerning superknowledge, see Barrett 2004, 78-81. These studies and 
discussions about folk psychological development and the capacities of children revolve around the “false 
belief” test. See .e.g, Wellman & Cross & Watson 2001.  
225 Barrett 2004, 85. Barrett is referring to the studies of the psychologist Deborah Kelemen (1999a, 1999b, 
1999c, 2004). 
226 Keleman refers to this tendency as “promiscuous teleology”. See, e.g., Kelemen 2004; Evans 2001. 
Psychologist Paul Bloom has also defended the existence of a “design bias”. See, e.g. Bloom 2009.   
227 Barrett 2004, 85.  
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 We began this section by pointing the importance of the notion of a supernatural 
agency for CSR writers. We also noted that the reason for its importance was their claim that 
gods, spirits and other religious agents are represented as counterintuitive persons. The 
upshot of this is the claim that folk psychology and related social cognition systems inform 
and constrain religious representations of supernatural agents. If representations of 
supernatural agents are around, then they can be easily be embedded in social networks and 
information that concerns them can be easily generated and transmitted. Finally, we pointed 
out how some god concepts that might seem highly counterintuitive can actually be quite 
intuitive, namely, close to the cognitive optimum of MCI representations.  
 
3.3. Supernatural Agents: Morality, Misfortune, Death and Ritual 
The previous section described how MCI supernatural agent representations activate 
multiple cognitive systems, such as folk psychology and other social mind systems. The 
argument of CSR writers was that representations of such agents with full access to strategic 
information are highly relevant for the behaviour of individuals and groups. This section 
describes the additional factors that CSR writers claim to contribute to the high rate of 
distribution of such representations. These additional factors include moral intuitions, 
explanatory intuitions and ritual behaviour.  
 We can begin once again from Boyer who claims that supernatural agent 
representations are parasitic on our moral intuitions, namely, intuitions produced by our 
cognitive systems specialising in social interaction. In his view, moral norms and behaviours 
are products of the human mind. According to him,  
 
it seems that moral intuitions and understandings develop in all human beings 
because of specialized, early-developed mental capacities connected with social 
interaction. This in turn creates all sorts of moral intuitions about possible courses of 
action. The intuitions do not require concepts of supernatural agents, but if there are 
such concepts around, moral intuitions will be associated with them. In other words, 
religious concepts are in part parasitic upon moral understanding.228  
 
Boyer adds that all human minds seem to produce similar skeletal moral principles 
automatically and, therefore, all human populations have somewhat similar moral 
prescriptions. Barrett calls this tendency “intuitive morality”.229 The fact that people in 
general are moral realists also suggests, claim Boyer and Barrett, that morality is natural. The 
idea is that most humans represent moral norms and rules as immutable and non-arbitrary 
and see behaviours as essentially morally valuable or reproachable. Hence, humans seem to 
think that if everyone had full access to relevant facts of social interaction – the motivations 
and intentions of the persons‟ involved – then they would agree on what action would be 
right and what would be wrong.230 If humans tend to be moral realists and supernatural 
agents have full access to strategic information, then supernatural agents automatically see 
the rightness or wrongness of some action, Boyer concludes. This makes supernatural agents 
                                                 
228 Boyer 2002, 81.  
229 Barrett 2004, 47. 
230 Barrett 2004, 47-49. Boyer (2001, 176-180) presents a host of developmental evidence for the naturalness of 
morality. This evidence suggests, Boyer claims, that young children have moral feelings and intuitions that are 
not formed on the basis of learned conventional rules. See also Boyer 2002, 80-85. Boyer also makes references 
to the studies of the psychologist Eliot Turiel that seem to suggest that even small children are capable of moral 
feelings and moral reasoning (distinguishing between principles and conventions, for example). See Turiel 1983, 
1998.  
70 
 
plausible candidates for legitimising moral intuitions whose actual origin (social cognition) is 
beyond conscious access.231  
 Representations of supernatural agents that have full access to strategic information 
and have moral knowledge are also plausible candidates for causes of unforeseen events, 
Barrett claims. As we have already noted, CSR writers claim that the human mind is geared 
to find explanations for life-threatening events and to provide as much information as 
possible about the environment. Barrett writes that  
 
[a]s with everything else in life, we automatically, often unconsciously, look for an 
explanation of why things happen to us (or people close to us), and “stuff just 
happens” is no explanation. Gods, by virtue of their strange physical properties and 
their mysterious superpowers, make fine candidates for causes of many of these 
unusual events.232 
 
As human minds are prone to seek reasons for social (or other) causes of fortune and 
misfortune they can easily use supernatural agent concepts when folk physical, folk biological 
or normal agent based explanation do not provide the necessary intuitions to explain a 
particularly salient event.  
 Further, Boyer emphasises that supernatural explanations do not really contradict 
physical or other causes, but they address different aspects of a physical event:  
 
When people find supernatural causes, it is not because they have ignored the work of 
mechanical and biological causes but because they are asking questions that go beyond 
these causes.233  
 
These questions are about particular situations, such as “Why was it that I won the lottery?”, 
even though people usually know that someone had to win and their win was by chance. In 
the case of supernatural agent explanations, Boyer continues, these explanations explain by 
giving the reason of the supernatural agent rather than a mechanism by which the 
supernatural agent achieved the effect. He emphasises that  
 
people do not even think about the ways in which the powerful agents act, but they 
are very precise about their reasons for acting in a particular way. Indeed, these 
reasons always have to do with people‟s interaction with the powerful agents.234  
 
The crucial thing here, Boyer continues, is that one must already construe the causes of 
misfortune in social terms before it makes sense to use supernatural agents to explain those 
events. If social cognition already produces intuitions according to which misfortune (and 
fortune) is a result of “someone doing something”, then given that supernatural agents are 
already represented as members of one‟s social network and can engage in social exchange 
their reasons can be used as intuitively satisfying explanations of misfortune.235 
                                                 
231 Boyer (2001, 190-191) writes that “concepts of gods and spirits are made more relevant by the organization of 
our moral understandings, which by themselves do not especially require gods or spirits. What I mean by 
relevant is that the concepts, once put in this moral context, are easy to represent and they generate many new 
inferences. ... [M]ost of our moral intuitions are clear but their origin escapes us, because it lies in mental 
processing that we cannot consciously access. Seeing these intuitions as someone‟s viewpoint is a simpler way 
of understanding why we have these intuitions. But this requires a concept of an agent with full access to 
strategic information” 
232 Barrett 2004, 52.  
233 Boyer 2001, 196. 
234 Boyer 2001, 197. 
235 Boyer 2001, 200-202.  
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 The reason why supernatural agent representations are associated with misfortune (or 
fortune), CSR writers claim, is the same as in the case of death: the human mind is geared to 
find explanations of salient events and when our folk theories fail, we will apply supernatural 
agent representations because they fit well with our intuitions. The death of a loved one and 
the dead body itself create a number of conflicting intuitions produced by different mental 
systems and these conflicting intuitions make death basically highly counterintuitive (at least 
in Boyer‟s view). Further, counterintuitive representations about death evoke strong 
emotions which easily provide plausibility for representations of agents with non-standard 
physical properties.  
 Barrett argues that supernatural agent representations are intuitively plausible because 
our intuitions suggest that mental activity does not end in biological death. The reason for 
this is that our natural intuitions of death proceed on two distinct routes: biological and 
mental. Our folk biological knowledge provides us with basic understanding of biological 
necessities such as eating, reproducing and eventually dying. However, our folk psychological 
knowledge is produced by a set of different cognitive systems than biological knowledge 
which makes it possible to dissociate biological and psychological activities. The end of 
biological activity is intuitive whereas the end of psychological activity is counter-intuitive 
because our folk psychology does not shut down even when a person is dead. This happens 
especially in cases where the dead person is very close to us: folk psychological systems do 
not stop producing intuitions about the mental states of a dead person even though we know 
that the person in question is really dead.236 
 Boyer explains death rituals as a result of a cognitive confusion concerning the dead 
body. Similarly to Barrett, he argues that bodies create conflicting intuitions of biological and 
psychological processes which in turn increases the plausibility of representations of non-
physical agents. Boyer further maintains that systems concerned with pollution are also 
active: humans have cognitive systems that produce intuitions about substances that have to 
be avoided. Human bodies are major sources of pathogens which would explain why the 
contagion system is activated when a dead body is present. The activation of the contagion 
system would explain why there is a sense of urgency and need to “do something with the 
body”.237   
 Moreover, CSR writers claim that communal religious activity, such as rituals, prayer 
and worship, enhances the plausibility of supernatural agent representations. Rituals have 
been in the centre of CSR‟s interest from its beginning as we can see from Lawson and 
McCauley‟s book Rethinking Religion (1990) which laid out the central methodological 
assumptions of CSR and developed a specific theory of rituals: the ritual form hypothesis.238 
Further, Whitehouse has offered another influential theory of religious activity, the “modes 
of religiosity” theory.239 Despite numerous attempts and hypotheses, there seems to be no 
                                                 
236 Barrett 2004, 55-59.  
237 Boyer 2001, 204-228. Jesse Bering and his colleagues have conducted several studies on afterlife beliefs. They 
have put forward the “simulation constraint hypothesis” according to which psychological immortality is a 
cognitive default for humans. The basic idea is that as no one has experienced of what it is like being dead, 
imagining it is also very hard. As a result, people tend to assume psychological, but not biological, survival of 
dead people.  See Barrett 2005; Bering 2002, 2006; Bering et al. 2005; Bering & Bjorklund 2004.  
238 See also Lawson & McCauley 2002a.  
239 For discussion on the ritual form hypothesis, see e.g., Whitehouse & McCauley 2005. For Whitehouse‟s 
modes of religiosity theory, see Whitehouse 2000, 2004. Whitehouse argues that public religious actions evolve 
towards either “an imagistic mode” or “doctrinal mode”. In the imagistic mode, religious actions involve strong 
emotions and sensory stimuli in order to produce a long-lasting memory. However, the difficulty with the 
imagistic mode is that only a small amount of propositional information gets stored, whereas in the doctrinal 
mode religious actions are frequently repeated but their emotional impact is relatively low. The doctrinal mode 
is thus well-suited for the transmission of religious propositions. The difficulty here is that information 
transmitted in a doctrinal mode can easily fade from memory because it does not necessarily involve anything 
personal. Whitehouse‟s theory is based on a distinction between two forms of memory: individual events are 
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consensus over the explanation of rituals and other religious activity in CSR. I will briefly 
highlight some central points from each scholar. 
 Barrett highlights the importance of communal religious action for religious belief. 
Not only religious representations cause religious behaviour but behaving religiously strongly 
increases the plausibility of religious representations. There are several reasons for this. First 
of all, the human mind attempts to reduce dissonance automatically. This means that if a 
person behaves in a way that contradicts his beliefs, then the person feels a certain amount of 
tension to make his beliefs consistent with his behaviour. Therefore, if a person behaves 
religiously for some reason even though he does not hold religious representations as true, 
the behaviour creates plausibility for religious representations. Further, Barrett argues that if 
a person‟s belief is challenged and the person is able to counter the attack by argumentation, 
evidence or the like, then the person‟s confidence in the belief in question strengthens. In a 
religious setting, the successful defence of religious ideas would count as evidence for their 
truth. In addition, religious actions increase the number of domains and contexts in which 
religious representations are activated and thus create additional factors for their plausibility. 
Finally, coordinated and public religious action enhances the plausibility of religious 
representations because it enhances the trustworthiness of others sharing that practice, and 
as other believers are represented as trustworthy their beliefs are more plausible.240  
 According to Barrett, rituals and ceremonies come in two basic forms: ceremonies 
that are conducted only once in a person‟s lifetime and ceremonies which are performed 
constantly. Initiation rites and other ceremonies that are not repeated have a strong tendency 
to develop towards forms that induce strong emotions and thus create long-lasting 
memories. Such ceremonies are filled with “sensory pageantry”, namely, they include 
multiple and unconventional sensory stimuli that strengthen the idea that “gods are acting”. 
If a high profile memory of an event of enormous personal significance is seen as an act of 
god, then a person‟s faith in god‟s reality is greatly strengthened. The term commonly used of 
such memories is “flash bulb memories”. Contrary to high-profile initiation rites and rites of 
passage, most religious ceremonies are frequently performed and do not arouse emotions. In 
particular, religions with theological doctrines demand conscious reflection and inferences 
from their members. Frequent ceremonies, such as reciting creeds, repeating central 
doctrines and other kinds of verbal communication, ensure that theological systems are 
stored in a member‟s memory and applied in everyday life. Frequency and reflection is 
needed because theologically correct systems are not minimally counter-intuitive: they require 
reflective interpretation and learning.241 
 Barrett does not seek to answer the question of the origins of rituals and ceremonies 
in general whereas Boyer and Atran dwell on the issue at length. According to Boyer, rituals 
are “cognitive gadgets” that activate a number of mental modules that originally have other 
functions and thus are attention-grabbing. Boyer‟s basic claim is that religious rituals make 
supernatural agents and their actions explicit and visible. Thus, rituals are places where 
interaction with supernatural agents is taking place. Three features of rituals require an 
explanation. First, rituals are performed with a sense of urgency, that is, there is a feeling that 
rituals must be performed in a very precise way even though the link between the effect of 
the ritual and the performance of the ritual is vague. Second, rituals are usually associated 
with social events and they signify a change in social status. Third, supernatural agents are 
usually associated with rituals.242  
                                                                                                                                                  
saved to episodic memory and encyclopaedic information to semantic memory. 
240 Barrett 2004, 61-65. 
241 Barrett 2004, 66-73. Barrett‟s account draws heavily from Whitehouse‟s modes of religiosity theory and the 
ritual form hypothesis of Lawson and McCauley. Atran is somewhat critical towards Whitehouse‟s theory 
whereas Barrett is sympathetic. See Atran 2002, 150-154. 
242 Boyer 2001, 232-236.  
73 
 
 Boyer claims that the sense of urgency can be explained by the fact that rituals 
mimics evasion behaviour: the sense of purity and the danger of being polluted are associated 
with precautionary rules and boundaries. Rituals with their precise patterns of behaviour 
invoke such rules and thus activate cognitive systems whose original function is to avoid 
contamination and pollution.243 The reason for rituals being associated with events in social 
networks is that our cognitive capacities of representing for social networks are limited. Our 
“folk sociology” represents our immediate social structure quite well but representations of 
relationships other than our nearest kin have a tendency to simplify. This simplification 
creates representations of different groups and levels that do not actually exist. Rituals are 
neat cognitive gadgets to remedy our baffled intuitions: rituals provide clear roles for 
everyone and simple representations of how the social network changes. Finally, Boyer 
emphasises that there are no sharp boundaries between religious and non-religious rituals. 
Rituals exist in human groups for reasons that have nothing to do with religion. However, 
supernatural agent representations fit into our intuitions of ritual very well: when people 
perform and participate in rituals they feel the sense of urgency but cannot really understand 
how the ritual produces the intended effects. Therefore, there is a cognitive gap between the 
performance of ritual and its effects which a representation of supernatural agent can easily 
fill. Our intuitions say that rituals must be performed in a precise way but offer no reason for 
it. Supernatural agents can act as mediators between the causes and effects of rituals‟ because 
their causal influence in general is considered as non-standard.244  
 According to Atran, rituals reveal a social hierarchy which is common in all groups of 
social mammals. He argues that religious rituals convey the fact that an individual is 
emotionally committed to communion with supernatural agents and with other individuals in 
the group. This display of commitment makes the individual a trustworthy partner of 
exchange in the eyes of other individuals in the group. Thus religious rituals and religious 
commitment serve a social function: religious practices and commitments facilitate the 
minimising of free-riders and cheaters in populations.245 Atran also claims that rituals invoke 
and satisfy emotions associated with existential anxiety. Human beings face inevitabilities and 
threats in the form of death, sickness and other natural events that invoke strong feelings of 
fear. Religious rituals mimic natural situations which create such anxieties and when these 
rituals have a positive outcome, the participant‟s belief in order and survival over the 
arbitrariness of life strengthens.246 
 In sum, religious actions both increase the plausibility of supernatural agent 
representations and constrain their features. Barrett presents some general mechanisms of 
how this happens. Boyer argues that rituals emerge naturally in human societies because our 
minds cannot make sense of complex social networks. Supernatural agents can easily be 
associated with rituals because our cognitive systems produce conflicting intuitions. Atran‟s 
point seems to be that human groups require rituals to represent the identity of the group 
and social relations in it as well as to relieve existential anxieties.   
 In conclusion, one point remains. As we have already seen, CSR writers claim that 
highly counterintuitive and abstract theological thinking is not necessary for having 
representations of supernatural agents. If this is the case, one can ask where organised 
religions come from. Boyer answers to this question by claiming that institutional religions 
are products of specialisation in the development of societies. In his view, theological 
doctrines, creeds and larger theological systems are products of the reflective reasoning of 
religious specialists and they usually contain representations that are quite far away from 
                                                 
243 Boyer has further developed this idea into what is usually called the “hazard precaution model” of ritualised 
behaviour. See Boyer & Lienard 2006a, 2006b.  
244 Boyer 2001, 237-263. 
245 Atran & Norenzayan 2004, 717. See also Atran 2002, 130-146. 
246 Atran 2002, 150-164. 
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easily transmitted MCI representations. Further, cultural transmission of such higher-order 
and reflective representations demands institutions, teaching, frequent rituals, ceremonies 
and reflective processing. However, in order to become successful and have a high level of 
distribution, higher-order and reflective theological ideas must make some use of underlying 
cognitive capacities. If theological ideas are highly counter-intuitive and completely bypass 
our intuitions, they become meaningless and people stop holding them true. Moreover, 
institutional religions with their doctrines, creeds and theologies make it possible to belong to 
a certain religion, that is, they make “religion” a distinct public domain of a society. Boyer 
writes that   
 
[h]aving a religion does not necessarily imply that one has ‟a‟ religion with particular 
doctrine. Those features that we find straightforward and natural are in fact the 
outcome of a very specific history. In some historical conditions, religious specialists 
group themselves in institutionalized associations (churches, castes, etc.) and diffuse a 
particular description of what their function is. It then becomes clear to everyone, 
first, that there is a such a thing as ‟religion‟ as a special domain of concepts and 
activities; second, that there are different ‟religions‟, that is, different possible ways of 
practicing religion, one of which is more valid; third, that adopting a particular 
religion means joining a social group, establishing a community of believers, 
emphasizing the demarcation between us and them.247  
 
Boyer maintains that institutional religion arises in societies that develop literacy and 
specialisation. Institutional religion also gives rise to the concept of “religion”: when 
doctrines and convictions are codified, they can be used to differentiate systems of beliefs 
and behaviours.248  
 Boyer also highlights the theological correctness effect again when he claims that  
  
[i]ndeed, when the literary account is too abstract, people just add to it the notion that 
their ancestors or some spirits are around and concerned with people‟s actions 
anyway. It is very difficult for literate groups to counter people‟s tendency to make 
their religious concepts more local and more practical. People are never quite as 
”theologically correct” as the guild would like them to be.249   
 
Integrated, deductive and stable theological systems are too general and too reflection-
demanding for people to apply rapidly in their everyday situations. Everyday intuitions 
support local and particular representations rather than global and abstract representations. 
Being global and abstract, theological systems, according to Boyer, are comparable to 
philosophical systems or scientific theories that have very little or no relevance at all for 
everyday life. They are too hard to learn and yield too small cognitive effects. Thus,  
 
[t]his, then, is the real tragedy of the theologian: not just that people, because they 
have real minds rather than literary memories, will always be theologically incorrect, 
will always add to the message and distort it, but also that the only way to make the 
message immune to such adulteration renders it tedious, thereby fuelling imagistic 
dissent and threatening the position of the theologian‟s guild.250 
 
                                                 
247 Boyer 2001, 267.  
248 Boyer 2001, 266-285. 
249 Boyer 2001, 283.  
250 Boyer 2001, 285.  
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The tragedy of the theologian is that as the theologian attempts to keep the theological 
system as intact as possible ordinary members constantly keep distorting the system by 
adding more local and practical notions to it. 251     
 To sum up the results of this chapter, we can say that the CSR is based on the claim 
that cognitive processes have an impact on the acquisition and transmission of religious 
information. In the course of long periods of time and given a massive amount of 
transmission events, religious representations evolve towards certain forms that have 
maximised the cognitive effort-effect relationship. Counter-intuitive representations of 
supernatural agents take minimal cognitive effort to form, but at the same time they provide 
massive cognitive effects. They activate multiple cognitive systems in different domains of 
knowledge and thus gain plausibility. Our intuitions concerning human persons, animals, 
physical objects, moral norms, misfortune, death, social relations and rituals all contribute to 
the high frequency of distribution of such counter-intuitive representations.    
 
3.4. The Naturalness of Religion 
We have now shown how CSR writers build their explanation of why religious ideas are so 
widespread. The argument began from the idea of the optimal nature of MCI representations 
in section 3.1. CSR writers argued that representations that included minimal violations of 
intuitions are more successful in cultural transmission than intuitive or highly 
counterintuitive representations. At this point, we also made a brief detour into dual-process 
models of cognitive processing. The subsequent section (3.2) dealt with the relevance of 
supernatural agent concepts. First we looked at the HADD hypothesis according to which 
humans‟ agent detecting device might be hypersensitive and provide supports for 
supernatural agent representations. We also described how CSR writers make the connection 
between our social mind systems and supernatural agents: supernatural agents can be 
represented as having full access to strategic information which makes such representations 
easy to process and highly relevant. In section 3.3, we described how events in everyday 
human life (social and individual) support religious representations. CSR writers claimed that 
moral intuitions both shape and make supernatural agent representations more plausible. 
Similarly, our intuitions about causes of unforeseen events support supernatural agent 
representations since supernatural agents can be represented as having non-natural causal 
powers. Our intuitions about dead bodies and the continuity of mental life after death give 
further plausibility to supernatural agent representations. We also noted that there is no 
consensus in CSR about theories of ritual. Finally, it was noted that CSR writers emphasise 
the difference between intuitive religious thinking and theological (and philosophical) 
systems.   
 CSR writers usually summarise their whole approach by saying that religion is natural. 
Indeed, the “naturalness of religion” can be considered as a slogan of the whole approach. 
                                                 
251 Boyer 2001, 277-285. Scholar of religion Donald Wiebe (1991) has also highlighted the difference between 
theological reflection and real-life religious beliefs. He argues that religious thinking is “mythopoetic” whereas 
scientific and theological thinking are rational and logical. The tragedy of the theologian is that in her attempts 
to systematise religious ideas on the basis of philosophical or scientific rationality, religious ideas lose contact 
with the actual beliefs of believers and become meaningless. Slone also makes similar points in his provocatively 
titled book Theological Incorrectness: Why religious people believe what they shouldn’t (2004). This problem, however, is 
not just a problem for theologians: all scientific education, for instance, faces the same problem. It takes time 
and effort to learn things like quantum mechanics, biology or psychology because the theories and methods in 
these fields are usually highly counterintuitive and they do not have much relevance for everyday life. Even after 
years of training and habituation, professionals can easily “relapse” into thinking in terms of more intuitive 
categories. This has led some writers to claim that science is highly unnatural for human beings. See McCauley 
2000; Dunbar 1996; Wolpert 1992. 
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We can see that such a claim can be understood in many ways that do not depend on one 
another. Consider the following claims:  
 
(1) Religion (or at least some part of it) is natural in the sense that it can be studied by 
the methods of the natural and behavioural sciences. 
(2) Religion (or at least some part of it) is natural in the sense that it depends on cross-
cultural or pan-human constraints rather than specific cultural constraints. 
(3) Religion (or at least some part of it) is natural in the sense that acquiring, representing 
and transmitting religious ideas are easy for human beings.  
(4) Religion is natural in the sense that it is not a supernatural creation; it is “nothing 
more” than a natural phenomenon.   
 
The assumptions behind the first claim were examined in section 2.1. The point was that 
religious beliefs and activities should be seen as parts of the natural world to the extent that 
they are constituted by psychological and biological processes. We also pointed out how this 
way of approaching religious phenomena was connected to a broader vision of how the 
socio-cultural domain should be understood. This reading of “the naturalness of religion” 
claim is clearly directed against those who argue for the irrelevance of natural factors in 
explaining religious phenomena. The second claim was examined in section 2.2 and in the 
subsequent sections. The idea was that underlying all cultural variation there is a pan-human, 
modular cognitive architecture that constrains the acquisition and transmission of all 
representations. This second reading of “naturalness of religion” claim is directed against 
those who argue for the irrelevance of natural factors in explaining socio-cultural phenomena 
in general. Chapter 3 examined the arguments in favour of the third claim, the basic idea of 
CSR which simply being that religion is natural because it is easy - or as Barrett puts it 
 
widespread belief in God arises from the operation of natural processes of the 
human mind in its ordinary human environments. Belief in God does not amount to 
anything strange or peculiar; on the contrary, such belief is nearly inevitable.252  
 
The fourth and final reading of the “naturalness of religion” claim is related to the truth of 
religious claims. I will return to this claim later in chapter 5 where I will be examining the 
possible religious relevance of CSR theories. For the time being, we should be careful not to 
mix these four meanings of the “naturalness of religion” claim, because they are not logically 
connected to each other and they can be defended and criticised independently of each 
other.  
 Before we conclude this chapter, we should deal with some critical points. As CSR 
makes it a central part of their project to produce empirical theories, it is reasonable to ask 
whether CSR so far has been able to achieve this goal. The critique that CSR has made bold 
theoretical claims without evidential support is raised from both inside and outside of CSR.253 
Barrett for instance, who is arguably CSR insider, notes that 
  
[a]lthough one of the attractive promises of Cognitive Science of Religion is to inject 
the study of religion with empirically testable theories, theoretical projects have 
outpacked empirical ones. Consequently, many theories in the area rest on weak 
evidential footing.254  
 
                                                 
252 Barrett 2004, 122.  
253 For criticism coming from the outside, see, e.g., Oviedo 2007. 
254 Barrett 2008, 296.  
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Barrett even goes on to chastise his own work by saying that his Why Would Anyone Believe in 
God (2004) includes a massive amount of under-supported but testable empirical claims. 
Barrett suggests that the future of the CSR depends on how well it is able to back up its 
theoretical claims with empirical results.255  
 To answer this question, we should take a brief look into the empirical work already 
done. Boyer's cognitive optimum theory has been cross-culturally tested.256 The standard 
interpretation of these experiments is that minimally counter-intuitive representations have 
better recall rate than either highly counter-intuitive or simply intuitive representations. 
Further, Barrett's claim that people seem to abandon their theologically correct ideas in 
situations which demand fast inference and apply more anthropomorphic ideas of 
supernatural agents has received some experimental support.257 Moreover, several 
experiments have been devised to reveal how children conceptualise gods and how these 
concepts are connected to innate assumptions.258 There are some experimental results that 
deal with afterlife beliefs and especially souls surviving death and they suggest that humans 
have a strong tendency to assume that there is a component in human beings, namely, the 
soul, which survives death.259 Finally, Lawson's and McCauley's ritual form hypothesis has 
received some experimental support.260    
 A recent article by Nicola Knight, Emma Cohen and Barrett (2009) which assesses 
the empirical support of core CSR theories, surprisingly concludes that  
 
it is evident that the development of the field of CSR has been affected by its fast 
rate of growth. Attempts have been made to provide a theoretically integrated picture 
before sufficient evidence has been gathered to support its assumptions. Of the eight 
topics reviewed, perhaps three (Afterlife beliefs, God concepts, and Teleo-functional 
reasoning) could be said to have received significant levels of empirical confirmation; 
the other five are not as strongly supported. 
 
The most disturbing thing from CSR‟s point of view is that the most central (or at least most 
talked about) theories, such as the cognitive optimum theory (counter-intuitiveness 
hypothesis) and HADD, have not obtained clear support. 261 The article points out that  
 
the mnemonic advantages of minimally counterintuitive concepts are often taken as 
fact in theoretical discussion, but these effects have been found only in a handful of 
methodologically heterogeneous studies.262 
 
In the light of this point, it is easy to concur with Barrett, that more theoretical claims have 
been confidently stated than the evidence would justify and that the CSR is very much “work 
in progress” rather than a verified theory or a discipline. If this assessment is close to the 
truth, then some of the carts are still in front of the horses. It is probably safe conclude that 
                                                 
255 Barrett 2008, 295-299.  
256 Barrett & Nyhof 2001; Boyer & Ramble 2001; Atran & Norenzayan et al. 2006; Pyysiäinen & Lindeman et al. 
2003. See also experiments presented in Atran & Norenzayan 2004.  
257 Barrett 1999; Barrett & Keil 1996.  
258 Barrett & Richert 2003; Barrett & Richert et al. 2001; Bering & Parker 2006.  
259 Bering 2004, 2006; Bering & Bjorklund 2003. For a popular exposition of “natural dualism”, see Bloom 
2004.  
260 Barrett & Lawson 2001; Barrett 2004b; Malley & Barrett 2003. In addition, Whitehouse's “modes theory” is 
directly based on ethnographic material and, as such, represents the first cognitively oriented theory that is not 
created “a posteriori” from ethnographical data gathered for some other purpose. See Whitehouse 1995, 2004.  
261 These also include the ritual form hypothesis of Lawson and McCauley and the “modes of religiosity” theory 
of Whitehouse.  
262 Knight et al. 2009.  
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the future of CSR depends on the experimental evidence it is able to produce and in its 
present state many claims of the CSR are merely hypotheses waiting to be tested. That being 
said, most of the CSR hypotheses certainly seem worth testing and there exists enough 
evidence to justify future research.  
 As CSR theories are strongly dependent on Sperber‟s ideas it will be useful to take a 
brief look at the criticisms directed towards the epidemiology of representations approach. In 
his critical book review of Sperber‟s Explaining Culture (2001), philosopher Kim Sterelny 
points out some problems in the approach. Although Sterelny is positively disposed towards 
Sperber‟s aim, namely, formulating a naturalistic approach to cultural material, and basically 
agrees with Sperber about the problems of more traditional, interpretative and sociological 
approaches, he is less enthusiastic towards Sperber‟s own proposal. First, he cautions against 
seeing intuitive and reflective beliefs as two clearly defined categories. Instead they should be 
viewed as “two ends of a continuum” in which most beliefs are situated somewhere in the 
middle. This is because “[o]bservation, unreflective inference, reflective inference, and 
testimony will play a role in the formation of most of our beliefs, but in varying 
proportions.”263 Sterelny suggests that if we look at particular cases, it might be quite difficult 
to classify a particular belief in either of these classes. If this is the case, then the explanatory 
force of intuitive machinery can be rather vague and/or minimal. This point is also relevant 
for CSR, for the automatic and innate nature of intuitive beliefs is much emphasised by 
Barrett, Boyer and Atran.  
 Second, Sterelny claims that Sperber‟s account of massive modularity is incoherent 
and his attempts to remedy the lack of central, domain-general cognition by introducing the 
notions of “actual” and “proper domains” of modules fail. Similarly to Fodor, Sterelny 
claims that in the case of massive modularity it does not make sense to talk about “modules” 
anymore and that the attempt to define modules in terms of “domains” does not solve the 
problem either because “domains” are quite vague as well. Without a more substantial 
definition of a module, Sterelny claims, the strong form of the massive modularity hypothesis 
turns into a truism.  The reason why Sperber defends the massive modularity hypothesis 
seems to be that “[i]f the mind were a general purpose device, psychology would play no 
interesting role in explaining culture.”264 This highlights the foundational nature of the whole 
notion of massive modularity for CSR as well: without a proper formulation of this auxiliary 
hypothesis, the whole project as apparently endangered.   
 Anthropologist Tim Ingold has also criticised Sperber‟s psychological assumptions in 
his article From the Transmission of Representations to the Education of Attention (2001). Ingold 
claims that Sperber‟s full-blooded cognitivism in which “knowledge exists in a form of 
„mental content‟”265 is somewhat misleading and ignores the role of environmental factors in 
the transmission of cultural information. Ingold‟s argument proceeds along the lines of those 
cognitive scientists who argue for a more context situated and embodied cognition than the 
advocates of a more traditional cognitivism.266 First, Ingold argues that it is not plausible to 
assume the existence of strictly innate mental modules that develop independently from the 
environment. Instead, we should make more room for the ontogenetic development of the 
mind which is strongly informed by particular environmental factors and practices.267 Ingold 
claims that  
                                                 
263 Sterelny 2001, 849.  
264 Sterelny 2001, 850.  
265 Ingold 2001, 113.  
266 For developments in this direction, see, e.g., Clark 1997, 2008. Clark‟s approach is a good example of a more 
general tendency in cognitive psychology and cognitive sciences towards more context situated and practical 
models of cognitive operations.  
267 One critical point can be made against Ingold here: he might be considering Sperber and other advocates of 
the massive modularity hypothesis too “nativistically”- that is, Ingold might be putting too much emphasis on 
the innateness of modules. In order to argue for the massive modularity hypothesis one need not necessarily 
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[f]or Sperber, a design for the mind is copied, along with the DNA of the genome, at 
the inception of every new lifecycle. And this design, prior to being opened up to the 
differentiating influences of the environment, magically turns itself into concrete 
mechanisms in the brain, ready and prepared to process relevant environmental 
input. I have argued, to the contrary, that copying is itself a developmental process, 
that this process takes place in an environmental context, and that it alone provides a 
link between the genome and the formal properties of the organism – including those 
of its brain. ... This is not to deny that the resulting neural organization may take 
modular form; it is to insist, however, that modularity develops.268 
 
Ingold‟s critique is also connected to his more general critique of the Neo-Darwinist account 
of natural selection as he seeks to dismantle the idea that genes somehow include “a design 
for the organism”. The phenotype of an organism, according to Ingold, is not simply a 
product of the underlying genotype but a combination of complex causal factors in 
ontogenetic development. Finally, Ingold also criticises Sperber‟s notion of “representation” 
for being vague. Sperber seems to assume that cultural knowledge can be completely 
understood in terms of representations that are “stored within the containers of universal 
psychology”269 and that such representations somehow include blueprints of how they turn 
into behaviours. Ingold‟s point is to show that Sperber‟s understanding of the interaction 
between mental representations and their public tokens is too simplified. Ingold claims that 
rather than being codified in mental representations in our minds, a large part of our 
“cultural knowledge” consists of skills and embodied actions (enactments) that include 
complex interactions between perception, action and cognitive content.270  
 The aforementioned critical points highlight the fact that there is much work to be 
done in the domain of CSR‟s auxiliary theories, for we have seen that neither the conceptual 
formulation of Sperber‟s epidemiology nor its psychological assumptions are generally 
accepted. Further, the criticism suggests that CSR writers would do well to consider more 
carefully possible alternatives for their auxiliary theories – especially recent moves towards a 
more context situated theory of cognition.271 However, CSR writers might be reluctant to 
revise their view of human cognition because the more human cognition is viewed as context 
situated the less explanatory power cognition has in cross-cultural contexts. Thus, crucial 
questions are (1) how responsive is the architecture of the human mind to environmental 
context and (2) can we understand all cognitive operations in terms of symbolic processing 
inside the brain or should we “extend” our considerations of cognitive processes to 
encompass the specific environments and bodies in which brains are situated.        
 As we have now constructed a picture of what CSR in its current form looks like and 
we can move forward to analyse CSR more carefully. My account so far has attempted to 
describe as well as clarify the central ideas and methodological assumptions more or less 
shared by most CSR writers. In what follows, I will take up two related problems in CSR that 
have not, in my mind, been adequately discussed. The first problem is related to the scope of 
CSR‟s explanations. There is much confusion about the extent to which explanations based 
                                                                                                                                                  
argue for strict genetic determinism of mental modules. It would be enough to argue that under similar 
environmental conditions human minds tend to develop similar modular architecture. Thus modular 
architecture would emerge as a result of both genetic and environmental factors.  
268 Ingold 2001, 130-131.  
269 Ingold 2001, 143.  
270 Ingold (2001, 146) writes that “the neurological structures and artefactual forms that Sperber calls 
representations are not causes and effects of one another, but emerge together as complimentary moments of a 
single process – that is, the process of people‟s life in the world. It is within this process that all knowledge is 
constituted” For a broader outline of Ingold‟s approach, see Ingold 2000.  
271 For situated and expanded cognition, see, e.g., Clark 1997, 2008.   
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on cognitive systems can explain actual religious behaviour. As we will see, this is a thornier 
issue that at first appears and it will lead us into the deep waters of philosophy of science and 
philosophy of psychology. The second problem that I will examine is the problem of 
religious relevance. Again, there is much confusion about the religious implications of CSR 
theories. These confusions betray the fact that the general philosophical frameworks in 
which CSR‟s theories are interpreted have considerable impact on this issue.   
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4. The Problem of  Scope 
 
It is understandable that those who advocate a novel scientific approach to some 
phenomenon have high hopes and expectations for its usefulness and explanatory power. 
This is also the case with the writers in CSR which we have been looking at. Candidly 
speaking, we can say that most CSR writers are adamant in proving that their approach is 
more “scientific” than other approaches to religion and that the cognitive approach will 
finally solve age-old mysteries by turning them into “empirically solvable problems”. Some 
have even claimed that CSR will revolutionise the whole field of religious studies by 
providing an overarching methodological framework for the study of religion in general, in a 
firmly naturalistic register, of course. However, there are many who do not share this 
enthusiasm, but insist that the explanations offered by CSR writers are rather meagre in their 
explanatory power and consider them as rather useless in explaining religious phenomena. In 
this chapter, we will be looking at this problem, what I will be calling “the problem of scope” 
and argue that in order to answer this problem – that is, to assess the explanatory scope and 
explanatory power of CSR theories – we must clarify the philosophical background 
assumptions of CSR theorising. Further, I will be highlighting some problems in these 
background assumptions as they currently stand and suggesting that more refined 
assumptions can be adopted from recent discussions in philosophy of science. Finally, as we 
proceed I will be pointing out how more or less implicit methodological choices in these 
background issues result into different interpretations of the explanatory power and scope of 
CSR theories.  
 Section 4.1 will outline the problem of scope as I see it and suggest that we need to 
analyse the notions of “explanation” and “integration of disciplines” to find an answer to the 
problem. In section 4.2, we will be looking at epidemiological explanations more carefully 
with the help of recent discussions about selective explanations in philosophy of biology. 
Section 4.3 will be looking at how psychological explanations work and the crucial 
relationship between personal and sub-personal types of psychological explanation. The 
notion of causal explanation is taken into consideration in section 4.4 which provides an 
outline of CSR writers‟ views about explanation and then describes a more refined account 
of causal explanation, the “interventionist model of causal explanation”. In section 4.5, we 
will move from explanation to integration of disciplines and analyse and criticise the models 
of integration that have motivated several CSR writers. Section 4.6 will continue to develop 
the themes of the previous section and provide a more developed model for inter-theoretic 
and interdisciplinary relations. The section will focus on explanatory pluralism and the idea 
of multi-level mechanistic explanation.         
 
4.1. Problems with Scope 
The problem of scope is a product of the enthusiasm of CSR writers on the one hand, and 
the pessimism of the critics on the other hand. If we look at CSR writers, examples of such 
enthusiasm and overblown estimates of the explanatory scope of CSR abound. Take Boyer, 
for instance, when he claims that  
 
[t]here cannot be a magic bullet to explain the existence and common features of 
religion, as the phenomenon is the result of aggregate relevance – that is, of 
successful activation of a whole variety of mental systems. Indeed, the activation of a 
panoply of systems in the mind explains the very existence of religious concepts and 
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their cultural success and the fact that people find them plausible and the fact that not 
everyone finds them so and the way religion appeared in human history and its 
persistence in the context of modern science.272  
 
In this one passage, he claims that CSR is capable of answering the following questions: 
 
(1) Why religious concepts exist in the first place? 
(2) Why religious concepts are so widespread in human populations? 
(3) Why people find religious concepts plausible and hold them true? 
(4) Why some people do not find them plausible and do not hold them true? 
(5) What are the origins of religion? 
(6) Why does religion persist even in modern societies, where modern science provides 
“a more efficient way of thinking about the world”273? 
 
In other places, Boyer also mentions additional questions such as: 
 
(7) Why does religion trigger such strong emotions that people are willing to kill for it? 
(8) Why are there several religions rather than just one? 
 
All these questions are not only answered by CSR but these answers are more 
comprehensive and “scientific” than all previous answers. Furthermore, he points out that 
whereas these questions used to be mysteries – from a scientific point of view – they can 
now be addressed as problems that can be given answers through empirical study.274 Finally, 
Boyer seems to think that CSR can answer these questions by invoking psychological 
mechanisms revealed by cognitive scientists and cognitive psychologists.  
 If CSR theories can and will answer all the aforementioned questions, it seems that 
their explanatory scope and explanatory power are relatively large and that a fully developed 
theory of religion along the lines of CSR would explain most of the interesting features of 
religious traditions. Now, we can ask whether it is plausible for an approach which is based 
on identifying non-conscious cognitive constraints of cultural transmission to provide 
answers to all these questions. Indeed, several critics have pointed out that the 
methodological assumptions of CSR make its explanatory scope much more modest than its 
optimistic advocates – such as Boyer – would like to think. Scholar of religion Michael Day, 
for instance, claims in his article Let’s Be Realistic: Evolutionary Complexity, Epistemic Probabilism, 
and the Cognitive Science of Religion (2007) that cognitive mechanisms can explain only 
population-level tendencies rather than particular cases of religious beliefs, practices or 
traditions. Day points out that probabilistic language is quite common in CSR writers: they 
talk about “the likelihood of transmission” and “cognitive systems usually operational” and 
so on.275 He further notes that Boyer's model especially is so statistically tentative that  
  
the scientific aspiration to explain religion may stumble over the inability to produce 
interesting generalizations. The implications of this for the budding cognitive science 
of religion is as obvious as it is stark. Given the persistent lack of universality, the 
necessity of ceteris paribus clauses, and the long list of exceptions and counterexamples 
that often obtain in psychological models, the cognitive scientific aspirations to 
explain religion – full stop – could be epistemically quixotic. On its best day, it would 
be a vital instrumental science that mirrors biology by offering us a powerful set of 
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274 Boyer 2001, 48.  
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statistically reliable heuristic devices for coping with other cognitive agents; 
unfortunately, these devices would yield surprisingly limited generalizations and 
meagre predictive power.276 
 
Day‟s assessment of the possibilities of CSR contrasts heavily with those who advocate CSR. 
Day especially emphasises that CSR may only be an instrumental science rather than 
providing approximately true insights in how religion actually works. Day also highlights 
Geertz's claim that large-scale anthropological programs have little or nothing to give to the 
study of particular cultural traditions because the generalisation that such programs produce 
are not very interesting. Anthropological universals like “people everywhere have views 
about differences between sexes” or “all societies have systems of social rankings” are not 
very helpful in explaining some particular conception of differences between the sexes.277 
Day concludes his article by asking whether “the cognitive program leaves us only with the 
soggy empirical generalization People everywhere believe in non-obvious, extra-human beings because they 
have human brains? Only time will tell.”278 
 Day‟s critique raises an important question about the aim of anthropological inquiry 
in general. If the aim of such an inquiry is to understand particular ideas and practices in 
particular traditions, then, Day‟s argument continues, population-scale explanations framed 
in probabilistic terms do not really help us because they do not give us any clue of how 
general mechanisms work in real historical and social contexts. This is because accounts of 
population-scale tendencies do not give us tools to identify the actual causal histories of 
particular occurrences of religious belief and practice.   
 Similarly, James Laidlaw has argued in his article Well-Disposed Social Anthropologist's 
Problem with the 'Cognitive Science of Religion' (2007) that as CSR deals with general features of 
religious thinking and behaviour its contribution to the study of actual religions equals “the 
contribution that technical knowledge about materials can make to aesthetics and the history 
of art.”279 Laidlaw‟s point here is that CSR theories specify only very general tendencies in the 
workings of human minds and exclude “everything that humans think and do in the 
reflective exercise of capacities [like] reason, imagination, and will”280 According to Laidlaw, 
this methodological exclusion is perfectly productive provided it does not lead its 
practitioners to suppose that other factors are absent or trivial in religion.281 
 Laidlaw makes another point about the scope of CSR‟s explanations when he claims 
that CSR theories seem to deal with phenomena that we do not usually associate with 
religion at all. His basic idea is that while cognitive science can provide a causal account of 
some religious phenomena, this does not constitute “an explanation of religion” because 
virtually all distinctive features of religious traditions as well as what religious people 
themselves identify as “religious” falls outside the CSR's scope.282 He insists that 
 
[t]he phenomena under discussion here are, it is convincingly claimed, so widespread 
in human populations because their causes – evolved mechanisms of  cognitive 
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architecture – are universal to humans. Thus they are to be seen, albeit in locally 
variable forms, everywhere. But if they are indeed very widely distributed across 
societies, and of incontestable importance, they do not come  near to constituting all 
that we might reasonably call religion. This fact is partly disguised by, and possible 
also from, practitioners of the cognitive science of religion by the virtually 
unanimous agreement among them in defining religion as beliefs and practices 
relating to spiritual or supernatural beings.283 
 
Simply put, Laidlaw is saying that the explanandum of CSR is what is traditionally called 
superstition, rather than religion.284  
 Although Day‟s and Laidlaw‟s comments (especially Day‟s) are at times unfair to the 
achievements of CSR, their general observation about the problems surrounding the scope 
of CSR explanations seems valid. This observation is that CSR is mainly dealing with 
recurrent features of religious thinking and behaviour at the most general level and the exact 
relationship between general tendencies and particular occurrences of religious thinking and 
behaviour is not properly worked out.285 Laidlaw writes that 
 
the demonstration of a propensity, which ... must take the form of establishing a 
statistical probability, by its very nature cannot be an explanation for why the feature 
in question is respectively present and absent in particular instances.286 
 
In short, what we need, in Laidlaw‟s view, is an account of how exactly general tendencies 
relate to actual historical and socio-cultural occurrences of religious thinking and 
behaviour.287 Laidlaw‟s and Day‟s critique could also be formulated in a more exact way by 
saying that CSR theories do make a plausible case for the fact that cognitive factors come in 
at some point during acquisition and transmission of representations, but they are unable to 
show where these factors actually come in when we consider the causal histories of actual 
beliefs and practices. If this is the case, then when we are looking at particular occurrences of 
religious thought and behaviour we can never be sure to what extent they are in fact 
products of cognitive constraints rather than some other factors.  
 Day‟s and Laidlaw‟s critique of CSR may be somewhat unfair because CSR writers do 
not in fact claim to explain religion “completely” since they think that religion is not a single 
category to be explained as we already noted in chapter 2. This being the case, some of the 
critique misses the point. Furthermore, most CSR writers acknowledge quite clearly that their 
explanatory model is not suitable to explain particular cases, but general tendencies. After 
making the point that all we can explain are the factors that contribute to “likelihood of 
religious belief” Boyer writes that  
 
All this is of great interest if you are like me a social scientist – that is, if you want to 
explain vast trends in human groups. ... The probability of a single event does not 
satisfy our appetite for explanations, which hankers after a definite causal chain that 
would have led this person to have this particular religious attitude. But if the 
intuitive plausibility of religious concepts is a matter of aggregate relevance, of 
activating different systems in different ways, then it is in principle futile to try to 
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identify that causal chain. All we can describe are trends in groups, which is certainly 
frustrating.288 
 
Prima facie such acknowledgements might seem to nullify Day‟s and Laidlaw‟s critique 
completely, but this is not the case. The critique of these writers can be understood as saying 
that the aspects of religious belief and behaviour that CSR is able to explain are not 
interesting or that they are marginal to the interests of anthropology of religion.  
 Although I will be addressing the theoretical and methodological side of the problem 
of scope, it must be emphasised that the problem itself cannot be solved by theoretical 
means only. It will be the task of future empirical research – especially research into actual 
religious beliefs and practices in their particular contexts – which will partly determine 
whether CSR theories have major relevance or not. However, the problem of scope is also a 
methodological and theoretical one in the sense that our understanding of the auxiliary 
theories and related assumptions gives us expectations about the future results of the CSR. 
In these terms, Boyer‟s view is that we should expect CSR to give satisfactory answers to 
most of the questions he poses whereas the more pessimistic view of Laidlaw‟s and Day‟s 
would claim that Boyer‟s general questions are of minor interest and even if CSR theories 
were equipped to answer them, those answers would not constitute a complete or a 
satisfactory answer.       
 
4.2. Explaining Cultural Selection  
Recall that in the discussions in section 2.2 we pointed out how CSR employs a certain type 
of selective explanation that invokes cognitive constraints to explain the prevalence of a 
certain type of ideas. In this section, we will be examining the nature of selective explanations 
and their relationship to other types of explanations. We will be looking at one popular way 
of making this distinction, namely, distinguishing ultimate and proximate explanations. 
Traditionally, in the case of human behaviour ultimate explanations have been understood as 
explanations that invoke events in the human evolutionary past, whereas proximate 
explanations invoke developmental or psychological mechanisms.  
 Recall that selective explanations employed by CSR writers are not biological or 
evolutionary explanations (section 2.2). For the sake of clarity, we should follow Valerie 
Haines who makes a distinction between evolutionary analogies and evolutionary 
explanations: 
 
Evolutionary explanations theorize or explore empirically how natural selection 
shaped human social behaviour, social organization, social change, and cultural 
evolution by causing humans to behave in ways that maximize their inclusive fitness 
in past and current environments. Evolutionary analogies use the logic of natural 
selection to offer sociological and anthropological answers to sociological and 
anthropological questions.289  
 
As we have already seen (section 2.4.), CSR writers do not think that evolutionary 
explanations (understood in the aforementioned way) go all the way. They claim that 
evolutionary explanations are useful in explaining why human cognition is what it is, but it is 
the cognition that explains why culture is what it is. Instead of evolutionary explanations of 
human culture, they propose that we adopt an evolutionary analogy (understood in the 
aforementioned way). Namely, that we can explain cultural evolution as if it was analogous to 
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biological evolution. Although CSR writers acknowledge that there are several differences 
between cultural and biological evolution, they maintain that cultural evolution can be 
explained in terms of “selection pressures” of cognitive and environmental constraints.290 
However, evolutionary analogies are troubled by the same problem as proper evolutionary 
explanations, namely, that general descriptions of selection pressures are not enough to 
explain why individual organisms have the traits they have.291   
 To highlight the difference between population-scale explanations and individual-
scale explanations evolutionary biologist Ernst Mayr introduced the notions of “ultimate” 
and “proximate causation”.292 According to philosopher André Ariew, Mayr understood the 
difference as a difference between the decoding of a genetic program (proximate causes) and 
changing of a genetic program by evolution (ultimate causes). Behind this distinction is 
Mayr's attempt to defend evolutionary biology against developmental studies which had 
considerable influence at the time he was writing.293 Without going in to the details of this 
muddled discussion, I will simply report Ariew's conclusions.294  First it must be noted that 
he is quite sceptical of the application of the terms “ultimate” and “proximate” in the sense 
that Mayr uses them and suggests that we replace them with “evolutionary explanation” 
(ultimate) and “individual explanation” (proximate). Despite Ariew's well meaning rejoinder, 
we will continue to use the ultimate/proximate distinction but we will take those terms to 
mean what Ariew wants them to mean. So, Ariew suggest that the terms “ultimate” and 
“proximate” refer to different kinds of explanations that answer different kinds of questions.  
 Proximate explanations are explanations that answer questions about an organism 
over its lifetime. These explanations are causal and are based on the structural elements of 
individual organisms and their development as well as adult capabilities. Proximate 
explanations seek to answer functional questions like “how does X operate?”, or 
developmental questions like “how does X come into being?”295 Conversely, ultimate 
explanations are answers to questions like “how come trait X is prevalent in a population?” 
or “why does trait X remain prevalent in a population?” and as such they are based on 
similarities between individuals in a population. Ariew claims that ultimate explanations are 
not reducible to individual-level causal explanations since ultimate explanations refer to 
                                                 
290 The biggest difference is that cultural transmission is more variable than genetic transmission. In genetic 
transmission the rate of mutation is very slow which means that transmission is mainly replication. In cultural 
transmission, the rate of mutation, at least according to Sperber (1996, 98-106) and Boyer (1994, 274-285), is 
very high indeed. Sperber and Boyer insist (see chapter 2.2.) that cultural transmission consists of continuous 
distortion and reconstruction rather than replication.    
291 This problem is by no means exclusive to CSR. On the contrary, the problem is very common both in 
philosophy of social science and in philosophy of biology. No consensus has been achieved and some have 
even insisted that the whole ultimate/proximate distinction should be completely dropped. One could point out 
that the problem itself is not going to dissolve even if we get rid of the terms. For discussion, see, e.g., 
Marchionni & Vromen 2009; Mitchell 1992; Mitchell & Dietrich 2002; Francis 1990.  
292 Mayr introduced these notions in his article Cause and Effect in Biology (1961). See also Mayr 1977, 1993. For 
an overview of the ultimate/proximate distinction in Mayr, see Beatty 1994.  
293 Ariew 2003, 553-555.  
294 According to Ariew, Mayr's account has several problems. In regards to proximate causes, Mayr's idea of 
what developmental biology studies and explains is too restricted. Mayr claims that developmental biology 
studies how the “genetic program is decoded”, but this is clearly inadequate. Ariew points out that explaining 
development is not just based on genetic decoding because other factors, such as environmental and other 
extra-cellular factors, come into the explanations as well. In regards to ultimate causes, Ariew claims that Mayr 
makes several unfounded assumptions. First, Mayr presupposes that natural selection is the only factor that 
explains why some traits are prevalent in populations. This is not true because other factors, such as migration, 
mutation, genetic recombination and drift, also explain the same phenomena. Second, Mayr assumes that 
ultimate explanations (evolutionary explanations) are historical, which is, again, false because rather than being 
based on individual histories, ultimate (evolutionary explanations) are based on statistical similarities of 
individuals in a population. See Ariew 2003, 554-560.  
295 Ariew 2003, 556-557. 
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common properties in individuals in a certain population. This point can be highlighted by 
introducing two different notions of fitness: individual fitness and trait fitness. Ariew writes 
that “individual fitness is a propensity of an individual to survive and reproduce in its 
environment given the traits it possesses”296 and as such individual fitness is the proper 
domain of proximate explanations, that is, explanations that explain the properties of 
individuals by their structures. Trait fitness, on the other hand, is “an average (individual) 
fitness of individuals possessing a particular trait. As an average, trait fitness does not reflect a 
property that any individual necessarily possesses (e.g no human couple has 2.3 children).”297 
Ariew's point here is that as individual fitness is a property of an individual, trait fitness is a 
property of a population, and populations are the things that evolve whereas individuals 
develop.298 So Ariew's conclusion is that  
 
[t]he point of natural selection explanations of evolutionary population changes is to 
explain those changes by citing varying features of the population. Those features are 
what some ensembles of individuals have in common that vary from other 
ensembles, namely varying traits. Consequently, natural selection provides an 
explanation of what several evolutionary events have in common.299 
 
 Ariew's basic result is that proximate explanations and ultimate explanations are 
different kinds of explanation altogether. Proximate explanations explain the properties of 
individuals, whereas ultimate explanations explain the properties of populations. In this 
sense, populations are not ensembles of individuals but statistical descriptions of the 
similarities between actual individuals in a population. He goes on to say that even if we 
could have a complete causal story of an individual organism X from its birth to its death, 
this causal story would only constitute a proximate explanation. There would still be a plenty 
of room for ultimate explanations that would explain why a population of organisms has the 
similarities it has.300 
 In Ariew‟s work, ultimate and proximate explanations seem to be distinguished on 
the basis of their targets. This is not the only possibility. Indeed, we can analyse any given 
explanation by asking three questions:  
 
(1) What does the explaining (explanans)? 
(2) What is the target of the explanation (explanandum)? 
(3) What is the “mode of explanation” (how does it explain)? 
 
If we apply these questions to Ariew‟s analysis, the following picture emerges. In biology, 
ultimate explanations explain traits that are shared in a given population by invoking 
similarities between evolutionary events, that is, events that all individuals of the population 
have in common. The mode of explanation is functionalistic as such explanations invoke the 
beneficial reproductive effects of adaptations. Conversely, proximate explanations in biology 
are explanations of individual traits which invoke events in individual development, structure 
and environment. The mode of this explanation is causal.301  
 Now, if we apply this scheme to cultural evolution instead of biological evolution, I 
suggest that we get the following results. Ultimate explanations of culture (explanations of 
cultural evolution) explain recurrent patterns in thinking and behaviour in human population 
                                                 
296 Ariew 2003, 562. 
297 Ariew 2003, 562. 
298 Ariew 2003, 560-563. 
299 Ariew 2003, 563. 
300 Ariew 2003, 561.  
301 Such explanations can also be constitutive. We will return to this point later.  
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by invoking species-general cognitive mechanisms. The mode of explanation is “cognitive 
functionalism” since it explains the existence of a recurrent pattern by its high cognitive 
effects (optimal effect-effort ratio). What about proximate explanations of culture? We might 
suggest that proximate explanations of culture would be explanations of individual instances 
of behaviours and thoughts, namely, explanations that we normally call psychological 
explanations. Such explanations explain individual traits, such as beliefs, by invoking 
individual development and environment (individual‟s history) as well as personal or sub-
personal psychological explanations. Note that cognitive mechanisms have different 
functions in these schemes and they should not be confused.  In the case of ultimate 
explanations of culture (explanations of cultural evolution), cognitive mechanisms serve as 
ultimate causes as they explain why certain ideas are more “catchy” than others. In the case 
of proximate explanations of culture (explanations of individual behaviour and thinking) 
however, cognitive mechanisms can serve as candidates for proximate causes.  
 In the case of CSR explanations, the aforementioned questions (1)-(3) should be 
answered in the following way. The recurrent patterns in religious thinking and behaviour (2) 
are explained by the architecture of the human mind (1) – or more specifically, by the 
operation of a particular cognitive mechanism or a set of mechanisms. Finally, the way in 
which cognitive mechanisms explain recurrent patterns is by showing that some ideas have 
selective advantage over other ideas.302  
 The discussion so far suggests several consequences for CSR explanations. First of 
all, we can say that CSR writers are working with abstract models rather than historical 
descriptions of events. Critics are right to point out that CSR theories are quite abstract. 
Second, if CSR explanations are truly ultimate explanations of cultural evolution, then there 
is room for proximate explanations. In explaining particular instances of religious behaviours 
and beliefs, ultimate explanations of cultural evolution are basically useless: if we want to 
explain, for instance, why is it that John believes in God, then we quickly realise that an 
answer in terms of cognitive similarities and cultural evolution is far from being sufficient. 
Indeed, it might even be misleading. Events in John‟s history, his conscious reflection and 
specific situations in which John has found himself are all factors that might better explain 
his belief. Let us take another example. CSR writers puts forward theories that explain why 
ritual behaviour is so widespread (section 3.3.) by showing how cognitive systems make ritual 
behaviour possible and probable. As such, these theories answer only some questions about 
rituals. They do not explain why particular rituals have the particular forms they have, or why 
some people attend to rituals and others do not and so forth. Specific questions, such as 
Why John attended this ritual rather than stayed home or Why the Zande tribe sing during 
their rituals and the Zimbo tribe do not, cannot be answered by the tools provided by CSR's 
scheme. Further, there is room for other ultimate explanations as well: even in the case of 
biological explanation, natural selection is not the only explanatory factor of evolutionary 
change.303  
                                                 
302 One important terminological point must be made. The term “ultimate” may have the connotation that 
ultimate explanations are somehow “deeper”, more “final” or fundamental than proximate explanations. This is 
simply not true: ultimate explanations do not reveal the “ultimate” meaning or basic motivations or anything 
the like.   
303 In addition to the ultimate/proximate distinction, there is also another quite famous classification of 
explanation-begging questions in biology. This four-question classification has been given by Niko Tinbergen 
(1963) and it is usually combined with the ultimate/proximate distinction by including the first two questions in 
the category of ultimate explanations and the latter two in the category of proximate explanation. The question 
can be presented as follows: (1) function (What kind of selective advantage does trait T give for a population of 
Y's? The answer is given in terms of selection pressures, environmental conditions and contesting traits), (2) 
evolution/phylogeny (What is the history of the population of Y's and how does it compare to other species? 
The answer is given in terms historical evidence and comparisons), (3) causation (How does organism Y 
operate? The answer is given in terms of mechanisms that underlie the operations of Y) and (4) 
development/ontogeny (How does organism Y come into being? The answer is given in terms of genetic codes, 
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 My central point here has been to show that selective explanations only answer 
questions that concern population-scale developments and use abstract models to answer 
them. A corollary of this point is that having an ultimate explanation tells us very little about 
actual proximate events and vice versa. Now, the interesting question is where the actual 
transition between these modes of explanation takes place. Or put in another way: at which 
point should we start talking about trends?  
 We are now in a position where we can reframe the problem of scope. The point of 
the critics of CSR is not so much that the scope of CSR is narrow, but that it does not give 
us tools to distinguish between “how possibly” explanations and “how actually” explanation. 
Again, this problem is common to all selective explanations.304 Further, evolutionary stories 
are speculative in the sense that they seldom describe actual historical processes and give 
accounts that outline the way in which certain adaptations might have developed. All these 
points apply to ultimate explanations of cultural selection as well. Descriptions of cognitive 
constraints and predictions that are based on them in “laboratory conditions” do not go a 
long way in showing what role these constraints play in real world situations. This is because 
we have no tools for distinguishing between situations where cognitive constraints play a 
significant role and situations where some other factors might be invoked to explain why 
recurrent patterns arise. 
 We now have a preliminary picture of what selective explanations explain and how 
they explain. The ultimate/proximate distinction was introduced as an attempt to clarify the 
nature of selective explanations of cultural evolution. It was also pointed out that the mode 
of selective explanations resembles functional explanations since they invoke beneficial 
cognitive effects as causes of the prevalence of religious ideas. This result might seem strange 
as CSR writers usually emphasise strongly that they are in the business of giving causal 
explanations rather than functional ones (section 2.2.).  
 
4.3. Explaining Cognitive Capacities 
The preceding section examined the problem of scope in the light of philosophy of biology. 
In this section, we will shift our point of view from evolutionary considerations to 
psychological ones. It has been pointed out several times in the course of this work that CSR 
writers argue strongly for the relevance of non-conscious (and non-intentional) cognitive 
mechanisms for explaining cultural selection. According to the critics of the CSR, 
psychological explanations of this kind do not go very far in explaining cultural products, 
ideas or practices as these explanations rule out “everything that humans think and do in the 
reflective exercise of capacities [like] reason, imagination, and will”, as Laidlaw puts it. 
Laidlaw‟s view seems to be that shared practices and ideas are mostly “reflective exercise of 
capacities [like] reason, imagination, and will” and as such are out of the reach of 
psychological explanations based on “mechanistic computational operations”. In order to 
clarify the issue, this section will recast the problem of scope in terms of the relationship 
between two kinds of psychological explanations, namely, personal and sub-personal 
explanations.  
                                                                                                                                                  
interactions with the environment and other ecological factors). 
304 The explanatory power of natural selection is under considerable debate in philosophy of biology and 
evolutionary psychology. Generally speaking there are three positions: (1) “hard-liner” Neo-Darwinians (or 
adaptationists) claim that all complex organisations are products of natural selection, (2) “spandrelists” claim 
that natural selection is an important but in most cases not the driving force behind evolutionary change and (3) 
the occupants of the middle position seek to strike a balance between natural selection and other factors. For 
discussion, see, e.g., Sober 2004.  
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 Several writers have suggested that the psychological sciences offer explanations of 
human behaviour and information processing capabilities in three different “levels of 
explanation”:305  
 
(1) personal explanations that explain individual behaviour and thinking by folk 
psychological categories, 
(2) sub-personal explanations that explain similarities in behaviour and thinking by 
unconscious cognitive mechanisms, 
(3) biological (i.e., neuroscientific) explanations that explain how cognitive mechanisms 
are realised by physical structures.   
 
Personal explanations (1) are explanations of behaviour that posit intentional states such as 
beliefs, desires or other propositional attitudes. In short, personal explanations assume that 
the explained behaviour is a product of a rational mind. In section 2.1 when we first 
encountered this type of explanation we called it intentional or rational explanation. 
Sometimes in philosophical literature it is also called commonsense psychological 
explanation or folk psychological explanation. Further, cognitive theories of mind posit 
computational and automatic mechanisms (section 2.2) which would inhabit the sub-
personal level of explanation. Finally, neuroscientists who study the actual physical 
interactions going on in the brain are dealing with the biological (3) level of explanation.306 
Now, the basic idea is that these levels of explanation are usually thought to form a hierarchy 
of explanations as presented in figure 4.  
 The philosophical consensus seems to tend in the direction of claiming that folk 
psychology in everyday contexts is first and foremost an explanatory theory.307 Folk 
psychological vocabulary which includes terms such as belief, desire and reason is used 
whenever we want to predict, explain or describe the intentional behaviour of others. Such 
terms refer to states that are difficult to localise into sub-personal or biological explanations 
as they seem to have normative aspects: personal explanations are based on the assumption 
that humans are rational agents and that their behaviour is systematically caused by and 
explainable in terms of beliefs, desires and related propositions.308 Note that such states can 
have an explanatory role because of their content, that is, they represent the world as being in 
a certain way. Further, personal explanations seem to suggest that intentional states causally 
bring about behaviour and those behavioural regularities that personal explanations pick out 
                                                 
305 Dennett introduces the distinction between personal and sub-personal explanations in his Content and 
Consciousness (1969). Dennett (1987) also distinguishes explanations from three different stances that we can take: 
the intentional stance, the design stance and the physical stance. Explanations from the intentional stance 
consider a system as a rational agent that attempts to solve a particular problem or perform a certain task. We 
identify the constraints of the given task as well as strategies that might be used to perform the task. In the 
design stance we consider the design of all possible systems that might solve the task at hand. Finally, in the 
physical stance we look at how a system that might perform the task at hand might be physically structured. 
See, Bermudez 2005, 17-18, 27-31. Similarly, philosopher Robert Cummins distinguishes five types of 
psychological explanation (2000, 127): (1) folk psychological explanations, (2) computational explanations, (3) 
connectionist explanations, (4) neuroscience explanations and (5) evolutionary explanations. The first type of 
explanation would correspond to personal explanation, the second and the third type would be alternative 
models of sub-personal explanation and neuroscience explanations would correspond to biological 
explanations. Evolutionary explanations could also be understood as a form of biological explanation.   
306 For an overview, see, e.g., Bermudez 2005, 27-29.  
307 In the following, I assume that mental activity consists of, roughly, intentional and non-intentional states and 
processes. For instance, propositional attitudes such as beliefs and desires are intentional states whereas 
perceptions and emotions are non-intentional. The cognitive/representational theory of mind (chapter 2.3) 
argues that all mental activity can be understood as representations and processes that are operated on these 
representations. Mental representations in this sense would cover both intentional and non-intentional states.  
308 This is what Cummins calls “Leibniz‟s gap”: folk psychological notions do not seem to map onto notions 
about brains and bodies or other internal structures.  
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cannot be picked out at the level of sub-personal explanation.309 Finally, folk psychological 
states that personal explanations refer to are states to which individuals themselves have 
some sort of “privileged access”: I have knowledge of my own propositional attitudes in a 
direct way (my mental states are transparent to me) whereas others come to know my mental 
states in an indirect way, such as by inferences drawn from my utterances and actions.310  
 
Figure 4. The hierarchy of psychological explanations.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Now that we have some idea of how personal explanations work we can take a brief 
look at sub-personal explanations. Philosopher Robert Cummins gives a useful outline of 
psychological explanation in his article “How does it work?” versus “What are the laws?”: Two 
Conceptions of Psychological Explanation (2000). Cummins strongly criticises accounts of 
psychological explanation that are based on the existence of explanatory laws as the 
deductive-nomological model of explanation suggests. After pointing out that psychology is 
not interested in seeking explanatory laws, but psychological effects, he writes that  
 
[w]hat I have been calling “psychological effects” are not the only, or even the 
primary, explananda of psychology. I have been concentrating on effects because I 
have been criticising the idea that psychological explanation is subsumption under 
law; and psychological laws specify effects. The primary explananda of psychology, 
however are not effects (psychological laws) but capacities.311 
 
                                                 
309 Bermudez (2005, 34) calls the former aspect “distinctive taxonomy” (personal explanations posit states that 
are not detectable at a sub-personal level of analysis) and the latter “distinctive regularities” (personal 
explanations posit behavioural regularities that cannot be specified in non-folk psychological terms).  
310 Botterill & Carruthers 1999, 31-38; Horgan & Woodward 1985, 197-198. The nature of folk psychology is 
widely debated in contemporary cognitive psychology, cognitive science, and in philosophy (in philosophy of 
mind to be exact). Debates rage over the function of folk psychology, the extent to which it should be used in 
scientific psychology, and its role in explaining human behaviour in the social sciences. See, e.g., Carruthers & 
Smith 1996. 
311 Cummins 2000, 122.  
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Cummins‟ point is that psychological explanations do not explain psychological phenomena 
on the basis of law-like regularities but rather such regularities of psychological phenomena 
(psychological effects) are targets of psychological explanations. Thus the explanandum of a 
psychological explanation is usually a capacity that creates the regularity. These might include 
capacities like seeing depth, understanding a language or planning the future. These capacities 
(and others) cannot be explained by general laws since psychological laws are just 
descriptions of regularities in such capacities. Moreover, Cummins suggests that to explain a 
dispositional property, such as a capacity of a system, one should proceed by “functional 
analysis”: 
 
Functional analysis consists in analyzing a disposition into a number of less 
problematic dispositions such that programmed manifestation of these analyzing 
dispositions amounts to a manifestation of the analyzed disposition. By 
“programmed” here, I simply mean organized in a way that could be specified in a 
program or flowchart.312  
 
The basic idea corresponds to that of “functional decomposition” advocated by Dennett. 
Functional analysis or decomposition breaks a function into smaller sub-functions until a 
level is reached where functions are relatively simple and can be instantiated by some 
physical system.313 Such an analysis is usually given in the form of a flowchart or what is 
sometimes called a “boxological” chart.314  
 We are interested in the exact relationship between personal and sub-personal 
explanation – a problem that Bermudez dubs as the “interface problem”. According to him, 
the interface problem can be stated as follows: 
 
How does commonsense psychological explanation interface with the explanations 
of cognitive and mental operations given by scientific psychology, cognitive science, 
cognitive neuroscience and the other levels in the explanatory hierarchy?315 
 
One way to understand the relationship between personal explanations that explain 
behaviour by invoking intentional mental states and sub-personal explanations that explain 
general psychological capacities by revealing underlying mechanisms was already presented in 
the form of “explanatory hierarchy”. If we can situate personal explanations at the top of an 
explanatory hierarchy, then we can understand its relationship to sub-personal explanations 
by distinguishing horizontal explanations from vertical ones. According to this view, 
horizontal explanations are singular causal explanations that invoke temporal and spatial 
sequences of events or states to explain a singular event. Normally, when we ask why X 
happened we are looking for a horizontal explanation. Why did the window break? It broke 
because the neighbour‟s son threw a baseball through it. In the case of personal explanations, 
such explanations would usually invoke intentional mental states. Why did the neighbour‟s 
son throw the ball through the window? He hated the evil uncle that lived in the house and 
wanted to annoy him. If horizontal explanations are singular causal explanations, then 
vertical explanations (or constitutive or structural) explanations explain why some of the 
                                                 
312 Cummins 2000, 125.  
313 In his article Artificial Intelligence as Philosophy and as Psychology (1978) and in his later works, Dennett describes 
this approach as postulating more and more stupid homunculi until a level is reached where the tasks 
performed by these homunculi are so simple that they can be done by a very simple process.  
314 If Cummins is right in claiming that psychological explanations explain capacities, then we might say that 
CSR attempts to explain the human capacity for religious belief and behaviour. Further, the argument of CSR 
writers would be that our capacity for religious belief and behaviour would be constituted by the same systems 
that constitute many of our non-religious capacities.  
315 Bermudez 2005, 35.  
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regularities invoked in horizontal explanations work in the first place. Vertical explanations 
do not refer to temporal sequences but to the structure or organisation of the disposition. 
Why did the window break? It broke because the physical structure of the window is such 
that when it is hit by a physical object with a velocity V it will shatter.316  
 When we attempt to work out the relationship between personal and sub-personal 
explanation we quickly end up asking how folk psychological terms and their referents 
should be understood. Roughly speaking, we have three different views which to choose: 
realism, anti-realism (or interpretationalism) and eliminativism (figure 5.). Folk psychological 
realists posit that in explaining and predicting people‟s actions and reactions on the basis of 
their intentional states (beliefs, desires) we are committed both to there being such things as 
intentional states (as types or kinds) and to these states having causal effects. Anti-realism 
comes in many forms but all deny the existence of causally relevant intentional states (types). 
Finally, eliminativists claim that not only are folk psychological terms vacuous but personal 
explanations will eventually be completely eliminated.317 
 
 
Figure 5. Folk psychological terms and their referents 
 
 
 
 
 Folk psychological realists argue that folk psychology commits us to certain kinds of 
inner structures:  
 
We can sum all this up by saying that folk psychology is committed to people having 
intentional states, and to the claim that those intentional states are forms of 
intentional content in which actual or possible items are presented to a subject in 
various ways, and conceptualized in various ways. … There are also – and this seems 
to be the very belief/desire core of folk psychology – characteristic causal 
connections between intentional states and actions.318 
 
This formulation commits the realist to the existence of intentional states in the mind. 
Usually those, such as Fodor, who advocate a representational theory of mind based on the 
Language of Though hypothesis, readily accept such commitments.319 Realists are also 
                                                 
316 The vertical/horizontal distinction can be found in Bermudez 2005, 31-33.  
317 Botterill & Carruthers 1999, 24-26.  
318 Botterill & Carruthers 1999, 38.  
319 See Fodor‟s classic Language of Thought (1975) and its sequel LOT II: The Language of Thought Revisited (2008) 
for details. According to the LoT hypothesis, propositional attitudes and other personal level states are vehicles 
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committed to the existence of different classes of intentional states based on the intrinsic 
properties of these states. This implies that intentional states have conceptual content in 
virtue of their structure. Finally, realists are committed to the claim that mental states are 
causally active, that is, they can be seen as causes of behaviour. In the realist picture, reasons 
and beliefs can be construed as causes of action because inferences that lead to actions can 
be construed as a causal process.320  
 Diametrically opposed to realism is eliminativism that comes in two basic forms. The 
first form, eliminative materialism, argues that personal explanations are based on theory-like 
structures that are clearly mistaken and should be replaced with neuroscientific explanations. 
According to this view, there are no intentional states or anything that correspond to them in 
the mind. The argument further claims that eventually both scientific psychology and 
everyday psychology will be replaced by neuroscience. Philosopher Paul Churchland is one 
of the most famous advocates of eliminative materialism.321 A softer version of eliminativism 
is proposed by Stephen Stich who argues that psychology and neuroscience should be 
developed further before we can decide our proper attitude towards folk psychology. In 
principle, it is possible that the sciences of the mind/brain finally vindicate our folk 
psychological intuitions. Stich concludes that this alternative can be hoped for but it currently 
does not seem very probable.322  
 Folk psychological anti-realism is a mediating position between realism and 
eliminativism. According to anti-realists, such as Dennett and Davidson, folk psychology is a 
theory or an interpretative schema that allows a person to produce mini-theories of the 
mental states of others. Davidson‟s position stems from his anomalous monism which states 
that our common psychological vocabulary does not allow law-like generalisations because 
the norms of rationality are constitutive in our attempts to explain the behaviour of others.323 
This would mean that states that personal explanations posit cannot be mapped onto states 
and processes of sub-personal levels of explanation at all. Personal explanations, in his view, 
would be based on inevitable normative assumptions about human beings. According to 
Dennett, the practice of folk psychology consists of taking a certain kind of stance towards 
other people: the intentional stance. People adopt the intentional stance towards other 
people because it is useful and seems to predict behaviour quite well. According to this view, 
intentional states such as propositional attitudes are abstractions and postulates generated by 
automatic inferences in the mind of the interpreter. This is why intentional states do not have 
causal effects and thus cannot be used as explanatory factors in science. Despite the fact that 
there is no connection between the practical utility of folk psychology and the real causes of 
behaviour, the intentional stance is nevertheless still useful and cannot be eliminated from 
everyday discourse.324  
 Based on these different positions concerning folk psychological terms three views 
about personal explanations emerge: 
 
                                                                                                                                                  
for sentences in the sub-personal language of thought. Fodor‟s LoT hypothesis was originally put forward to 
vindicate and clarify the notion of propositional attitude against connectionism. In the literature, the language 
of though itself has subsequently been dubbed as “Mentalese”. See Botterill & Carruthers 1999, 194-207.    
320 Botterill & Carruthers 1999, 34-38. The realist interpretation of folk psychology has been defended by, e.g., 
Fodor (1987, 2000) and Peter Carruthers (2006). In their famous article Why Folk Psychology Is Here to Stay (1985), 
philosophers Terence Horgan and James Woodward also defend a form of folk psychological realism. 
321 See Churchland 1990, 1995. 
322 See Stich 1983.  
323 Davidson‟s articles on this issue are reprinted in Davidson 1980. 
324 See Dennett 1987, 1991. According to Botterill and Carruthers, Davidson‟s position is problematic because 
the constitutive nature of the norms of rationality seems to make irrational behaviour impossible. The problem 
with Dennett‟s account is instability: Dennett‟s mix of interpretationalism and realism is in constant danger of 
reducing itself either to realism or to eliminativism: on Dennett‟s view, there is no reason for the practical utility 
of folk psychology. See Botterill & Carruthers 1999, 27-31. 
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(1) personal explanations refer to actual states in the mind and they can be conflated 
with sub-personal explanations (folk psychological realism),  
(2) personal explanations do not refer to actual states in the mind nor can they be 
conflated with sub-personal explanations (folk psychological anti-realism), 
(3) personal explanations and sub-personal explanations do not refer to actual states in 
the mind nor can they be conflated with biological explanations (folk psychological 
eliminativism).   
 
According to position (1), personal explanations are similar to sub-personal explanations and 
as such personal explanations are irreducible and can feature in scientific theories. Opposing 
this view, anti-realists (2) agree that personal explanations do not map onto sub-personal 
explanations, but they have different takes on what this means. Davidsonians claim that 
personal explanations need not refer to states that can be mapped onto states of sub-
personal explanations and psychology is thus unable to give sub-personal accounts of 
personal level phenomena. However, Dennettians conclude that sub-personal explanations 
explain the same things as personal explanations without assuming problematic intentional 
states. Finally, advocates of position (3) claim that both personal and sub-personal 
explanations should be eliminated because the states that they posit cannot be mapped onto 
states posited by biological explanations.  
 From these general points we can conclude that the philosophical jury is still out: the 
relationship between personal and sub-personal explanations is (and will probably remain) 
vague in the sense that no general account of that relationship can be given. All three 
positions are philosophically possible and each has different consequences for the scope of 
CSR explanations. Despite these differences, I suggest that we could at least accept the 
position suggested by Botterill and Carruthers when they point out that  
 
[the] difference which we find between folk psychology and scientific psychology is 
that whereas the folk theory is geared to the minutiae of individual cases, scientific 
theory is interested rather in general kinds of processes. Thus, I might be concerned 
whether that look on your face shows that you have recognised me as I attempt to 
sneak out of some disreputable haunt. What scientific psychology is interested in 
explaining is how our capacity for recognising faces operates in general.325  
 
As sub-personal explanations explain general capacities (which in turn create tendencies) we 
should not think that such explanations can substitute personal explanations. In this sense, 
the critics of CSR are right when they claim that “everything that humans think and do in the 
reflective exercise of capacities [like] reason, imagination, and will” is out of reach for sub-
personal explanations. In explaining singular works of art, ideas or actions personal 
explanations are irreplaceable. On the other hand, the critics are wrong in claiming that sub-
personal explanations have nothing to say about ideas and actions based on “reflective 
exercise of reason, imagination, and will”. Personal explanations might work well with 
singular events but sub-personal explanations should be invoked to explain general 
tendencies or patterns that singular events, actions and ideas exhibit.    
 On the one hand, it seems plausible that the cognitive capacities that underlie our 
conscious thinking and action have some effect on the content of our ideas and thus create 
patterns and tendencies. Thus it would be a mistake to deny a priori the explanatory relevance 
of such mechanisms for explanations of cultural diversity and stability. On the other hand, as 
sub-personal explanations are mostly models explaining capacities and as we do not have any 
idea how sub-personal or biological explanations could replace or eliminate personal 
                                                 
325 Botterill & Carruthers 1999, 47. 
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explanations we should not assume that sub-personal explanations would “go all the way up” 
in explaining behaviour and thinking. There is an extensive philosophical debate going on 
about these issues so taking strong positions is not advisable. On the one end are those who 
claim that personal explanations are mostly autonomous and cannot be mapped onto sub-
personal or biological explanations. At the other end of the spectrum one finds writers 
according to whom biological explanations will eventually remove all personal and sub-
personal explanations. Previous considerations suggest that we should avoid both extremes 
and leave our options relatively open at this point. It would seem best to proceed on a case-
by-case basis, that is, by putting forward hypotheses at different levels of explanation and 
testing them in individual cases, rather than deciding a priori either that sub-personal 
explanations can be invoked to answer all questions about shared behaviour and ideas or that 
sub-personal explanations are completely irrelevant for such considerations.   
 
4.4. Rethinking Causal Explanation 
This section examines the notion of causal explanation in CSR writers and attempts to flesh 
out their assumptions with the help of philosophical theories of scientific explanation. We 
have already pointed out in section 2.2 that CSR writers seek causal explanations and noted 
how they connect causal explanations to physicalistic assumptions. Their assumption seems 
to be that causal explanations of this type are a norm in science and such explanations should 
be applied in the study of religion as well.  
 Recall Atran‟s formulation of his position: 
 
[n]aturalism in cognitive anthropology describes the attempt to causally locate the 
commonsense objects of study – cultures – inside the larger network of scientific 
knowledge. This approach posits no special phenomena, ontologies, causes, or laws 
beyond those of ordinary material objects and their inter-relationships. It studies the 
structure and content of representations, both private and public, and their variously 
patterned distributions within and between human populations.326 
 
He insists that  
 
[c]ultures and religions do not exist apart from the individual minds that constitute 
them and the environments that constrain them, any more than biological species 
and varieties exist independently of the individual organisms that compose them and 
the environments that conform them. They are not well-bounded systems of definite 
clusters of beliefs, practices, and artifacts, but more or less regular distributions of 
causally connected thoughts, behaviors, material products, and environmental 
objects. To naturalistically understand what “cultures” are is to describe and explain 
the material causes responsible for reliable differences in these distributions.327 
 
The central point here is that a properly naturalistic account can only accept causes and 
effects that are material or physical. These material causes seem to include psychological, 
ecological and evolutionary factors, but not social or cultural factors. Recall that Sperber 
understands the issue in a similar fashion when he insists that an explanation is causal and 
mechanistic when it analyses a complex causal relationship as an articulation of more 
elemental relationships. The idea here is that a good naturalistic explanation shows how the 
elemental causal relationships can be given a natural description in terms of some natural 
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science (section 2.2.). It seems that these claims are an attempt to get rid of all “vague” 
entities and “higher-level” causes that populate the socio-cultural sciences (cultures, 
abstractions, urges, etc.).  
 Sperber's emphasis on causal explanation leads him to reject three dominant 
explanatory strategies in anthropology. First, he claims that the strategy of hermeneutical 
anthropology - “interpretative generalisation” - attempts to describe the meaning of some 
practice or institution in abstract and interpretative terms. After the meaning is described, it 
is usually generalised and compared to similar interpretations from other cultural contexts. 
He singles out Geertzian “thick descriptions” as prototypes of such an approach (section 
2.1). The problem is, Sperber points out, that general meanings and interpretations attributed 
to local institutions, practices or symbols by anthropologists cannot be causes of local 
inhabitants‟ actions. This is because interpretations are construed by the anthropologist 
himself and they exists in his mind only. Locals behave and act on the basis of what is in 
their heads rather than on the basis of the anthropologist's interpretation. This is why 
Sperber concludes that interpretative generalisations are not explanations at all: they cannot 
be tested so they are not even proper hypotheses.328  
 Second, Sperber claims that even though the explanatory strategy of structuralism is 
an improvement on interpretative generalisation, it does not do well in causal analysis. He 
points out that structuralist explanation is based on the idea that in the diversity of cultural 
material there are some underlying themes. Thus, structuralist explanations start from 
interpretive generalisations, but attempt to go beyond them: their goal is to identify 
similarities between representational structures. But, again, the problem is that structuralist 
explanations ground themselves on the interpretations of anthropologists: these 
interpretations are causally vague because they are abstractions of what is actually going on in 
the locals‟ minds, Sperber claims. What we want is an account of causal factors that explains 
why cultural representations exhibit similarities cross-culturally. So, Sperber's conclusion is 
that structuralism has identified the thing that is in need of an explanation, but is unable to 
explain it in causal terms. Finally, Sperber rejects the most dominant explanatory strategy in 
past and present social sciences: functionalism. He grounds his rejection in the claim that 
functional explanations are not properly causal, because they explain the existence of some 
population-level property, such as a particular social structure or institution, by its beneficial 
effect for the population in general. Without a plausible feedback mechanism, effects of 
institutions or practices cannot be their causes.329           
 Sperber's ideas of explanation coincide quite neatly with the causal-mechanism model 
of scientific explanation which has been developed by several writers, especially by 
philosopher Wesley Salmon.330 The causal-mechanism model is based on the idea that there 
are actual causal relationships in the world and the function of our explanations is to track 
                                                 
328 Sperber 1996, 41-43. Anthropologists such as Mary Douglas and Claude Levi-Strauss practice interpretive 
generalisation, in Sperber‟s opinion. Clifford Geertz and other hermeneutically oriented scholars could be 
included in this group also. One critical point: Sperber seems to assume that Geertz and other advocates of 
interpretative anthropology are interested in “explaining” things, but this does not seem to be the case. Geertz, 
for instance, does not claim to explain anything at all; for him interpreting the web of cultural meaning 
surrounding humans is a way to understand their actions. See Geertz 1973, 5-10. It seems pointless to criticise 
Geertz for giving bad explanations when he is not interested in giving explanations at all. Furthermore, 
McCauley & Lawson point out that we cannot escape interpretation completely: in order to explain action, we 
must always interpret what is going on in participant‟s heads. See Lawson & McCauley 1990, 22-23.  
329 Sperber 1996, 41-49. There is a considerable amount of discussion of functionalist explanations. Several 
philosophers have defended the use functional explanations on different levels of social science by identifying it 
as a sub-species of causal explanation. See, e.g., Kincaid 1996, 2007.  
330 See Salmon 1984, 1989. Usually theories of scientific explanations are divided very roughly into two groups: 
the first group bases explanations on laws (or law-like dependencies), whereas the second group grounds 
explanation to causes. The former group is sometimes said to have an epistemic idea of explanation whereas the 
latter group has an ontic idea.  
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those relationships. In this sense, the model is strongly realistic: explanations are not 
arguments that are based on universal laws of nature as in the deductive-nomological model 
(D-N model) of explanation331 or schemes which unify separate areas of knowledge as in 
Philip Kitcher's model of explanation as unification332. Salmon's formulation of the causal-
mechanism model is strongly materialistic: he claims that in the world there are physical 
causal processes and interactions between these processes. To explain a phenomenon P is to 
track the causal process and causal interactions between processes that led to the emergence 
of P. Take the movement of billiard balls, for example. The movement of a cue ball on the 
billiard table is a causal process that carries with it a potential for causal interaction. A causal 
interaction occurs when the cue ball hits another ball which starts moving instead. The causal 
interaction event transmits the causal power or energy from one process to the next.333  
 Originally the causal-mechanism model was developed to answer the problems which 
besed the D-N model. Indeed, the causal-mechanism model has certain benefits that make it 
appealing. First, causal explanations in this scheme invoke causes that are independent and 
temporally prior to their effects. This ensures that causal relationships can be properly tested 
by empirical methods. Second, the causal-mechanism model does not presume the existence 
of universally valid laws of nature as the D-N model does. The problem with universal laws 
is that they seem very rare in sciences other than physics: even natural sciences such as 
biology lack universal laws.334 Third, the causal-mechanism model ensures that scientific 
explanations and the results of scientific inquiry can be subsumed under one ontologically 
physicalistic framework thus keeping the social and natural sciences together.  
 Now, it seems relatively clear that the causal-mechanism analysis of explanation helps 
us to clarify the assumptions behind Sperber and CSR writers. These basic assumptions can 
be summed up by the claim according to which to explain a phenomenon P is to describe the 
causal/physical processes and interactions preceding the phenomenon P. However, such an 
account of explanation faces severe challenges that have led many philosophers to abandon 
it. The first weakness of the model is that it is unable to identify those causal relations that 
are relevant for explaining a phenomenon. For each given phenomenon to be explained, we 
have numerous causal/physical processes that are irrelevant for the purposes of explanation. 
What we want is not a description of all causal processes that temporally precede the effect 
and contribute to its emergence, but rather an account of explanatorily relevant causes. We 
                                                 
331 The D-N model was introduced by philosopher Carl Hempel (1965). For an outline of both the D-N model 
of explanation and subsequent (massive) criticism, see Salmon 1989, 11-116. The basic idea of the D-N model 
is that explanations are arguments that have an explanandum sentence that describes the explained phenomenon, 
an explanans sentence that is supposed to account for the phenomenon and sentences that describe relevant 
background conditions. Two conditions must be fulfilled for the explanation to be successful. First, the 
explanandum must be logical consequence of the explanans and the explanans must be true. Thus, explanation 
should be valid deductive argument. Second, the explanans must contain at least one “law of nature” or some 
other type of general law. The claim is basically that in order to explain X, one must construct an argument 
where X is subsumed under some universal constant. Thus, the D-N model assumes the existence of general 
laws or some law-like constants. The motivation behind the model is based on the idea of “nomic 
expectability”: scientific explanations make things expectable on the basis of their lawful connections.  
332 For accounts of the unificationist model of explanations, see Kitcher 1989, 1991. The basic idea of the 
unificationist account of explanation is that explanations should relate previously unrelated and unconnected 
phenomena to the body of knowledge we already have. The process of explanation, thus, would be a process 
where constantly growing group of unrelated phenomena is subsumed under constantly diminishing group of 
principles. 
333 Woodward 2003a gives an excellent overview of the D-N model, causal-mechanism and unificationist 
models and their subsequent criticism. One of the basic problems of the causal-mechanism model has been that 
the idea of causal interactions between processes turned out to be extremely hard to conceptualise. Salmon‟s 
view is that causal interactions leave some kind of a “mark”. A mark is a local change in the structure of a 
process such as a dent in a car bumper. This mark distinguishes “pseudo-processes” from genuine causal 
processes. However, it is difficult to say what this “mark” actually is. For discussion, see Craver 2007, 72-86. 
334 For discussion of explanation in biology, see, e.g., Rosenberg 1994.  
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need an explanatory account which describes those causes that we need to know. Take a car 
crash, for instance. A car crashes into a tree because the driver tries to dodge a cat running 
across the road. If we do not have an account of how to distinguish explanatorily relevant 
causal processes from irrelevant causal processes, we might as well say that the car crashed 
because the physical constants of our universe are what they are. It is true that if the physical 
constants of our universe had been different, then the car would not have crashed. In some 
sense this is true, but it somehow seems to be an unsatisfactory answer to why the car 
crashed. The fact that this explanation does not seem to tell us what we want to know about 
the car crash shows that it is not enough to cite just one physical process as the single cause 
or make a list of all preceding physical processes.335     
 The second weakness of the causal-mechanism model is its physicalism or 
“fundamentalism” since it assumes that there is a “basic” level of explanation. In other 
words, the model presumes that all explanations can be ultimately given in terms of physical 
interactions between particular physical entities. This creates problems for explaining 
complex systems, because there are several instances of explanation – even in the domain of 
the natural sciences – that do not deal with particular physical processes, even though it is 
usually thought that such processes underlie “higher-level” phenomena. The idea here is that 
even in physics, when for instance thermodynamics explains the behaviour of gases, 
explanations do not refer to trajectories of individual molecules, even though it is widely 
recognised that gases are just collections of individual molecules, but rather to general laws 
of the behaviours of such collections of molecules and their environmental conditions. This 
is even truer in biology or economics where complex systems are explained without any 
reference to individual physical processes.336 Against this background, micro-reduction and 
emphasising individual physical processes does not seem to make sense.337  
 Now, if we relate these discussions to CSR, I suggest that we get the following 
results. It seems that the requirement of actual material causes is far too strong: CSR writers 
very seldom describe particular physical states or physical processes that explain the 
distribution of representations in a population. Instead, what can be found are models of 
psychological and ecological factors that the CSR writers believe to be more likely to be 
physically realised by some physical structures than entities and processes postulated by 
traditional socio-cultural approaches. Further, although CSR writers suppose that cognitive 
systems are realised in the neuronal activity in the brain (sections 2.2 and 2.3), they continue 
to use cognitive models which very seldom refer to actual physical processes in the brain. 
Thus, it seems quite plausible to claim that when CSR writers talk about “material causes”, 
                                                 
335 For discussion, see Woodward 2003a. The problem described here sometimes goes under the name of the 
“problem of causal relevance”. Craver (2007, 78) describes the problem as follows: “Causal relevance cannot be 
analyzed in terms of exchanges of conserved quantities alone. The causal nexus is a complex reticulum of causal 
processes and interactions. Only some of them are relevant to any given explanandum phenomenon. Providing an 
etiological explanation involves not merely revealing the causal nexus in the past light cone of the explanandum 
phenomenon. It involves, in addition, selecting the relevant interactions and processes and picking out relevant 
features of those processes and interactions.” 
336 Woodward 2003a. Describing individual causal processes in the case of complex systems is almost 
impossible, because the individual processes are too complex: “However, it also seems plain that producing a 
full description of these processes (supposing for the sake of the argument that it was possible to do this) will 
produce little or no insight into why these systems behave as they do. Again, this is not just because any such 
'explanation' will overwhelm our information processing abilities. It is also the case that a great deal of the 
information contained in such a description will be irrelevant to the behaviour we are trying to explain, for the 
same reason that a detailed description of the individual molecular trajectories will contain information that is 
irrelevant to the behaviour of the gases.” 
337 Garfinkel 1981, 49-53. According to Garfinkel, micro-reduction includes two claims: (1) for every state, 
there is a micro-state and (2) for every micro-state, there is a micro-explanation. Usually reductionists hold that 
micro-states, described in physical terms, are “everything there is” and macro-states are either epiphenomenal 
or illusory. Thus micro-reductionism could also be called “nothing more than”-reductionism: a complex state is 
“nothing more than” its micro-state.   
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they are in fact talking about causes that are not teleological or intentional. So, the claim that 
explanations should be based on “material causes” seems to amount to a simple exclusion of 
intentional explanations.   
 Finally, if these claims have any validity, then CSR writers would do well to examine 
their background assumptions concerning explanation and causation.338 It might even be 
argued that CSR writers‟ implicit micro-reductionism partly explains the lack of positive 
engagement between CSR and other approaches, since if it assumed that physical processes 
are the only possible explanatory factors, then approaches that ground their explanations in 
models that are not easily decomposed to physical processes seem non-explanatory. Such an 
explanation might invoke the feeling of not being “properly causal or scientific”. However, 
as the critique of the causal-mechanism model suggests, there are other alternatives available 
– alternatives that do not have problems in providing grounding for empirical research and 
acknowledging the explanatory relevance of “non-physical” looking events or processes. The 
rest of this section will focus on providing a brief outline of one possible alternative to the 
causal-mechanism model. 
 The account of causal explanation that I am suggesting goes by several different 
names, such as the “interventionist theory of causal explanation”, “manipulationist theory of 
causal explanation” or “contrastive theory of causal explanation”.339  Philosopher James 
Woodward summarises this theory in his book Making Things Happen: a Theory of Causal 
Explanation (2003b) and it has been subsequently applied to many different fields. From our 
point of view, the most interesting application is Carl Craver‟s account of neuroscientific 
explanation in his Explaining the Brain: Mechanisms and the Mosaic Unity of Neuroscience (2007). 
Craver‟s view is also based on an account of mechanistic explanation that we will deal in the 
subsequent sections.  
 We can begin by pointing out that the interventionist theory is thoroughly realistic 
since it presumes – as does the causal-mechanism model– that explanations track the causal 
structure of the world: causal relationships are “in the world” and explanations are 
representations of these relationships. However, the causal structure of the world is not 
clearly observable to us and, our explanations - that is, representations of explanatorily 
relevant causal relationships - refer to processes that are beyond our direct observation. 
Experimental settings are needed to isolate and test the existence of such relationships. 
Second, interventionist theory assumes that explanations operate inside what Alan Garfinkel 
calls “explanatory frames”. The idea is that all explanations include an implicit (or explicit) 
conceptualisation of the explanandum phenomenon and some possible alternatives to it. In 
this sense, explanations only explain what they already conceptualise. As explanation explain 
only the explanandum phenomenon “under a certain description” it does not make sense to 
talk about “a complete” or “ultimate” explanation that will somehow exhaust all other 
explanations.340 The third assumption is that explanations are always answers to questions, 
usually why-questions or sometimes how-questions. An explanation is adequate, if it answers 
the question satisfactorily. The assumption that explanations are answers to questions makes 
                                                 
338 Some CSR writers have already considered these issues. See, e.g., Pyysiainen 2009, forth.  
339 Interventionist theory of causal explanation has its roots in several different developments. First, it draws 
inspiration from pragmatic theories of scientific explanation, such as Bas van Fraassen's idea of explanations as 
answers to contrastive questions. See van Fraassen 1980; Garfinkel 1981. Second, it is rooted in counter-factual 
theories of causation of which David Lewis' (1986) theory is the most famous. Third, contemporary 
interventionist theory is indebted to earlier manipulationist approaches or what were formerly called “agentual 
theories of causation”, developed by, e.g., von Wright (1971). Finally, the interventionist theory has roots in 
Salmon's causal-mechanism model of explanation. For overviews of the interventionist theory, see, e.g., 
Woodward 2000, 2003b; Ylikoski 2001, 17-47. For a general account of manipulationist theories of causation, 
see Woodward 2008a. See also Ylikoski 2006.      
340 Garfinkel 1981, 7-10.  
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it possible to specify the object of explanation: questions include “contrast spaces” that limit 
the alternative answers.341  
 This idea of contrasts, or contrast spaces, is extremely important for the 
interventionist account.342 Garfinkel highlights the idea with a well-known example. The 
bank robber named Willie Sutton was serving time in prison and the prison chaplain with the 
intention of reforming him asked him why he robbed banks. Sutton replied: “That‟s where 
the money is.” The point of the example is to show that although both ask the same 
question, their contrast spaces are different. The prison chaplain wants to know why Sutton 
robs in general, whereas for Sutton the issue is whether banks are better places to rob than 
some other places. These questions can be reformulated as what-if-things-had-been-different 
questions to reveal the relevant alternatives, that is, contrasts. Sutton's question is “Why does 
Sutton rob banks rather than other places (like supermarkets or private homes)”, whereas the 
chaplain‟s question is “Why does Sutton rob banks rather than not robbing anything”. When 
we look at these formulations, it is easy to see that they require different answers: to explain 
why Sutton robs banks rather than supermarkets is a different task than explaining why 
Sutton robs banks rather than living a decent life.343 Garfinkel concludes that we should not 
hold explananda as simple objects, but rather as states of affairs together with a contrast space 
which includes a contradictory alternative to it.344 
 The interventionist account of causal relationships is based on the idea of counter-
factual support. The existence of a causal relationship can be determined through 
intervention: if we change the cause factor, we get change in the effect factor. If we are able 
to manipulate the cause, have co-variance in the effect and can determine that the variance in 
the effect is not caused by some other factor, then we can infer that there really is a causal 
relationship between the cause and the effect. In this analysis, causality is ultimately a 
relationship that holds in different counter-factual conditions.345 More formally, we can give 
the relationship between the cause factor and the effect factor in terms of variables:  
 
Variable X is causally relevant to variable Y in conditions W if some ideal 
intervention on X in conditions W changes the value of Y (or the probability of 
distribution over possible values of Y). In the context of a given request for 
explanation, the relationship between X and Y is explanatory if it is invariant under 
the conditions (W) that are relevant in that explanatory context.346 
 
Variables X and Y are capable of taking on determinate values. Talk of events or processes 
can be easily translated to the vocabulary of variables: events can be seen as variables that 
have only two values, 0 or 1, and processes can be seen as variables that can take on any 
value in a continuum. When the relationship between variables X and Y remains stable in 
specified conditions, we can safely deduce that the relationship between them is causal.  
 There are several important points that we have to make about this analysis. First of 
all, the interventionist account does not require an account of a physical chain of events 
which would link the cause to the effect. Of course, an account of the precise mechanism(s) 
that relate the change in cause variable to the change in effect variable would increase the 
plausibility and comprehensiveness of the explanation, but such an account is not necessary 
in principle. What is necessary for the existence of a causal relationship is that we can 
                                                 
341 Garfinkel 1981, 10-14.  
342 The idea of contrast spaces in some form or another appears in several different sources. The “classical” 
discussions can be found in Bas Van Fraassen‟s The Scientific Image (1980) under the heading of “pragmatics of 
explanation” and in Alan Garfinkel‟s Forms of Explanation (1981). For an overview, see Hitchcock (1996).  
343 Garfinkel 1981, 21-41.  
344 Ylikoski 2001, 22-29.  
345 See Woodward 2003b. 
346 Craver 2007, 94. 
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produce change in the effect factor by producing change in the cause factor. This point 
about physical connections generalises over descriptions of causes and effects as well: the 
descriptions of causes and effects need not be given in “physical” (or some other 
predetermined set) of terms. It is enough that descriptions include states, processes or events 
that we can change in principle.347 Furthermore, we need not think that we must be able to 
produce an intervention in the actual world in order to demonstrate the existence of a causal 
relationship. It is enough that we can have an idea of what an intervention might look like – 
an ideal intervention. In many cases, causal claims cannot be tested in laboratory settings; this 
is especially true in the social sciences where the explananda are macro-level events that are 
impossible to operationalise in the laboratory (e.g., revolutions). However, this does not 
prevent us from formulating the explanations involved in interventionist terms. We can seek 
causal factors by describing what would happen, if this or that factor would be removed. 
Finally, if we conceptualise causal relationships in terms of interventions and variables, we 
can identify relationships that are not universal, general or even probable. Thus, we can give 
causal explanations even in conditions where relevant processes are highly context sensitive, 
stochastic and historically contingent.348    
 It was noted earlier that the causal-mechanism account falls prey to the “problem of 
causal relevance” – that is, the problem of how to distinguish causally relevant relationships 
from causally irrelevant relationships. If we take – as the causal-mechanism model suggests – 
physical interactions as prototypes of such relations, we are faced with the problem of how 
to distinguish irrelevant physical interactions that precede the effect from explanatorily 
relevant physical interactions.  This is where the idea of contrast spaces comes in again: in 
order to assess the truth or falsity of a causal claim, it is necessary to explicate the implied 
contrasts in both the description of the cause and the description of the effect. For the cause 
variable, the contrast is between the value of the variable when it is not intervened, and the 
value that the intervention produces. For the effect variable, the contrast is between the 
value of the effect variable when the cause variable is not intervened and the value of the 
effect variable when the value of the cause variable is intervened. More plainly stated causal 
claims are of the form  
 
 X, rather than not-X, causes Y, rather than not-Y in condition W.  
 
Hence when we are looking for an explanation, we are looking for causally relevant contrast 
for the cause-variable which is appropriate for our effect-variable contrast.349  
 We can illustrate the preceding ideas with an example from Craver. Let us imagine 
that we have a bucket of water in the middle of the room and the room temperature drops to 
                                                 
347 This feature of the interventionist account leaves the door open for defences of mental causation and 
“higher-level” causation taken up recently by several authors independently from each other. See, e.g., 
Woodward 2008b and Menzies 2008. The basic idea of this argument is that in order for a mental state (or any 
other “multiply realised” state) to be causally relevant for some event, it is enough that we can produce an 
intervention that changes the particular mental state. Hence, the “ontological” nature of mental states does not 
really matter for the purposes of explanation. To show the existence of a causal relationship between, say, a 
belief and some behaviour, one needs only to produce a change in the belief that will produce a change in the 
behaviour. If this succeeds, the belief can be considered as an explanation for some behaviour.       
348 Craver 2007, 93-100. The final point is the very reason why Craver thinks that the interventionist account is 
especially suitable for the biological and psychological sciences as well as the neurosciences where general laws 
are scarce and mechanisms are highly context sensitive.  
349 Craver 2007, 82, 202-211. Craver (2007, 204) makes this point when he writes that “any time that one 
searches for a cause or attempts to formulate an explanation, one must specify the effect or the explanandum that 
one is trying to explain. Having done so, one then looks for the objective relations of causal relevance that 
explain the effect. The contrastive description of the explanandum effect is helpful merely to specify as precisely 
as possible what one is trying to explain – to identify precisely that feature of the world for which a cause is 
sought.” 
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-18.6 degrees. The result is that the water in the bucket freezes. Now, we can ask, “What 
caused the bucket of water to freeze?” At least two possible hypotheses come to mind: the 
temperature dropped to -18.6 degrees or the temperature dropped below zero. What we are 
looking for here is the causally relevant property that is responsible for the freezing. The 
obvious way for deciding between these competing hypotheses is to do experiments by 
making interventions to the temperature and testing what changes are relevant to the state of 
the water. If the temperature is set to -20 degrees or -10 degrees or any value under zero and 
the water keeps on freezing, then we can conclude that these values in the cause variable are 
not causally relevant to the changes in the effect variable. We can continue the example in 
order to show how the change in contrast classes or explanatory frames changes the 
explanation. We could seek an explanation to the question “What caused the bucket of water 
to freeze in precisely t minutes rather than t1?” Again, we can start by making an intervention 
by changing the temperature to neighbouring values and measuring the rate of freezing. 
Changing the temperature from -18.6 degrees to -20 degrees does make a difference in the 
rate of freezing. This would, in turn, make the different values of the cause variable which 
are under zero degrees causally relevant properties for the time it takes the water to freeze 
even when they are causally irrelevant for the water freezing.350  
 The point of the example is that different effect-contrasts help us to identify the 
relevant cause-contrasts. In our example, one could seek an explanation for the fact that the 
water froze rather than turned to steam or for the fact that the water froze at some particular 
rate t rather than at some other rate. Both of these effect-contrasts demand different cause-
contrasts: the appropriate contrast for the first effect-contrast is the fact that the room 
temperature was below zero rather than above zero. What is not appropriate for the first 
effect-contrast is the fact that the room temperature was -18.6 degrees rather than some 
other value below zero. This cause-contrast, however, is causally relevant for the second 
effect-contrast.351    
 The contrastive analysis also helps us to understand better the relationship between 
micro-explanations and macro-explanations. Garfinkel argues that macro-explanations can 
be truly explanatory without being placeholders for micro-explanations. Thus, according to 
Garfinkel‟s view, the explanatory strategy of micro-reduction (or fundamentalism as Craver 
calls it) is flawed. Even if we were to accept some form of physicalism or another, it does not 
mean that every state would be explained by its physical structure: 
 
So the fact that something materially “is” something else does not mean that we can 
reduce the explanations involved. From the point of view of explanation there is a 
relative independence from the nature of the substrate. A macrostate, a higher level 
state of organization of a thing, or a state of the social relations between one thing 
and another can have a particular realization … But the explanation of the higher 
order state will not proceed via the microexplanation of the microstate which it 
happens to “be.” Instead, explanations seek their own level, and typically this will not 
be the level of underlying substratum.352  
 
The problem with micro-reduction is the assumption that only physical relationships are 
explanatory. This might be due to the fact that only material entities or processes are 
considered to have “causal powers” or what to be ultimately “real”. However, what the 
interventionist model suggests is that we should cut the metaphysical idea of causation loose 
                                                 
350 Craver 2007, 205-206. 
351 Craver 2007, 208-209.  
352 Garfinkel 1981, 59.  
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from the empirical and pragmatic notion of explanatory relevance: we do not need an a priori 
account of “causal powers” or a menu of ultimately real processes.353 
 This confusion between metaphysical constitution and causality makes it difficult for 
a micro-reductionist to see how useful macro-explanations actually are. Garfinkel‟s argument 
here is that macro-explanations change the implicit contrast of the explanandum. In short, 
micro-explanations explain different things than macro-explanations and hence they do not 
compete. Let us take an example from Garfinkel again. Imagine an ecological system which 
has two populations, rabbits and foxes, and in which the size of both populations fluctuate. 
The explanation for the fluctuations is that when the foxes eat most of the rabbits, the fox 
population runs out of food and it begins to shrink. And when the fox population shrinks 
and the pressure of the predators is decreased, the rabbit population begins to grow quickly 
(due to the proverbial capabilities of rabbits to multiply quickly). Finally, when the 
population of rabbits grows, the population of foxes begins to grow again because there are 
enough rabbits for the foxes to eat. Now, we can have different explanations for different 
aspects of this process. Take these two causal claims for instance: 
 
(1) The low level of rabbit population is caused by the high level of fox population 
(2) The cause of death of a single rabbit was that the fox population was high. 
 
Note that the first explanation explains a macro-state with another macro-state and the latter 
explains a micro-state with a macro-state. If micro-reduction were true, then there would 
have to be micro-explanation for the death of a rabbit. The micro-explanation for (2) would 
be something like “rabbit r was eaten because it passed through the capture space of fox f”. 
But this micro-explanation is no longer about the same thing as the macro-explanation: the 
explanandum of the micro-explanation is the death of a rabbit at the hands of fox f, at place p, 
time t, and so on. The explanandum of the macro-explanation is why the rabbit was eaten 
rather than not eaten, whereas the explanandum of the micro-explanation is why the rabbit 
was eaten by fox f at time t rather than by some other fox at some other time and so on.354 
 Garfinkel concludes that macro-explanations are invaluable and irreducible because 
they describe real counter-factual relationships that can be multiply realised by different 
physical mechanisms. In the case of foxes and rabbits, we want to know what makes a 
difference between a rabbit being eaten or not eaten. If I were a rabbit, I would not need to 
know why a rabbit r was eaten at time t and in place p because this would not really help me 
to avoid being eaten by a fox. The reason is that if the rabbit r had not been eaten at time t 
and in place p, then it would have been eaten at some other time and in some other place if 
the population of foxes is indeed high. So there is a genuine counter-factual relationship 
between the number of rabbits being eaten and the high level of foxes, a relationship than 
can be realised in different times and places where rabbits actually are eaten by foxes.355 In 
sum, Garfinkel writes that  
                                                 
353 Garfinkel 1981, 49-53. Craver presents a detailed discussion of fundamentalism. First he defends his account 
of non-fundamental explanations against Jaegwon Kim‟s causal exclusion argument (Explaining the Brain chapter 
6). We will return to the topic of physicalism and causal closure in chapter 5.2. Craver also defends his account 
of non-fundamental explanations against explanatory reductionists of different kinds (Explaining the Brain 
chapter 7).  
354 Garfinkel 1981, 55-56.  
355 Garfinkel 1991, 56-66. Garfinkel provides additional examples. There has been a car crash and the driver was 
drunk. We want to know why the accident happened. We could describe causes that would explain why the 
accident happened at time t in place p under some conditions c, but this would again change the explanandum. If 
the drunk driver had not crashed the car in time t in a place c, he would have crashed it at some other time or at 
least the probability of the crash would be higher than in normal conditions. We can take yet another example. I 
raise my arm. We want to explain why my hand goes up. A micro-reductionist or a fundamentalist would say 
that the explanation must be given at the level of physical states of the brain and my nervous system. This 
would again change the explanandum: in this case, we would be explaining why my hand went up at time t, in 
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[t]he macroexplanation tells us that some realization or other will be the case to bring 
about Q but is indifferent as to which. The microexplanation tells us the mechanism 
by which the macroexplanation operated. The structure gives the why, while the 
microexplanation gives the how.356 
 
In short, a micro-explanation gives us the mechanism by which a given macro-explanation 
worked, but the macro-explanation can work by several different underlying mechanisms. 
The result is that micro-explanation does not give us what the macro-explanation does – that 
is, the event that makes the biggest difference between the rabbit being eaten or not being 
eaten. 
 My argument in this section has been that CSR writers should re-examine their ideas 
of causality and scientific explanation in order to explicate what their theories explain and 
how those theories are related to other account of religious phenomena. I argued that CSR 
writers‟ assumptions can be understood in terms of the causal-mechanism model of causal 
explanation which I then proceeded to criticise. Finally, I suggested that an alternative theory 
of causal explanation – the interventionist theory – might help us to clarify the relationships 
between different kinds of explanations. The implications of such a theory for CSR was not 
discussed here since we must deal with other topics first. Here it suffices to point out that 
what CSR writers hold as one of the most central virtues of their explanations – that is, that 
their explanations posit “no special phenomena, ontologies, causes, or laws beyond those of 
ordinary material objects and their inter-relationships” - is somewhat vague and unnecessary 
as they are clearly referring to phenomena, ontologies and causes that are far beyond any 
physical theory of material objects.  
 
4.5. Rethinking Integration and Reduction  
In addition to the emphasis on causal explanation of religious phenomena, CSR writers are 
also committed to certain ideals concerning the integration of scientific disciplines that partly 
drives their assumptions about of the extensive scope of CSR theories. CSR writers 
constantly combine insights from diverse disciplines, such as cognitive psychology and 
anthropology, and criticise traditional approaches for not recognising the value of the 
behavioural and cognitive sciences to the study of religion and not making their 
methodological assumptions continuous with different branches of such sciences. Although 
CSR writers have not presented a general account of how such an integration should be 
achieved, we have already encountered hints of such a view in their writings. In this section, I 
will try to reveal these assumptions by comparing them to the idea of “vertical integration” in 
Evolutionary Psychology which shares the same goal.  
 The idea of “vertical integration” (or conceptual integration) has been advocated by 
Evolutionary Psychologists Leda Cosmides and John Tooby. According to vertical 
integration the various disciplines of the social and behavioural sciences should make 
themselves mutually consistent and integrate their methodological assumptions with the 
natural sciences. Cosmides and Tooby claim that   
 
                                                                                                                                                  
place p and in some specific trajectory c. The object of the explanation is not the specific trajectory of my hand 
at a certain time, but rather the reason my hand moved at all. For my hand movements in different times and 
trajectories can all be instantiations of my hand going up. 
356 Garfinkel 1981, 58. In the same page Garfinkel also points out that the micro-explanation is simply “too true 
to be good” – that is, it does not help us to distinguish the explanatorily relevant physical (or micro-processes) 
from explanatorily irrelevant processes.  
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[t]he natural sciences are already mutually consistent: the laws of chemistry are 
compatible with the laws of physics, even though they are not reducible to them. 
Similarly, the theory of natural selection cannot, even in principle, be expressed solely 
in terms of the laws of physics and chemistry, yet it is compatible with those laws. A 
conceptually integrated theory is one framed so that it is compatible with data and 
theory from other relevant fields.357  
 
Compatibility in this sense means that biological theories, for instance, do not assume 
physical processes that are not at the same time acknowledged in the theories of physics or 
chemistry. According to Cosmides and Tooby, integration should be seen as multidisciplinary 
consistency and multilevel compatibility of theories. However, they explicitly deny that 
conceptual integration would be a form of “classical theory reduction”: theories cannot be 
reduced to each other but their presuppositions can be consistent. Whereas natural sciences 
are mutually consistent, social sciences are not, Cosmides and Tooby argue. Anthropology 
and psychology, for instance, are construed as isolated disciplines and their theories are not 
integrated. Vertical integration of these disciplines would mean that anthropological 
theorising should not assume psychological processes or events that cannot be approached 
by cognitive psychology. Further, psychologists should not restrict their theories to individual 
minds but focus on the culture generating aspect of human cognition. Finally, conceptual 
integration takes the natural sciences as paradigmatic sciences in the sense that social and 
behavioural sciences should construe their theories in such a way that they do not contradict 
theories in the natural sciences.358 
 The goal of conceptual integration is to create a multidisciplinary and multilevel 
approach to socio-cultural phenomena. Cosmides and Tooby see Evolutionary Psychology as 
an attempt to create an integrated approach of the sort that would construct a bridge over 
“the dark waters” that separate biology from psychology and psychology from social 
sciences. The reason why integration is so important is that  
 
[c]onceptual integration generates this powerful growth in knowledge because it 
allows investigators to use knowledge developed in other disciplines to solve 
problems in their own. The causal links between fields create anchor points that 
allow one to bridge theoretical or methodological gaps that one‟s own field may not 
be able to span. This can happen in behavioral and social sciences, just as it has 
happened in the natural sciences.359 
 
The idea is that unification of all disciplines of science contributes to scientific progress: the 
social and behavioural sciences should aim towards integration because integration in the 
natural sciences has led to powerful growth in knowledge. For example, the atomic theory 
altered the way that chemists view thermodynamics and connected Newtonian mechanics 
with kinetic theories of heat and so on.  
 Vertical integration can proceed in at least two ways. First, it can seek to overcome 
methodological dualism, that is, the distinction between the natural and social sciences and 
thus maintain the unity of science. In this sense, conceptual integration requires that the 
domain of socio-cultural phenomena is “naturalised”, that is, re-conceptualised in terms of 
some natural science. The most relevant natural science has usually been either biology, as in 
the case of evolutionary approaches, or psychology as exemplified by Sperber's epidemiology 
of representations. Secondly, conceptual integration attempts to facilitate interdisciplinary 
and inter-theoretic research by advocating the use of causal explanation. The idea here is that 
                                                 
357 Cosmides & Tooby & Barkow 1992, 2. 
358 Cosmides & Tooby & Barkow 1992, 1-6.  
359 Cosmides & Tooby & Barkow 1992, 12. 
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one of the reasons why social and cultural sciences cannot be integrated into the natural 
sciences is that they both presume ontologically vague entities and use non-causal 
explanations. According to this view, proper causal explanations, as we have seen in the 
previous section, explain phenomena ultimately as effects of physical processes and their 
interactions. In this view, naturalisation and re-conceptualisation of the socio-cultural domain 
would amount to causally explaining why humans have the mental representations they have.  
 Vertical integration presumes that particular scientific disciplines exist as parts of a 
larger structure of hierarchically organised disciplines of science. Disciplines at lower levels 
of the hierarchy deal with laws and principles of a very general nature. The higher a discipline 
is situated in the hierarchy, the more particular its laws and principles are and the more 
restricted its scope is. Thus, the laws and principles of the most fundamental discipline, 
namely, physics, apply to chemical and biological phenomena but not vice versa. Cosmides 
and Tooby emphasise that compatibility does not entail reduction: higher level disciplines 
have their own laws and principles but they should be compatible with the ones situated at 
the lower levels.360 This hierarchical structure of scientific disciplines can be understood as a 
pyramid as depicted in figure 6. 
 
 
Figure 6. Hierarchical organisation of scientific disciplines.  
 
 
 
 
 Cosmides and Tooby outline their conceptually integrated approach to behavioural 
and social science by contrasting two models: the Standard Social Science Model (SSSM) and 
the Integrated Causal Model (ICM). They argue that SSSM presupposes that collective 
representations, emotions and tendencies are not caused by certain states of consciousness of 
individuals but by the conditions in which the social group, in its totality, is placed. Further, 
they claim that SSSM assumes that socio-cultural systems are abstract wholes that supersede 
individual psychology. SSSM also includes psychological assumptions according to which 
complex and diverse behaviour and thinking is absent from infants which implies that the 
adult mental capacity and organisation originates from the social world itself. These social 
and cultural elements mould individual psychology and cognition in different cultures in 
different ways. The central point of SSSM, as Cosmides and Tooby understand it, is that 
these powers are extra-genetic and extra-somatic, emergent processes only visible at a 
                                                 
360 Cosmides & Tooby & Barkow 1992, 15. Especially note 1.  
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population-level analysis.361 Furthermore, the motivation behind SSSM seems to be to secure 
the autonomy of the social sciences: the subject matter of social sciences is independent from 
the subject matter of the natural and behavioural sciences and thus theories of the social 
sciences cannot be reduced to theories in the natural sciences. According to this view, SSSM 
would be committed to methodological holism, namely, the existence and non-reducibility of 
“social facts” (section 2.2).362  
 Cosmides and Tooby propose that SSSM should be replaced with the Integrated 
Causal Model of social science. If the central conviction of SSSM is the independence of 
social facts, ICM by contrast is based on the dependence of socio-cultural phenomena on 
psychological states. According to Cosmides and Tooby, eight distinct claims characterise 
ICM:    
 
(1) the human mind consists of a set of evolved information-processing mechanisms 
instantiated in the human nervous system; 
(2) the mechanisms, and the developmental programs that produce them, are 
adaptations, products of natural selection in our ancestral environments; 
(3) many of these mechanisms are functionally specialised to produce behaviours that 
solve particular adaptive problems; 
(4) to be functionally specialised, many of these mechanisms must be richly structured in 
a content-specific way; 
(5) content-specific mechanisms generate some of the particular content of human 
culture; 
(6) the cultural content generated by these and other mechanisms is then presented to be 
adopted or modified by psychological mechanisms situated in the other members of 
the population; 
(7) this sets up epidemiological and historical population-level processes; 
(8) these processes are located in particular ecological, economic, and intergroup social 
contexts or environments.363     
 
According to Cosmides and Tooby, ICM leads to the view that    
 
culture is the manufactured product of evolved psychological mechanisms situated in 
individuals living in groups. Culture and human social behaviour is complexly 
variable, but not because the human mind is a social product, a blank slate, or an 
externally programmed general-purpose computer, lacking a richly defined evolved 
structure. Instead, human culture and social behaviour is richly variable because it is 
generated by an incredibly intricate, contingent set of functional programs that use 
and process information from the world, including information that is provided both 
intentionally and unintentionally by other human beings.364  
 
The idea of the ICM is that human culture in all its diversity rests on certain psychological 
mechanisms which themselves are products of natural selection for different functions in our 
ancestral environment. 
 If we compare the arguments of CSR writers to those of Evolutionary Psychology, 
we see clear affinities, many of which have been noted in previous chapters. As we have 
already covered most of these themes, I will just give a brief list of the most salient ones. 
First, both CSR and Evolutionary Psychology claim that the socio-cultural domain is not an 
                                                 
361 Cosmides & Tooby 1992a, 24-30. 
362 Rosenberg 1986, 115-128.   
363 Cosmides & Tooby 1992a, 23-24.  
364 Cosmides & Tooby 1992a, 24.  
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explanatorily independent domain, but rather causally connected to psychological and 
biological domains. Second, Evolutionary Psychology and CSR presume that culture consists 
of widely distributed mental representations in people's heads. Third, Evolutionary 
Psychology and CSR assume that the human mind has specialised architecture and this 
architecture is relevant in explaining cultural content. Finally and most importantly, both 
presume that human culture is a by-product of evolved cognitive systems.   
 The commitment to integration is a commitment towards what is usually called the 
“unity of science”. Taken as a general claim, the unity of science can mean at least two 
different things. First, the unity of science can refer to some sort of ideal state of science, 
usually achieved somewhere in the future. In this ideal state, scientific disciplines would be 
totally consistent and scientific language and laws would be the same regardless of 
disciplines. Secondly, the term “unity of science” can refer to intellectual trends in 
contemporary sciences which seek to fulfil this ideal.365 From this point of view, vertical 
integration can be regarded as a meta-scientific idea that attempts to drive actual scientific 
theorising towards a future consilience to produce a single body of knowledge from the 
results of the natural and social sciences. Usually the advocates of this view have in their 
minds picture of what that consilience would look like and they hope that the sciences will 
come together to fill the gaps in that picture.366 We will return to this topic later in section 5.2 
where we will provide a brief outline of the philosophical assumptions that motivate this 
kind of meta-scientific theorising. Finally, when Cosmides and Tooby talk about possible 
progress achieved through integration, they are assuming that socio-cultural sciences are not 
making meaningful progress in their present “non-integrated” form and this lack of progress 
is a sign of their impotency as scientific disciplines.367 
 There are several points of convergence between the vertical integration of 
Evolutionary Psychology and the assumptions of CSR writers. First, it is presumed that all 
scientific disciplines should construct their methodology in such a way that their assumptions 
do not contradict disciplines or theories at lower levels. We can clearly see this tendency in its 
programmatic form when Atran writes that “[t]his approach posits no special phenomena, 
ontologies, causes, or laws beyond those of ordinary material objects and their inter-
relationships.” We pointed out in the preceding section how this claim is based on a 
philosophical commitment to a physicalist interpretation of causal explanation and how it is 
more confusing than helpful. In any case, the point that Atran is making here is that in CSR 
theorising it is a virtue to avoid “phenomena, ontologies, causes, or laws that go beyond 
those of ordinary material objects.” This claim seems to assume an picture of scientific 
                                                 
365 Oppenheim & Putnam make this distinction (1991, 404).  
366 We can distinguish different aspects of the unity of science: (1) the unity of scientific method, (2) the unity 
of scientific goals, (3) the unity of subject matter, (4) the unity of explanatory laws and (5) the unity of scientific 
knowledge. According to claim (1), scientific disciplines are methodologically unified to the extent they share a 
basic method or a set of methodological principles. The three basic views are methodological pluralism, dualism 
and monism. According to claim (2), scientific disciplines can be unified in terms of goals: in a unified science, 
there would be only one goal. What this goal should be has been a matter of serious debate. Usually scientific 
realists claim that the goal of science is truth, namely, the construction of true theories about the empirical 
world. This position is usually called “verism”. Many opponents of realism, such as constructive empiricists, 
have claimed that truth should not be the goal of science, but rather science should aim at systematisation of 
empirical knowledge which would amount to “instrumentalism”. Claim (3) entails that all scientific disciplines 
have ultimately the same subject matter. One way of understanding this claim would be to posit that the 
subjects of particular scientific disciplines consist of physical parts of some sort. According to claim (4), all 
explanatory laws or law-like regularities should be compatible or, in the best possible case, reducible to a small 
set of core laws. Classical reductionism reflects this idea very well: the scientific theories of higher level 
disciplines can be reduced to theories of lower level disciplines which finally reduce to a single set of physical 
laws. Finally, according to claim (5), the unity of science can be seen as the unity of scientific knowledge. The 
basic idea is that science, in its future ideal form, should not include any contradictory statements. 
367 See, e.g., Cosmides & Tooby 1992a, 22-23.  
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disciplines as a hierarchically organised structure in the sense indicated earlier in this section. 
The very term “vertical integration” gives the idea away: we should aim to close the gaps and 
seek connections between disciplines related vertically in an organised hierarchy. In this 
hierarchy, there is a fundamental level or a discipline – physics – that has the most general 
laws and explanatory framework which provides constraints for all theorising of higher 
levels. Hence, there should not be a discipline or a theory anywhere in science which would 
contradict any statement or theories in physics. Second, both CSR and Evolutionary 
Psychology argue that all scientific disciplines should share the same goal, namely, 
description and explanation of the natural world. They also share the idea that the natural 
world is best revealed by our current theories in the natural sciences, mainly physics and 
evolutionary biology. Since socio-cultural systems are part of the same world described in 
physics and biology, these systems can be seen as patterns of individual behaviour that, in 
turn, are physical phenomena consisting of physical movement and the interpretations given 
to them. The goal of the behavioural and social sciences would be to describe and explain 
such phenomena. The point here is that the primary goals of all disciplines of science should 
be epistemic (true descriptions and explanations) rather than practical. Furthermore, 
Evolutionary Psychologists claim that it is the intrusion of practical goals, such as 
emancipation, enhancement of social structures or attempts to increase understanding 
between religious groups, that is responsible for the poor scientific quality of the social and 
cultural sciences. Practical goals should not be totally excluded, however, because they can be 
side-effects of accurately achieved epistemic goals, but they should not be considered 
necessary.   
 Vertical integration can be seen in the light of a certain set of general philosophical 
positions dealing with the nature and unity of science. The set of assumptions that we are 
interested in her are those related to what McCauley calls the “classical model of theory 
reduction” whose modern advocates are known as New Wave reductionists.368 These 
discussions have been conducted mostly in the context of the relationship between 
psychology and neuroscience (psychoneural identity) but they generalise easily to create a 
bigger picture of how scientific theories should be related. The benchmarks and starting 
points for these discussions are the classic article The Unity of Science as a Working Hypothesis 
(1958)369 by Paul Oppenheim and Hilary Putnam and Ernest Nagel's The Structure of Science 
(1951). Although the view of inter-theoretic reduction put forward in these texts is not a very 
popular one among philosophers, it has set the stage for current discussion and some of its 
assumptions are alive and well.  
 The aim of the classical model is to guarantee the unity of scientific theorising and 
knowledge. The basic idea is, very roughly, that scientific theories at one level should be 
reducible to theories underlying them at a more fundamental level. Inter-theoretic reduction 
is a deductive process whereby the laws of one higher level theory are reconstructed as 
deducible from the laws of a lower level theory. This inference requires “bridge laws” that 
spell out the systematic connections between the laws of both theories. In this sense, inter-
theoretic reduction is a way to explain the laws of one theory in terms of the laws of some 
more fundamental theory and as such it can be understood as a form of deductive-
nomological explanation where the explanandum is not a natural event, but a law of another 
                                                 
368 My discussion proceeds along the lines of McCauley's article Reduction: Models of Cross-Scientific Relations and 
Their Implications for the Psychology-Neuroscience Interface (2007). McCauley's critique of New Wave reductionists 
shares many points with that of Craver (2007). Both Craver and McCauley consider the models of inter-
theoretic reduction put forward by, e.g., John Bickle (1998, 2003), Paul Churchland (1988) and Patricia 
Churchland (1986, 2002) as prototypes of New Wave reductionism. See also the discussions in McCauley 1986 
and 1996. The term “New Wave” reductionism comes from Bickle's book Psychoneural Reduction: the New Wave 
(1998) where Bickle puts forward his self-appointed “ruthlessly reductionistic” model. See also Bickle 2003. 
369 Reprinted in, e.g., Boyd et al. 1991.  
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theory.370 In this scheme, science as well as the world is seen organised hierarchically 
according to levels of complexity. Further, classical reduction postulates a fundamental or 
“basic” level – an assumption which we already encountered in the previous section in the 
context of micro-reduction. The assumption is that scientific theories form a structure in 
which the physical theory forms the foundation and other theories come on top of it. The 
idea of the organisation is that a given theory at a lower level takes the entities and processes 
posited by a higher level theory as its explananda. In other words, lower level theories explain 
the constituents of higher level theories until one gets all the way down to the basic level of 
fundamental physics. The resulting structure is considered to represent the structure of the 
natural world as well.371 Finally, the reduction ends with physics which explains the most 
fundamental constituent parts of reality. In addition to guaranteeing the unity of science, 
classical reduction has two other aims: first, to promote reduction as a viable research 
strategy in all sciences; and second, to provide a grand framework in which all scientific 
inquiry and knowledge can be situated.372  
 The classical model has several problems that have led later reductionists to develop 
the model further.373 The most important modification is that later reductionists gave up the 
search for bridge laws and claimed that the deductive relationship between the reduced 
theory and the more comprehensive theory was too tight. Instead they proposed that the 
functions and the targets of the reduced theory are taken over by the reducing theory: the 
theory that is being reduced should be reconstructed within the framework of the theory into 
which the theory is reduced. In short, as McCauley puts is, “reduction, is in effect, the 
mapping of particular models and their intended applications across two theories”.374 Despite 
these concessions the New Wave reductionists preserve most assumptions of the classical 
model. They claim, for instance, that sciences can be characterised best in through their 
theories and that a single model can be given to characterise inter-theoretic relationships 
across the board. Finally, New Wave reductionists also hold on to the hierarchical 
organisation of scientific disciplines.375 
 Note that vertical integration shares much common ground with these reductionistic 
models. They both assume that the organisation of scientific theories and disciplines reflect 
the organisation of nature: nature (or the world) consists of interrelated levels of complexity 
and every level of complexity has its own scientific discipline or “level of analysis”. Further, 
both models assume a certain kind of unity of science according to which lower-level 
disciplines and theories should constrain upper-level theory formation and, finally, that 
physical theories should constrain theorising in all sciences. These claims reveal a third 
                                                 
370 McCauley 2007, 108-110. For other accounts of classical reductionism, see, e.g., Carnap 1991. 
371 This point is made in Craver 2007, 172-177.  
372 The program of micro-reductionism described in section 4.4 is basically driven by the classical view of inter-
theoretic reduction in the sense that it attempts to fill in gaps between theories and disciplines.   
373 The biggest problem was that despite numerous attempts philosophers were not able to produce one single 
generally accepted case of inter-theoretic reduction that would fulfil the constraints. In particular, the formation 
of bridge laws turned out to be nearly impossible. Another reason for the failure of classical reductionism was 
that its account of the history of science – as a progress towards more integrated disciplines and successful 
reductions – was not considered plausible. Finally, when logical positivism with which the classical model was 
closely connected lost its popularity among philosophers of science in the 1970s, reductionism was also 
abandoned in favour of anti-reductionist models that usually defended some form of non-reductive materialism 
and the “multiple realisation” thesis (see section 5.2 for further discussion. One of the most famous critiques of 
classical reductionism is Jerry Fodor's article Special Sciences, or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis 
(1974). 
374 McCauley 2007, 112. In the New Wave reductionists' account of inter-theoretic reduction, reduction is a 
matter of degree. McCauley points out that there seems to be a continuum of inter-theoretic mapping: on the 
one end of the continuum are the cases in which inter-theoretic mapping proceeds smoothly and on the other 
end are the cases in which inter-theoretic mapping is non-existent. In the latter case, New Wave reductionists 
suggest that the higher-level theory can be completely eliminated. See the figure in McCauley 2007, 113.  
375 McCauley 2007 112-115, 120-127. 
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similarity: both models exhibit commitment to physicalism and micro-reduction as an 
explanatory strategy.  
 As vertical integration is closely related to the New Wave reductionist account it can 
be subjected to the same criticism that has been directed towards the New Wave model. First 
we should point out that “compatibility” is not very illuminating because Cosmides and 
Tooby do not give any criteria for successful cases of compatibility. One way to understand 
the notion would be through theory-reduction, but this move is explicitly denied by 
Cosmides and Tooby. Another way to interpret the notion of compatibility would be by 
invoking the idea of logical compatibility: two claims can be held compatible, if there is no 
contradiction in holding them both true. If we apply this idea to theories, we could say that 
two theories are compatible if it is the case that holding them both true does not generate a 
contradiction. However, this interpretation seems too loose for Evolutionary Psychologists, 
for it would allow the existence of theories that are about different things and assume 
different entities.376 In any case, it seems that Evolutionary Psychologists construct 
compatibility as some sort of naturalistic constraint for theory development: theories of the 
natural sciences should constrain theory development in other disciplines. In other words, 
there should be no theorising anywhere in the academy that would totally reject insights from 
the natural sciences. Another general problem with vertical integration is that it remains 
unclear what the basic units that are supposed to be compatible actually are. Are we talking 
about theories, background assumptions of disciplines or methodological principles to name 
just a few? Cosmides and Tooby seem to take the terms “discipline”, “theory” and “science” 
as interchangeable.377 This understanding is quite problematic as McCauley‟s and Craver‟s 
critical remarks show.  
 
4.6. Explanatory Pluralism and Multi-Level Mechanisms 
We have been highlighting some problems in reductionist models of interdisciplinary and 
inter-theoretic relationships and will now proceed to suggest some alternatives. We will be 
examining McCauley‟s “explanatory pluralism” model and proposals from recent 
“mechanistic philosophy of science”, mainly by Craver and William Bechtel. McCauley 
suggests a relatively pluralistic model in which inter-level co-operation is important but it is 
not understood as a form of reduction or elimination. Pluralism of this kind leads to a 
general picture of scientific disciplines that develop theories relatively autonomously but seek 
convergence with neighbouring disciplines. Craver‟s and Bechtel‟s propositions are based on 
a very developed notion of mechanism and on the interventionist account of explanation.  
 McCauley presents his explanatory pluralism as an alternative to the New Wave 
reductionist account.378 In a nutshell, McCauley‟s explanatory pluralism has three core ideas. 
First, he claims that reduction or elimination of established scientific theories or disciplines is 
highly unlikely as established disciplines have usually uncovered relatively stable causal 
relationships. Further, McCauley also opposes fundamentalist tendencies where all 
explanations are reduced to some basic level. Similarly, he argues that constraints in theory 
development should not proceed from the “bottom-up” only, but rather from both 
directions.  
 McCauley‟s explanatory pluralism model requires that there are relatively fixed 
“analytic levels” that usually correspond to a “level of complexity” in the natural world much 
                                                 
376 The nature of the required consistency is mentioned briefly by Cosmides & Tooby & Barkow 1992, 13 (note 
1.) 
377 In one single paragraph (1992, 4), they move from talking about conceptually integrated disciplines to 
conceptually integrated laws and finally to conceptually integrated theories. These moves do not seem 
warranted as integration between disciplines, laws and theories can be undertaken in different ways.  
378 McCauley develops his ideas in his 1986, 1996 and 2007 articles. 
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in the same way as in figure 5.379 The main point of explanatory pluralism is that “analytic 
levels” are considered relatively autonomous – that is, reductions and eliminations happen 
mainly between theories in the same analytic level rather than between theories or disciplines 
that are on different analytic levels. McCauley thus distinguishes inter-level contexts from 
intra-level contexts. In one single analytic level, we get theoretical evolution that can 
occasionally turn into theoretical revolution when new theories replace (eliminate) or 
radically reformulate (reduce) previous theories. The analytic level of the physical sciences, 
for instance, has seen several scientific revolutions where new theories have radically changed 
and sometimes eliminated old theories‟ concepts. In situations of elimination, new theories 
usually explain the same data as old theories but more elegantly or broadly and thus 
incorporate old theories into a larger framework as in the case of Newtonian mechanics and 
the theory of general relativity. Therefore, in intra-level contexts, McCauley claims, we can 
sometimes witness reductions that New Wave reductionists so fervently seek. However, in 
inter-level contexts, revolutions or reductions of this kind seldom happen. It is more 
common that theories persist in different analytical levels even in the case that theories in 
neighbouring levels do not map onto each other at all. Although it is possible that theories in 
neighbouring analytic levels might constrain each other quite strongly – as in the case of 
thermodynamics and statistical mechanics, for instance – and thus have extensive inter-level 
mapping, this is not a necessary state of affairs. And even in these cases where neighbouring 
theories are closely related, there is seldom a reduction involved.380  
 Although McCauley argues that micro-reduction is not something to be aimed at for 
its own sake, theorising about “heuristic identities” might constitute useful research program 
for developing inter-level connections. In collaboration with Bechtel, McCauley has 
developed the “heuristic identity theory” to accompany his explanatory pluralism. The idea 
is, roughly, that despite the relative independence and autonomy of disciplines in different 
analytic levels we should attempt to form heuristic identities between entities and processes 
postulated in different levels. In other words,  
 
[e]xplanatory pluralism holds that cross-scientific hypothetical identities are perfectly 
common means for abetting the study of some phenomenon at multiple levels of 
explanation. They enable scientists working at one analytical level to exploit the 
conceptual, theoretical, methodological and evidential resources available at another. 
... To repeat, hypothetical type-identities (of comparable grain) are heuristics of 
discovery that inspire multi-level programs of research.381   
 
                                                 
379 McCauley (2007, 124-125) gives several criteria for distinguishing analytical levels: (1) analytical levels 
correspond to levels of complexity (or organisation) in nature, (2) theories in lower analytical levels are more 
widespread or “basic” (have larger scope) than theories in higher levels, (3) analytical levels are organised in 
such a way that entities in lower levels are parts of the entities in higher levels and (4) analytical levels also 
correspond to the chronological order in natural history – that is, lower levels appear earlier in evolutionary 
history than the higher ones. Finally, McCauley (2007, 126-127) identifies four families of sciences: (1) socio-
cultural sciences, (2) psychological sciences, (3) biological sciences and (4) physical sciences. 
380 McCauley 1996, 29-33, 35-39. Elsewhere McCauley (1996) reiterates his explanatory pluralism in terms of 
co-evolution of scientific theories. He distinguishes three types of co-evolution of theories. In micro-reduction 
(1), two theories in the inter-level context become so tightly knit that the lower level theory describes the 
constitutive parts of the higher level theory. In elimination (2), the higher level theory is incommensurable with 
the lower level theory (abysmal inter-level mapping) and subsequently becomes eliminated in favour of the 
lower level theory. Finally, in pluralism (3) each analytic level has its own theories that need not map onto each 
other and constraints of theory formation flow in all directions.  
381 McCauley & Bechtel 2001, 753. 
114 
 
Contrary to New Wave reductionists, McCauley and Bechtel claim that such “heuristic 
identities” do not constitute a reason for reducing or eliminating theories, but are meant to 
enhance inter-theoretic and cross-disciplinary work.382  
 
 
Figure 7. Explanatory pluralism according to McCauley. 
 
 
 
 Finally, explanatory pluralism rejects the fundamentalism inherent in reductionist 
models and the related idea that theory development in one analytical level should be 
constrained by theorising in its neighbouring lower level. In other words, according to the 
reductionists and eliminativists constraints of theory development will always come from the 
“bottom-up”. This is not the case with explanatory pluralism. McCauley writes that  
 
[a]s a first pass, where co-evolutionm [elimination] anticipates increasing intertheoretic 
integration largely guided by and with default preference for the lower level, co-
evolutionp [pluralism] construes the process as preserving a diverse set of partially 
integrated yet semi-autonomous explanatory perspectives – where that non-negligible 
measure of analytic independence rests at each analytic level on the explanatory 
success and epistemic integrity of theories and on the suggestiveness of empirical 
findings. Co-evolutionm, in effect, holds that selection pressures are exerted 
exclusively from the bottom up, whereas co-evolutionp attends to the constraints 
imposed by the needs and demands of theories operating at higher levels.383 
 
McCauley‟s point here is that inspiration and fertilisation should flow in all directions in 
inter-level contexts. One discipline could, for example, form hypotheses about inter-theoretic 
                                                 
382 For details, see McCauley and Bechtel 2001 and McCauley 2007, 150-154. McCauley (McCauley & Bechtel 
2001, 736) explains his motives for developing explanatory pluralism: “[e]xplanatory pluralism offers a picture 
of cross-scientific relations that highlight the benefits to each of separate inquiries occurring simultaneously at 
multiple analytical levels in the empirical sciences. Explanatory pluralism aims to establish a middle ground 
between the theoretical and ontological parsimoniousness of reductionists, on the one hand, and the 
metaphysical extravagances of antireductionists, on the other.” By the “metaphysical extravagancies of 
antireductionists” McCauley seems to refer to different forms of non-reductive materialism or emergentism.   
383 McCauley 1996, 27.  
Analytical level I 
Analytical level II 
Theory I Theory II 
Theory III Theory IV 
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identities with a lower level discipline and adopt problem-solving strategies from it or use its 
theories to formulate new research questions. But in order to carry out such activities the 
discipline on the higher analytical level must be independent from the lower level 
discipline.384  
 In conclusion, McCauley highlights the pragmatic nature of explanatory pluralism 
when he writes that  
 
 [f]or the explanatory pluralist, all explanations are partial explanations; all 
 explanations are from some perspective, and all explanations are motivated by and 
 respond to specific problems.385  
 
In his emphasis on the pragmatics of explanation, the explanatory pluralist is very much 
going in the same direction as those who advocate the interventionist theory of explanation 
we introduced earlier.    
 Now, there are several lessons to be learned from McCauley‟s explanatory pluralism. 
Although McCauley‟s pluralism is developed in the context of the psychology/neuroscience 
interface, the moral of explanatory pluralism can be easily applied to the relationship between 
psychology and the socio-cultural sciences and the study of religion. The most important 
result, of course, is that from the fact that theories of religion or other socio-cultural 
phenomena do not map onto theories about cognition it does not follow that the former 
theories should be reduced or eliminated in the favour of the latter. Psychological theorising 
can inform socio-cultural theorising and vice versa, but it is not reasonable to demand 
complete inter-theoretic mapping. Even in the case where theorising about religion was 
strongly informed by psychology or evolutionary biology, the study of religion itself would 
retain its autonomy in the sense that its theories need not necessarily map onto those of 
neighbouring disciplines.  
 This point raises the question of where we should locate CSR theories in this scheme. 
On the one hand, the fact that most of the auxiliary theories of CSR are psychological 
theories would suggest that CSR theories should be located on the same analytical level as 
psychology. On the other hand, as CSR seeks its inspiration from those approaches that have 
attempted to find connections between psychological and cultural sciences and since it aims 
to inform theorising about socio-cultural phenomena we could situate its theories 
somewhere in between the analytic levels of psychology and the socio-cultural sciences. If 
this is the case, we could understand CSR theorising as an attempt to create inter-level 
connections and inform theorising in both behavioural sciences by pointing out how the 
study of religious phenomena might provide new material for psychological theories by 
suggesting more psychologically plausible background assumptions. In addition to creating 
inter-level connections between the socio-cultural sciences and psychological sciences, some 
CSR writers have attempted – with the help of Evolutionary Psychology – to create 
connections to the biological sciences, mainly evolutionary biology. This multiple-level 
approach of CSR can be understood as reflecting the nature of religion as a phenomenon 
that can be understood in many different levels. Religious phenomena are not solely 
restricted to the socio-cultural domain, but rather they can be identified and studied by other 
disciplines in other analytic levels as well.   
 McCauley‟s explanatory pluralism depends heavily on the notion of “level”. The 
“levels metaphor” is very commonly used in discussions in philosophy of science and 
philosophy of mind in an unreflected way. Craver has provided us with a useful account of 
the different ways in which the level metaphor is used to show how his own view – levels of 
mechanism – differs from other ways of understanding levels. Craver‟s own account of levels 
                                                 
384 McCauley 1996, 31-34. 
385 McCauley 2007, 150. 
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of mechanism is connected to his notion of mechanistic explanation as the best means of 
giving answers to why- and how-questions in neuroscience. Although his mechanistic 
account is constructed mainly in the context of neuroscience, it can be expanded to include 
other approaches that attempt to explain regularities in terms of the constitution and 
structure of capacities. In this sense, Craver‟s account has the same aim as Cummins‟ 
“functional analysis”, namely, to provide a model of explanation that does not explain in 
terms of “laws of nature”, but rather by describing the activities and organisation of the 
constituent parts of the explanandum phenomenon.    
 
Figure 8. A field-guide to levels (Craver 2007, 171). 
 
 
 We will proceed from left to right in figure 8 and look at all the other views of levels 
before examining Craver‟s own levels of mechanism.386 Craver begins by distinguishing levels 
of science from levels of nature (or the world). In his mind, it is quite common, but not 
unproblematic, to equate the hierarchical organisation of scientific disciplines to the 
ontological structure of nature. This assumption already came up several times in the 
preceding section. There are several reasons for Craver‟s scepticism. First of all, he claims 
that the world is too complex to correspond neatly to the organisation of scientific 
disciplines and he even suspects that there is no neat way to organise scientific disciplines 
into some kind of a whole at all. Actual scientific practices are so diverse that they cannot be 
so easily stratified into a hierarchy of disciplines and theories. It is very common, for 
instance, that scientist use theories from multiple disciplines to explain events in one single 
“level of nature”. Moreover, when we are talking about science we can take different “basic 
units” as our starting points: we can talk about scientific units such as research programs, 
disciplines and paradigms or scientific products such as theories and hypotheses. As scientific 
disciplines usually have multiple theories and fields of research which examine different 
aspects of the same phenomena and as the relationship between theories and approaches 
                                                 
386 Craver suggests (2007, 170,172) that when we are analysing any given account of “levels”, we should ask 
three questions: what kind of things are sorted into levels, what is the interlevel relation and by virtue of what 
are any two items at the same level?   
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even in one single discipline is usually far from clear we should not assume that we can sort 
disciplines (units) or their products (theories) in some neat hierarchical structure. These brief 
points give at least some reason to think that there is no self-evident way to organise 
scientific units and products into a unified structure or assuming that this structure might 
correspond to levels of natural phenomena – “to carve nature at its joints”, so to speak.387  
 Craver proposes that “we start by thinking of levels as primarily features of the world 
rather than as features of the units or products of science.”388 Candidates for inhabitants of 
different levels might then include entities, activities, properties and mechanisms of different 
kinds. Similarly, causation, size and composition would be candidates for possible inter-level 
relations. Regarding causation, sometimes the level metaphor is used to distinguish between 
different stages of a task or a causal process, such as the flow of information in the human 
visual system. Such accounts are usually given in terms of a flowchart and they describe 
temporal and spatial sequences of events or processes. However, as this understanding of 
levels is quite far from the way in which we have been talking about levels up to this point 
we will not dwell on it any further. The most popular use of the level metaphor is arguably to 
distinguish between entities of different sizes. In this scheme, smaller things are on lower 
levels and bigger things are on higher levels. The problem with levels of size is that they 
easily confuse the relationship between bigger and smaller things to that between the whole 
and its parts. Usually parts of a whole are smaller than the whole, but this is only a 
contingent by-product rather than a necessary property of the whole/part relationship. It is 
of course possible, according to Craver, to arrange entities in the world in levels of size but 
such accounts do not say anything about causal interactions between entities of different size 
or restrict the focus of one scientific discipline to one level of size. Therefore, Craver 
suggests that we restrict the use of the level metaphor to different levels of whole/part 
relationships.389  
 We now approach Craver‟s own idea of levels as we come to levels of composition. 
Compositional relationships are relationships between wholes and their parts. There are at 
least four ways in which such relationships can be understood: mereology, aggregation, mere 
spatial containment and mechanisms (levels of activities and component parts of those 
activities). To begin with, Craver rejects the usefulness of traditional mereological theories, 
such as the classical reflexivity theorem “every object is part of itself”, as guides for scientific 
practice because they are mostly based on abstract notions. Next he considers aggregation 
which is a possible way to understand levels of material and spatial containment. Craver 
writes that “[i]n levels of aggregates, the relata are properties of wholes and the properties of 
parts, and the relation between them is that higher-level properties are sums of lower-level 
properties.”390 The mass of a pile of sand, for example, is an aggregate of the masses of the 
individual grains that constitute the pile of sand. However, Craver points out, that 
aggregative properties are rarely interesting. After dismissing aggregativity as a model for a 
mechanistic organisation, Craver argues that levels of simple material/spatial containment 
fail as well. According to this understanding, things are in a lower level if they are inside the 
material boundaries of things in a higher level. However, the problem here is that 
material/spatial containment “does not allow one to distinguish between mere pieces of a 
system and its components. Dividing a system or mechanism into material/spatial pieces any 
which way will not break it into components.”391 Therefore, Craver concludes, none of the 
                                                 
387 Craver 2007, 172-176.  
388 Craver 2007, 177.  
389 Craver 2007, 177-183. 
390 Craver 2007, 186. 
391 Craver 2007, 187. 
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aforementioned accounts of whole/part relationship helps us when we are seeking to identify 
component parts of a mechanism.392  
 Finally, we come to Craver‟s levels of mechanism and to the nature of mechanistic 
explanation in general. In what follows, I will give an outline of how mechanisms are 
understood by Craver and other advocates of the “new mechanistic philosophy of science”393 
 
Craver writes that  
 
[l]evels of mechanism are levels of composition, but the composition relation is not, 
at base, spatial or material. In levels of mechanisms, the relata are behaving 
mechanisms at higher levels and their components at lower levels. These relata are 
properly conceived neither as entities or activities; rather, they should be understood 
as acting entities.394 
 
Thus we can understand mechanisms as (1) entities that (2) are engaged in some activity (3) 
which is produced by the activities of its parts. The central idea is that mechanisms are 
composite systems that are always doing something.395 In other words, they have a function 
and this function is how we identify mechanisms and their composite parts. The thing on my 
desk is a cell phone because it does something; it can perform many functions and these 
functions are produced by the activities of its parts. Furthermore, its parts are not simply 
identified by material/spatial containment, but rather on the basis of what they do. We 
cannot just list bits of material objects inside the phone and imagine to understand the 
organisation of the parts. Composite parts of a mechanism are specified by their activities 
and by their relationships to other parts and their activities (figure 9.). We identify the 
battery, for instance, as a composite part of the mechanism as it produces power.    
 
 
Figure 9. Levels of mechanism (adapted from Craver 2007, 189) 
 
                                                 
392 Craver 2007, 184-188. Consider my cell phone on my desk in front of me. Some of its properties, such as its 
colour or mass, are aggregates of the properties of its parts. If the relevant properties of the parts change, so do 
the properties of the whole. Further, in spatial/material containment, the identification of component parts is 
based on spatial boundaries. If we were to smash my cell phone to pieces, it is highly improbable that the pieces 
would correspond to the component parts of the cell phone. All those pieces are arguably inside the boundaries 
of my phone, but they are not its component parts.       
393 See, e.g., Bechtel 2006; Bechtel & Wright 2007; Glennan 2002; Machamer et al. 2000.  
394 Craver 2007, 189.  
395 This definition of a mechanism is outlined by Machamer et al. 2000 and subsequently reiterated in several 
places by Craver (2007) and others (Bechtel & Wright 2007).   
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 Now, when Craver and others talk about levels of mechanism they are referring to 
levels of whole/part relationships specified in terms by mechanisms and their component 
parts that are related to each other by spatial, temporal and active relationships. Note how 
this understanding of levels differs significantly from the more traditional and popular uses 
of the level metaphor. Usually entities like molecules, societies or organisms are considered 
to be located in one single level instead of another. The mechanists, however, do not think 
that such entities can be categorically located in one level since societies, molecules or 
organisms are not doing anything – they are not performing any activity. There can be no 
neat hierarchy of such entities in terms of levels of mechanism at all. Component parts that 
are picked out by mechanistic decomposition are not mere objects but acting entities: 
identification of a mechanism as a whole and its composition is based on the activities (or 
functions) of that mechanism, not on its simple physical or material composition. In this 
sense, mechanisms are always “perspectival” or “local”: acting entities and their parts do not 
map onto some “global” or metaphysical menu of levels in nature.396 Therefore, the same 
entity can be situated in several different levels of mechanism depending on our point of 
view which depends on the compositional hierarchy of activities we are interested in at that 
moment.  
 This last point is very important. When Bechtel and Wright are discussing the 
differences between the reductionist account and mechanistic accounts they write that 
 
[p]erhaps the clearest difference is simply that mechanistic accounts do not start with 
separate theories at different levels that are subsequently related to each other with 
the formal apparatus of theory or reconstructed in their idealized forms. Mechanistic 
explanations at each level are partial and constructed piecemeal with a focus toward 
actual experimental investigation, without overarching concerns that they fit into 
grand, large-scale scientific theories; hence, there is no desideratum to provide a 
complete account of everything that happens.397  
 
The point is that when discovering mechanisms there is no need for a general theory that 
lists the ontological furniture of the world. Nor is there any need for assuming a specific 
structure of scientific disciplines and theories. Interestingly, mechanistic explanation is a 
form of reductive explanation in the sense that it explains the activities of the whole as a 
result of the activities of its parts. This means that it is always the micro-level of mechanism 
that explains the macro-level of mechanism, but such reductionism is always “local 
reductionism” since levels of mechanism are not anchored to some global or universal level 
of nature. Finally, unlike micro-reductionism mechanistic explanation does not require the 
existence of some “basic” or “foundational” level which would then constitute “the ultimate 
explanation”.  
 We can now see how mechanistic explanation is very closely related to other 
accounts of constitutive explanation, such as to Cummins‟ style functional analysis and to the 
idea of sub-personal explanation. Indeed, we can see the mechanist account as the most 
developed version of constitutive explanation currently available. It can also be combined 
with Woodward‟s interventionist theory of causal explanation. Note, however, that causal 
explanation differs from constitutive explanation. We already sketched an account of this 
                                                 
396 Craver 2007, 191-195. Craver‟s view (2007, 192) entails that “there can be no unique answer to the question 
of when two items are at the same level. I can provide only a partial answer: X and S are at the same level of 
mechanisms only if X and S are components in the same mechanism, S‟s Φ-ing is not a component in X‟s Φ-
ing, and S‟s Φ-ing is not a component of X‟s Φ-ing.” Similar points are made by, e.g., Bechtel & Wright 2007, 
55-56. 
397 Bechtel & Wright 2007, 59.  
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difference by distinguishing “horizontal” and “vertical” explanation (section 4.3). Causal, or 
horizontal, explanations are etiological as they explain an occurrence of a single phenomenon 
and as such they do not necessarily require an account of the underlying mechanisms. 
Constitutive (mechanistic) explanations are not causal in this same sense since they explain 
how something works rather than why something took place. In short, causal explanations 
usually gives us “Why” and constitutive explanations “How” answers.  
 Finally, notice how the multi-level mechanism account reaches a very similar 
conclusion to McCauley. Craver highlights this point by the notion of “mosaic unity” when 
he writes that  
 
[t]he different fields that contribute to the mosaic unity of neuroscience are 
autonomous in that they have different central problems, use different techniques, 
have different theoretical vocabularies, and make different background assumptions; 
they are unified because each provides constraints on a mechanistic explanation. 
Individual fields do not surrender their autonomy through this form of unification; in 
fact, their ability to contribute novel constraints on a mechanism requires that they 
maintain their autonomy.398 
 
In this passage, Craver clearly expresses similar sentiments to those that drive McCauley‟s 
explanatory pluralism. The emphasis on pragmatics of explanation, the independence of 
background assumptions and on the diversity of central problems fits well with explanatory 
pluralism.  
 
4.7. Explanatory Scope Revisited: Asking Questions about Religion 
We began in section 4.2 by clarifying the explanandum and the explanans of CSR explanations 
and concluded that CSR explanations 
 
(1) explain general tendencies in the transmission of representations 
(2) by invoking operations of particular cognitive systems that introduce selection 
pressures and  
(3) that the mode of such explanations is functional.  
 
The ultimate/proximate distinction was introduced in order to identify the aspects which 
selective explanations explain and how they explain them. It was argued that ultimate 
explanations can be understood as explaining changes in populations whereas proximate 
explanations explain individual traits. With respect to explaining cultural evolution, ultimate 
explanations can be understood as describing abstract selective pressures that lead to 
accumulation of certain types of representations in human populations whereas proximate 
explanations would explain why individuals have the representations that they have.  We also 
identified several factors that reduce the explanatory power of such models. First of all, 
ultimate explanations of cultural evolution do not describe actual causal chains but rather 
they generate “how possibly” scenarios for cultural trends and yield general predictions about 
them. The abstractness of these models makes them vulnerable to counterexamples and 
suggests that more work is needed in the future to integrate such models into accounts of 
actual cultures and religious traditions. Secondly, we also established that ultimate 
explanations of cultural evolution do not reduce to proximate explanations of why some 
individuals have the representations that they have. In other words, we could have a fairly 
comprehensive explanation of why John believes in God but we would still have no ultimate 
                                                 
398 Craver 2007, 231.  
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explanation of why belief in God is so common in John‟s population. Finally, we must 
remember that ultimate explanations of cultural evolution are not “ultimate” in the sense that 
they are more foundational or basic than other explanations. This also means that ultimate 
explanations do not claim to describe unconscious motivations or some “hidden” 
motivations of individuals.  
 In section 4.3, we looked at different accounts of psychological explanation and 
claimed that these accounts shape our understanding of the scope of CSR explanations. If we 
assume that sub-personal explanations of behaviour can explain the same things that 
personal explanations explain but in a more elegant way, then we might conclude that 
personal explanations of behaviour might be eliminated at some point. If this would be the 
case, then there could in principle be a sub-personal explanation for all religious actions. 
However, if we assume that personal explanations of behaviour do not map onto sub-
personal and biological explanations, then it is difficult to see how CSR could explain those 
behaviours that would fall onto the side of personal explanation. Finally, we pointed out that 
there is no consensus about these questions and that we should be cautiously sceptical 
towards attempts to equate personal explanations with sub-personal explanations since it was 
suggested that sub-personal explanations explain psychological capacities by their internal 
structures.    
 Section 4.4 began by giving an overview of CSR writers‟ views about causal 
explanation. Then it proceeded to identify the assumptions of those views by looking at 
philosophical theories of causal explanation, especially the causal-mechanism model. It was 
then observed that the causal-mechanism model has certain problems – it leads to 
explanatory fundamentalism and it cannot distinguish explanatorily relevant causes from 
irrelevant causes – and that there might be better alternatives available. Finally, we looked at 
one alternative, the interventionist model of causal explanation, and noticed how it avoids 
the problems of the causal-mechanism model. We also noted how the contrastive analysis of 
explanandum might help us to specify our explanations and relate them to one another.   
 Finally, in sections 4.5 and 4.6 we looked at how CSR writers understand the way in 
which scientific disciplines and theories are related to one another. It was argued that the 
idea of vertical integration advocated by evolutionary psychologists had probably had an 
implicit influence. This model of integration was then criticised along with models related to 
it and it was suggested that we might adopt a more pluralistic view. Finally, we examined two 
models, McCauley‟s explanatory pluralism and the multi-level mechanism model, as viable 
anti-reductionist alternatives and concluded that we might understand CSR in terms of these 
models.  
 We can now see how our understanding of the scope and explanatory power of CSR 
theories depends on the philosophical assumptions we have been dealing with in previous 
sections. First of all, if we assume that explanations given in terms of cultural selection 
answer all our questions about religion, then CSR theories might go far in explaining religion. 
But if we assume that religion has something to do with individual level beliefs and practices 
and their content, then we might conclude that the scope of CSR theories is more modest. 
Second, if we assume that sub-personal explanations can be invoked to explain everything 
that personal explanations explain, then we might conclude that sub-personal explanations of 
religion might replace personal explanations. Finally, if we assume that all proper 
explanations are invariably given by describing physical causal chains, then it would be 
possible in principle to “explain religion away”. Note that answers to these questions cannot 
be found simply by experiment; they are philosophical questions and need philosophical 
answers.  
 We can now return to Laidlaw‟s and Day‟s critical points and to the problem of 
scope. I hope that it has become clear by now that critics of CSR are both right and wrong. 
The critics are right in insisting that CSR explanations are not sufficient to explain why some 
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occurrences and characteristics of particular instances of religious thinking and behaviour 
differ from one another. Critics are also right in claiming that CSR explanations do not 
explain the “whole of religion” or every aspect of behaviour and thinking that we consider 
religious. Finally, they are right in saying that CSR explanations do not give a “final” or 
“ultimate” explanation of religion in the sense that everything would now have been said 
about religion or its metaphysical nature would now be resolved. Although the critics, in my 
view, are right about all these things they are wrong in insisting that these points make CSR 
explanations irrelevant or meaningless. There seems to be a more or less implicit assumption 
that there should be one approach that would answer all our questions about religion at work 
here. This assumption, as we have seen, does not seem very plausible. When the critics are 
chastising CSR explanations for not being very applicable to particular cases, they have in 
mind totally different contrasts and explananda than CSR writers. When Laidlaw is 
complaining that the cognitive approach excludes “everything that humans think and do in 
the reflective exercise of capacities [like] reason, imagination, and will”, he is saying that these 
factors are extremely important in explaining why some individual instances of belief and 
action are different from some other instances of individual belief and action. However, CSR 
writers are claiming that when we explain why certain recurrent patterns arise at the level of 
populations, “reason, imagination and will” are not sufficient to explain these patterns. 
Simply put, the critics are interested in explaining individual differences whereas CSR writers 
are interested in explaining general tendencies across populations.  
 We can see the radical difference between these explananda if we take an example. Let 
us seek an answer to the question of why John believes in God rather than not believing 
God. Recall that when we are looking for an explanation we are looking for the factor that 
makes a difference in the case that we are explaining. We could answer the question by 
saying that John believes in God because he has a normal human brain (which includes all 
normal domain specific cognitive architecture). In one sense this is surely right because if 
John did not have a brain, he would certainly not believe in God. However, this answer 
seems somehow unsatisfactory because all humans have brains and not all humans believe in 
God. We are looking for the factor that makes the difference in John‟s case and having 
brains does not seem to be it. Suppose that John had a strong religious experience when he 
went to church two weeks ago. This experience would be an exceptionally good candidate 
for an explanation of John‟s belief in God because it would reveal the factor that made the 
difference in John‟s case. And as we have already seen in our discussions about micro-
reduction (section 4.4) we need not reduce or transform this explanation to some micro-
explanation based on cognitive mechanisms or biological functions.  
 When we disconnect explanation from physical causation as suggested, then in the 
case of John‟s belief in God, we can simply say that cognitive mechanisms do not give us 
what we want. Cognitive mechanisms surely are among the causes of John‟s belief in God 
but they are not explanatorily relevant for our question. But if we are interested in explaining 
why almost all human beings believe in gods and spirits in different environments, then 
cognitive mechanisms might be explanatorily relevant. A mechanistic, constitutive 
explanation that would explain how the psychological capacity for religion worked might be 
very relevant for such an explanation. Consider what would happen if our agency detection 
device suddenly stopped being hyperactive. I doubt that John‟s belief in God would be 
affected since the hyperactivity of his agency detection device was not responsible for his 
religious experience. On the other hand, if the hyperactivity of HADD were to be reduced in 
all human populations, then we might see a change in the overall amount of people believing 
in spirits. As it seems to be explanatorily relevant HADD might constitute at least part of the 
answer to our latter question. This method of imagining a counterfactual intervention and its 
results might be used to test other CSR explanations as well. This rethinking, however, I 
leave to CSR writers themselves.  
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 I will now draw some concluding morals from the somewhat lengthy discussions of 
previous sections. We have established that there can be no final or ultimate scientific 
explanation of religion for several reasons. Explanations, at least if we adopt the theory of 
explanation that I was advocating, depend on our interests and questions and these can 
change over time. Furthermore, some writers have assumed that we can “explain religion” in 
some metaphysical way to reveal the “actual” causes behind it without examining our 
interests and questions at all. If explanations depend on our questions and interests, then this 
attitude will not do. I suggested that we construe the enterprise of explanation as answering 
different kinds of why-questions and we let our questions drive our explanatory efforts. It 
seems to me that we should not debate so much about whether we should “explain religion” 
or not, but rather we should be clarifying our explanation-begging questions and their 
implicit contrasts to identify what we are actually explaining, how we are explaining it and in 
relation to what. This last point is especially important since there is considerable loose talk 
about “explaining religious belief”. We could be explaining a number of different things, 
such as the persistence or prevalence of religious belief, the content of individual religious 
beliefs, the similarity between contents of individual religious beliefs and so forth. It is highly 
unlikely that one approach – especially an approach that invokes underlying cognitive 
mechanisms – would be able to answer all our questions at all possible levels.  
 What about the aspirations of some CSR writers and Evolutionary Psychologists to 
create an overarching framework that would unify the socio-cultural sciences with the natural 
and behavioural sciences? Our discussions about explanatory pluralism and multi-level 
explanations leave much room for scepticism on this issue. Many critics agree that 
Evolutionary Psychology has not been successful in replacing or assimilating more traditional 
approaches in the socio-cultural sciences and if we are to take McCauley‟s explanatory 
pluralism model seriously, such replacement should not be expected. Haines, for example, 
concludes that “current evolutionary theorizing in sociology and anthropology is a 
heterogeneous activity and is likely to remain a heterogeneous activity.”399 I think this point 
holds also in the case of CSR. We should not expect CSR to provide a general theoretical 
framework for the study of religion in general; nor should we expect it to replace existing 
approaches. This is because CSR operates, as we have seen, on certain levels and not on 
others, asks certain questions about religion and not others and conceptualises its target in a 
certain way. However, our emphasis on explanatory pluralism should not be taken to mean 
that we are left with radical incommensurability and pluralism – or anarchy even. Even if 
disciplines would proceed to develop theories without the prospect of reduction, they should 
look to other disciplines and theories for inspiration and possibilities of cooperation. For 
instance evolutionary and psychological theorising might inform and transform some of the 
assumptions behind traditional approaches to religion and produce more comprehensive 
approaches in the future. In fact, we might view CSR as not being in the business of 
producing theories at all, but informing theorising about religion by psychological results. 
                                                 
399 Haines 2007, 294. 
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5. The Problem of  Religious Relevance 
 
Although the religious implications of CSR theories rarely interest CSR writers themselves, 
they implicitly (and sometimes explicitly) hold conflicting views about these issues. The 
situation is made more complicated by the fact that recent atheistic writers such as Richard 
Dawkins and Daniel Dennett have appropriated CSR theories into their arguments against all 
religious beliefs. Especially Dawkins seems to think that CSR theories explain why humans 
have widespread false beliefs in supernatural agents.400 Furthermore, some critics of CSR 
have argued that CSR is inherently “anti-religious” or is motivated by an aggressive 
naturalistic agenda. The reason why I find these points interesting is that, if examined, they 
lead us to the philosophical assumptions that the advocates of these different positions hold. 
I am calling these assumptions philosophical in nature because it is always at least partly a 
philosophical question of how some scientific theory is related to some non-scientific piece 
of knowledge (or belief).   
 To anticipate, it seems to me that most CSR writers have fairly strong philosophical 
or worldview positions that enter in especially when they are interpreting their theories and 
the overall nature of the study of religion. Section 5.1 will lay out three possible views that 
are already present in CSR writers, namely, strict naturalism, broad naturalism and/or 
methodological naturalism and theism. The subsequent sections (5.2, 5.3 and 5.4) will then 
examine and elaborate each of these positions.  
 
5.1. Three Views: False Belief, Agnosticism and Positive Relevance 
The relevance of CSR theories to religious beliefs and other worldviews is far from clear as 
both insiders and outsiders have conflicting views. On the one hand, some writers (insiders 
and outsiders in some moods) are of the opinion that CSR theories severely undermine 
traditional religious – especially theistic – worldviews. On the other hand, some writers 
(again, insiders and outsiders in some moods) think that CSR theories are basically religiously 
irrelevant, namely, that they do not support or undermine religious views. Finally, there are 
writers who claim that CSR theories actually give support to some religious worldviews such 
as theism.401    
 We will begin by looking briefly at what CSR writers themselves have to say about 
this issue. It will become clear that their views are divided and that there is constant 
fluctuation between different views even in the case of single writers. The dominant view is 
that CSR enquiry does not assume anything about the truth or falsity of religious beliefs and 
its results are mostly religiously irrelevant. However, sometimes CSR writers seem to think 
that CSR enquiry begins from the assumption that religious beliefs are false or mistaken 
                                                 
400 See Dawkins 2006; Dennett 2006.  
401 For contributions to the discussion so far, see Barrett 2007; Brelsford 2005; Bulkeley 2003; Clark & Barrett 
2009; Day 2007; Dennett 2006; Gregersen 2006;  Lawson 2005; Murray 2007, 2009; Näreaho 2008; Oviedo 
2008; Peterson 2006; Van Till 2008 and Visala 2008. In the scattered debate, there is some disagreement about 
how relevant the findings of CSR are to religious matters. Furthermore, those who hold that they are relevant, 
disagree about the proper manner of engagement with CSR theories. Some writers (Bielfeldt 2004, Laidlaw 
2007) have cast doubt on the ability of the cognitive sciences in general (and therefore the ability of CSR in 
particular) to contribute anything new to topics such as traditional religious views of the human being, nature, 
and God, whereas others have argued for the relevance of the findings of CSR and the importance of 
engagement (Oviedo 2008) but differ about what form the engagement should take. While some have supposed 
that the hypotheses and findings of CSR can be shown to be largely compatible with traditional religious claims, 
others (Peterson 2006, 857) suggest that CSR is inherently hostile to these claims and the appropriate religious 
response might be (at least partial) critique.  
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which would mean that if CSR theories acquire evidential support, the case against religious 
beliefs would be stronger.  
 In the preface of his In Gods We Trust, Atran briefly points out that the cognitive 
perspective is agnostic towards religious truth-claims. He then goes on to say that 
 
[r]eligious beliefs and practices involve the very same cognitive and affective 
structures as non-religious beliefs and practices – and no others – but in (more or 
less) systematically distinctive ways. From an evolutionary standpoint, these 
structures are, at least proximately, no different in origin and kind from the genetic 
instincts and mechanical processes that govern the life of other animals. Religious 
explanations of religion may or may not accept this account of proximate causes, but 
no faith-based account considers it to be the whole story. I do not intend to refute 
such nonscientific explanations of religion, nor do I pretend that they are morally 
worthless or intellectually unjustified. The chosen scientific perspective of this book 
is simply blind to them and can elucidate nothing about them – so far as I can see.402 
 
Atran makes at least two important claims here: firstly, he claims that nonscientific, religious 
accounts of religion are also possible and secondly, that the scientific account that he himself 
professes is agnostic towards religious accounts of religion. The question of how to relate the 
scientific account and the religious accounts is left for the religious believers to decide, but 
the falsity of “religious accounts”, that is, some set of religious beliefs, is not assumed. 
Therefore, by assuming that religious ideas (as well as all other ideas) are products of the 
human mind/brain, Atran does not want to claim that religious ideas are false.403  
 However, even though Atran in his introduction seems to opt for the religious 
irrelevance of CSR theories, he sometimes writes as if the falsity of religious claims had 
already been established. For example, he connects the counter-intuitiveness of religious 
ideas with “counterfactuality”: when religious ideas violate our innate and modular 
expectations about ontological categories, they necessarily become counterfactual. The exact 
meaning of “counterfactuality” in Atran is unclear, but at least in philosophical language the 
property “counterfactual” is connected to non-actual states of affairs. Furthermore, in 
addition to being counterfactual, religious beliefs, according to Atran, do not include 
propositions at all, but rather some kind of quasi propositions that have no proper content. 
He writes that   
 
religious quasi propositions may have truth value (e.g., Baptists believe that “after you 
die you either go to Heaven or Hell” has truth value), but they are not truth-valuable in 
the sense of being liable to verification, falsification, or logical evaluation of the 
information. Truth is taken on faith and emotionally validated with little reasoning 
required for support.404  
 
Atran seems to claim here that even though religious quasi propositions might have some 
content, that content cannot be evaluated as being true or false and as a result, religious quasi 
propositions are basically meaningless.405 However, as believers usually consider their 
religious beliefs representing the world Atran at least radically challenges what the believers 
themselves think that they believe, so much so that we can conclude that this basically 
amounts to holding religious beliefs false.406   
                                                 
402 Atran 2002, ix.  
403 Atran 2002, viii-ix.  
404 Atran 2002. 95.  
405 Atran 2002, 93-95.  
406 Atran makes a brief reference to A. J. Ayer, who in his Language, Truth and Logic (1936) famously argued that 
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 We also can see similar fluctuation in Boyer. He sometimes implies that it is the 
business of the CSR to explain why belief in imagined agents is so widespread in human 
cultures. “The question is”, he writes, “why do some concepts of imagined entities and 
agents rather than others matter to people?”407 In several different places in his writings he 
explicitly states that “[r]eligious notions are products of the supernatural imagination.”408 We 
could understand these statements as employing professional jargon where the term 
“imagination” is used without any implication to truth or falsity of religious ideas. Elsewhere, 
Boyer is describing his approach and writes that  
 
people who think that we have religion because religion is true (or their version of it 
is, or perhaps another, still-to-be-discovered version of it) will find little here to 
support their views and in fact no discussion of these views.409  
 
Again, Boyer can be interpreted in two ways on this point. On the one hand, he seems to be 
saying that his approach to religion somehow entails, that religious truth-claims should be 
considered false. In this case, he would be saying that CSR theories explain why a set of false 
beliefs is so widespread in human populations. On the other hand, Boyer might mean that 
with regard to the explanations he is interested in giving, the truth or falsity of religious 
beliefs is irrelevant. In other words, his cognitive approach explains religious beliefs 
regardless of their truth or falsity. These points show that Boyer‟s actual view in this issue 
should be left relatively open. Finally, we might regard some of Boyer‟s and Atran‟s 
comments as a kind of “intrusion” of worldview assumptions into their popular 
presentations of the aims and findings of CSR. Such comments do not feature in their actual 
empirical work.   
 Whereas Boyer and Atran leave the question unanswered or to the level of implicit 
assumptions, others have tried to be more specific and show that the falsity of religious 
beliefs need not be assumed. Barrett, for instance, has argued that CSR enquiry is neutral and 
that its results are religiously irrelevant. In addition, he has also implied that CSR results 
might actually support some theistic beliefs. In his Why Would Anyone Believe in God, after 
pointing out that from a cognitive viewpoint religious beliefs are not that absurd or irrational, 
he makes the following response to his sceptical minded colleagues: 
 
I also hope that I have shown that religious belief may be comparable to other belief 
that many of these befuddled professors hold near and dear, such as belief in other 
people's minds, belief in the permanence of physical principles governing our world 
and belief in moral certitudes.410 
 
Barrett's idea is here that what the cognitive study shows is that religious beliefs are 
psychologically comparable with many other beliefs that are held true. As in the case of these 
                                                                                                                                                  
religious expressions, as well as other types of metaphysical, ethical and aesthetic expressions, are non-cognitive, 
namely, that they lack proper truth-conditions and are meaningless. Atran's position seems to be very close to 
Ayer's non-cognitivism which originally arose in the classical debate about falsification and religious language. 
Today, Ayer‟s criterion of meaningful language (the criterion of verification) has been very broadly rejected by 
philosophers.    
407 Boyer 2002, 68.  
408 Boyer 2003, 199. Boyer (2001, 342) also states that the evidence for gods and spirits is “shall we say, tenuous 
at best” and on the same page he points out that the “activation of a panoply of systems in the mind” explains 
“the very existence of religious concepts” and not just their appeal and spread.  Elsewhere (2001, 343), he 
points out that “People who ask questions such as How can one believe that? are of course not among the 
believers”.   
409 Boyer 2001, 48.  
410 Barrett 2004, 122.  
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ordinary beliefs, religious beliefs are products of cognitive systems that we normally hold to 
be reliable. He claims that we cannot take the facts that God's existence cannot be 
scientifically proven and that many phenomena that were explained by appeals to God can 
now be explained scientifically as proof prove that God does not exist. The reason is that 
such criteria would destroy most of our everyday beliefs as well. Although Barrett 
acknowledges that the naturalness of religion seems to seriously undermine the truthfulness of 
religious beliefs, in fact, he argues, this is not the case at all. In his view, the cognitive 
approach to religion is, therefore, compatible with some theologies and he concludes that 
“[t]hese observations should reveal that I find the cognitive science of religion independent 
of whether someone should or should not believe in God.”411 We will return to Barrett's 
arguments later in detail. 
 On the basis of this brief survey, we can conclude (1) that the writers in the CSR 
have not reached consensus on the subject of the religious implications of CSR theories, and 
(2) some CSR writers are not themselves consistent in their views on this matter. Some (e.g., 
Atran and Boyer, in some moods) seem to imply that in order to study religion scientifically, 
we need to start from the fact that religious beliefs are false and leave the religious 
implications to the religious people to decide. Others (e.g., Barrett - again, at least in some 
moods) deny both of these claims and argue that, first, scientific explanations of religion 
should not presume anything at all about the truth or falsity of religious beliefs, and second, 
the results of the CSR are mostly religiously irrelevant. The main differences between these 
positions is not that they disagree about the actual results or the core theories of the CSR, 
but rather that they interpret the function of science and the results of the CSR in different 
frameworks with different large-scale assumptions.     
 CSR theories have achieved a great level of public exposure through the writings of 
high-profile atheists, such as Richard Dawkins and Daniel Dennett, who make explicit 
references to CSR.412 These writers are mainly interested in showing how religion could have 
developed even though religious beliefs are false and religious practices are irrational. It is 
unclear whether these writers think that CSR theories themselves show or prove that 
religious ideas are false or just undermine the plausibility of religious ideas when they claim 
that “religion is natural”. We already pointed out (section 3.4) the ambiguities of the “religion 
as a natural phenomenon” claim. At least Dennett acknowledges the possibility that religion 
might be a natural phenomena and God could still exist. When he is examining the different 
meanings of the “religion as a natural phenomenon” claim he writes that 
 
I might mean that religion is natural as opposed to supernatural, that it is a human 
phenomenon composed of events, organisms, objects, structures, patterns, and the 
like that all obey the laws of physics or biology, and hence do not involve miracles. 
And this is what I mean. Notice that it could be true that God exists, that God is 
indeed the intelligent, conscious, loving creator of us all, and yet still religion itself, as 
a complex set of phenomena, is a perfectly natural phenomenon.413 
 
However, for reasons that will become apparent later it is clear that both Dennett and 
Dawkins use CSR results as parts of their argument for atheism.  
                                                 
411 Barrett 2004, 123.  
412 See Dawkins‟ God Delusion (2006) and Dennett‟s Breaking the Spell: Religion as a Natural Phenomena (2006). 
Dennett uses Boyer‟s, Atran‟s and Barrett‟s theories extensively when he is examining the origins of religion. 
See, e.g., Dennett 2006, 104. Dawkins refers to Boyer and Atran (and to the work of psychologists Paul Bloom 
and Deborah Kelemen) when he argues that humans are psychologically primed for religion. See, e.g., Dawkins 
2006, 177-190. See also Bloom 2004, 2007; Kelemen 2004. 
413 Dennett 2006, 25.  
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 Finally, some critics of CSR have argued that CSR theories seek to replace the 
religious understanding of religion with cognitive scientific explanations. Kelly Bulkeley, for 
instance, writes in his very hostile book review of Boyer‟s Religion Explained that 
 
[t]his is the essence of Boyer‟s argument in Religion Explained. He presents research on 
the adaptive values of various cognitive functions, and then uses that research to 
show how religion has developed as a parasitic growth on those inherent mental 
processes. His analysis sweeps through history and across religious traditions all over 
the world ... In every case Boyer finds cause to dismiss religious understandings and 
replace them with cognitive scientific ones. He expresses no interest in counterclaims 
that religion is more complex, subtle, or multidimensional than his theory suggests.414  
 
Bulkeley‟s point here seems to be that rather than explaining religion Boyer ends up 
explaining religion away. Pyysiäinen answers this critique by pointing out that scientific 
explanations of religion should not be given in religious terms. Furthermore, he insists that 
the goal of explanations of religion is not to take the place of religion in people's lives: 
arguing for a more rigorous approach to the study of religion is not the same as arguing that 
religious ideas should be replaced by scientific theories about religion.415 Pyysiäinen is surely 
right in his claim that scientific explanations of religion need not be given in religious terms. 
Further, he is right in insisting that bringing rigour to the study of religion does not imply 
that scientific results should supplant religious ideas. However, we can understand Bulkeley‟s 
critique as pointing out that Boyer seems to constantly imply that although scientific 
explanations do not supplant religious or theological understanding of religion, they severely 
question their truth.   
 There is also a more general question here about whether the mere existence of a 
naturalistic explanation of some religious phenomena would seriously undermine religion. 
The problem is determined by our intuitive pre-understanding of what explanations of 
religion are about. Many people seem to think that if religious beliefs were true, they would 
not require an explanation at all, and as a result, all attempts to “explain” religion should be 
considered anti-religious or instances of evil “reductionism”.416 This claim, as we have already 
seen, is plainly false, because we can have many different kinds of scientific explanations of 
religion that have different explananda. And further, scientific explanations do not explain 
religion as a whole or provide an “ultimate” explanation. So “explaining religion” is not 
inherently anti-religious any more than “explaining science” is anti-scientific.417       
 We have now briefly outlined two different positions. According to the first, CSR 
enquiry and results are mostly religiously irrelevant and worldview neutral. This would mean 
that CSR theories are compatible with different kinds of secular or religious worldview 
positions. According to the second position, CSR enquiry almost inevitably leads us to refute 
religious truth-claims and CSR theories lead to rejection of religious belief. Finally, there is a 
third position that was mentioned in the beginning of this section, but was not developed 
further. This position claims that some CSR theories can offer support to some theistic 
claims. In order to clarify these positions, we must look beyond CSR writers‟ explicit claims 
in their philosophical assumptions which are mostly implicit. First, however, we must clarify 
the ideas of religious relevance and worldview neutrality.  
                                                 
414 Bulkeley 2003, 672-673.  
415 Pyysiäinen 2005b, 60-63; Pyysiäinen 2009. 
416 Some defenders of “religionist” or anti-reductionist approaches to religion argue in this fashion (chapter 
2.1.).  
417 Pyysiäinen makes similar points in his article Reduction and Explanatory Pluralism in the Cognitive Science of Religion 
(2009). 
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 By introducing the distinction between worldview neutrality and religious relevance 
that originates from the philosopher Mikael Stenmark, we can bring some measure of clarity 
to these debates. According to Stenmark, we must first distinguish between worldview418 
neutral and worldview partisan science. If science or some part of it is worldview neutral, 
then it does not intentionally align with or support a particular ideology, worldview or 
religion over another. Conversely, science, or some part of it, is worldview partisan, if it 
aligns with or supports a particular ideology, religion or worldview over another.419 Notice 
that these claims deal with methodological commitments. In addition to worldview neutrality 
or partiality, we must distinguish biased science from unbiased or wrong science. Science, or 
a part of it, is biased, if it represents how things are unfairly or in an unjustified way. 
Unbiased (objective) science, however, would represent how things are in a fair and justified 
manner. Science is in error if it misrepresents how things really are. Finally, Stenmark 
introduces the difference between religiously relevant and irrelevant science. Science is 
religiously relevant, if its results or practices can either support or undermine religions or 
world-views. Further, science is religiously irrelevant, if its results or practices cannot support 
or undermine religions or world-views.420 Notice that the distinction between religiously 
relevant and irrelevant science is based on scientific results, rather than methodology.  
 Stenmark concludes that 
 
we should grant that science could be worldview-relevant in respect to religions or 
ideologies x, y or z, while at the same time being worldview-neutral in respect to 
them. Worldview-relevance does not imply worldview-partisanship.421  
 
Stenmark‟s point is that we should not infer from negative religious relevance to worldview 
partisanship which is a quite common mistake in science/religion discussions. Alvin 
Plantinga, for instance, seems to assume that if some scientific theory undermines theistic 
beliefs, this theory is de facto worldview partisan.422 In Stenmark‟s mind, this inference is not 
valid because there can be a worldview neutral theory, that is, a theory that does not favour 
materialism over theism, for instance, which has negative (or positive) religious relevance.423 
In the case of CSR theories, it could be that they are worldview neutral in the sense that they 
                                                 
418 Stenmark (2004, 172) defines “worldview” as a “constellation of beliefs and values that (consciously or 
unconsciously) guides people in their attempts to deal with their existential concerns.” Such existential concerns 
include such questions as who they are, why they exist, what the meaning of their life is and so on. Notice that 
according to this usage, it does not make sense to talk about a “scientific worldview” or a “religious worldview” 
as such. 
419 Pyysiäinen (2005) also highlights another idea of neutrality according to which neutrality equals scientific 
objectivity. By this he means that enquiry and theorising in some discipline or a field of research are conducted 
according to general scientific norms. This neutrality would be what Stenmark calls unbiased (or objective) 
science. 
420 Stenmark 2004, 174-183. Notice that neutrality, relevance or bias can be implicit or explicit in some given 
science. For example, it could very well be the case that writers in some discipline explicitly declare worldview 
neutrality but at the same time practice worldview partisanship. We can also distinguish normative and 
descriptive claims of worldview neutrality. The question of whether some discipline is in its present form world-
view neutral and the question of whether some discipline should in its ideal form be world-view neutral are 
crucially different. The former is basically a question that can be solved by looking into how scientists actually 
go about doing science whereas the latter is a more conceptual question. Finally, Stenmark points out that 
neutrality and partiality are matters of degree rather than “on-off” properties of some scientific enquiry. In this 
sense, science is always worldview partisan in some sense although total objectivity (unbiased science) functions 
as a regulative ideal. He (2004, 192) writes that “[e]ven if science always was partisan and never fully unbiased, 
the goal of scientists could still be to strive to be as objective as they could, given their partisanship, abilities, 
and social context, and they could succeed in this to a larger or smaller degree.” 
421 Stenmark 2004, 181.  
422 See, e.g., Plantinga 2006, 2009. 
423 Stenmark 2004, 180.  
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do not presume the truth of one single worldview, and yet they might have strong negative 
religious relevance.424  
 Another important conclusion we should draw from these distinctions is that 
religious relevance is worldview relative in the sense that there can be no “general” account 
of the religious or worldview relevance of some scientific theory. Religious or worldview 
relevance is always relative to the religious or worldview position we are currently looking at. 
In the case of CSR for instance, its religious (or worldview) relevance would be relative to the 
set of beliefs and practices we choose to take as our focus. These positions could be religious 
positions - different forms of theism, for example - or ideological or political positions such 
as Marxism.    
 By applying the aforementioned conceptual resources, we can now break the 
question of the religious implications of CSR theories into sub-questions: 
 
(1) Are CSR theories worldview neutral or worldview partisan? 
(2) Are CSR theories religiously relevant or irrelevant for some set religious ideas and 
practices?  
(3) If CSR theories are religiously relevant for some set of religious ideas and practices, is 
this relevance negative or positive? 
(4) Are CSR theories biased or unbiased? 
 
We have already provided a preliminary answer to the question (1) when we pointed out that 
some CSR writers seem to assume that most religious beliefs are false whereas others remain 
agnostic. The former position would be a case of worldview partisanship425 whereas the latter 
position would be closer to a worldview neutral position. As to questions (2) and (3), we also 
have preliminary answers. Some writers consider CSR theories to undermine almost all 
religious beliefs whereas others hold that CSR theories are religiously irrelevant. I will skip 
question (4) because I simply assume that CSR experiments and their results are products of 
sound scientific reasoning and practice insofar as CSR researchers employ the same norms of 
scientific rationality and justification as their peers. Moreover, the answer to this question is 
mostly scientific (or empirical), rather than philosophical. What I mean by this is that 
conceptual a priori considerations are unlikely to resolve the issue.  
 The relevant positions I will be looking at in the following sections are 
 
(1) CSR theories are worldview partisan in the sense that they assume the truth of strict 
naturalism (that is, they are methodologically atheist) and religiously relevant for 
theistic beliefs in the sense that they have negative religious relevance for them. 
(2) CSR theories are worldview neutral in the sense that they allow different worldview 
positions and religiously irrelevant for theistic beliefs in the sense that they do not 
have consequences for their truth or falsity. 
(3) CSR theories are worldview neutral in the sense that they allow different worldview 
positions and religiously relevant for theistic beliefs in the sense that they have some 
positive consequences for some of them.  
  
                                                 
424 Stenmark (2004, 180) writes that “science has the potential to undermine (or support, for that matter) any 
religious or ideological idea that has empirical content. Here lies also the key to understanding why we cannot 
expect that science is (or should be) worldview-neutral in this sense, because investigating empirical claims and 
developing theories about empirical states of affairs is what science is all about; it is its proper domain.” 
425 We can call this feature “methodological atheism”.  
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5.2. Strict Naturalism and Methodological Atheism 
In this section, we will be looking at position (1) outlined in the previous section and its 
philosophical background. I have already connected this interpretation of CSR to some 
remarks made by Atran and Boyer as well as some atheistically oriented writers outside the 
field itself. As these writers do not explicitly reveal their assumptions, I will use other writers 
that have explicitly defended strict naturalism in the study of religion to flesh out a possible 
set of philosophical background assumptions. These background assumptions have their 
roots in a certain form of philosophical naturalism.   
 The notion of “naturalism” is tricky because it is used in different forums and 
discussions in different branches of philosophy with different meanings. And as basically 
everyone in modern analytic philosophy wants to be a naturalist the term itself tends to lose 
any robust meaning and its power as an analytic tool. Given the scope of the present work, it 
is futile to attempt to give an overview of all discussions where the term is applied or even 
the history of the term.426 Nevertheless, I must point out that my considerations should be 
kept separate from the uses of the term “naturalism” as it comes up in methodological 
discussions in the study of religion. I am referring to the insider/outsider problem that was 
outlined in section 2.1.427 We will simply start from philosophy of science where different 
forms of naturalism are now the philosophies of choice for many contemporary 
philosophers. These philosophers usually share most of the following four assumptions: 
 
(1) Rejection of “first philosophy” (no philosophical foundations for science) 
(2) Scientism (sciences as guides to epistemology and metaphysics) 
(3) Darwinism as a framework for scientific and philosophical enquiry 
(4) Progress in science.428 
 
These four assumptions come up in the discussion later in this section: we will see how they 
are appropriated by those who seek to “naturalise” the humanities and socio-cultural sciences 
(and the study of religion).  
 For the present purposes, we can take anti-supernaturalism as the common core of 
the forms of naturalism that we are interested in. The naturalist emphasises “natural” 
processes, events and explanations rather than supernatural ones. In this sense, “naturalism” 
only makes sense when it is contrasted with supernaturalism. Philosopher Owen Flanagan 
takes supernaturalism to claim that  
 
(i) there exists a 'supernatural being or beings' or 'power(s)' outside the natural world; 
(ii) this 'being' or 'power' has causal commerce with this world; (iii) the grounds for 
belief in both the 'supernatural being' and its causal commerce cannot be seen, 
discovered, or inferred by way of any known and reliable epistemic methods.429   
 
The problem here of course is that “nature” itself defies definition. Philosopher Paul Draper 
defines nature as “the spatiotemporal universe of physical entities together with any entities 
that are ontologically or causally reducible to those entities.”430 However, this definition 
                                                 
426 It is commonly used on such diverse fields of philosophy as epistemology, philosophy of mind, philosophy 
of science, ethics and philosophy of religion. For a useful overview, see Flanagan 2006. See also Kitcher 1992 
and Rosenberg 1996.   
427 See, e.g., McCutcheon 2005, Gothoni 2005. 
428 These four claims are formulated in Alexander Rosenberg‟s article A Field Guide to Recent Species of Naturalism 
(1996). Rosenberg also traces the roots of contemporary philosophical naturalism to Ernest Nagel‟s The Structure 
of Science (1961). 
429 Flanagan 2006, 433.  
430 Draper 2005, 278. Draper's definition of supernatural is basically a simpler version of Flanagan's definition: x 
is supernatural if x is not a part of nature and x can affect nature. 
132 
 
simply pushes the problem even deeper: what is physical? Usually philosophers define nature 
in a somewhat circular way by saying that nature consists of those events and processes that 
the natural sciences study or eventually disclose.  
 Philosophers Charles Taliaferro and Stewarth Goetz in their succinctly named book 
Naturalism (2008) distinguish “strict naturalism”431 from “broad naturalism”432. According to 
strict naturalism, “nature is all that exists and nature itself is whatever will be disclosed by the 
'ideal' natural sciences, especially physics.”433 This definition of “nature” is open and 
pragmatic because it acknowledges the fact that natural sciences are in a state of constant 
change. Furthermore, it highlights the point that sciences not only study actual entities, but 
they postulate unseen entities and processes that are used to explain empirical results. Thus 
“natural” entities, such as sub-atomic particles, can be said to be “physical” even though they 
are not “material” in any traditional sense of the world.   
 Several philosophically oriented writers have argued for a “naturalisation” of the 
study of religion and in so doing they have endorsed strict naturalist assumptions. In what 
follows, I will take a brief look at two such writers – Edward Slingerland and Donald Wiebe 
– in order to get a hold on assumptions that some interpreters of CSR seem to share. I have 
chosen these two writers because they both regard CSR as an example of properly 
naturalised study of religion.434  
 In his recent article Who Is Afraid of Reductionism?: the Study of Religion in the Age of 
Cognitive Science (2008a), Slingerland claims that the study of religion should adopt a more 
naturalistic attitude than before because social-constructivism, with which the contemporary 
study of religion has been associated, has made the study of religion parochial and 
uninteresting to scientists.435 Social-constructivism is mistaken, Slingerland argues, because it 
implies that social and mental realms are causally independent of natural realms, such as 
physics and biology. Slingerland's antidote is the idea that human beings are physically 
constituted: human thoughts and mental life are physical events in the brain and as such 
susceptible to the causal explanations of biology and psychology. For Slingerland, Darwinism 
is the key for providing a proper foundation for the study of religion: because our bodies and 
minds are products of evolution, the products of our minds, that is, ideas and cultural 
artefacts, are products of evolution as well. Slingerland, thus, calls for the “embodiment” of 
the humanities and a rejection of the implicit dualism between mind and body: 
 
What I am going to be referring to as the “embodied” approach to the study of 
culture involves a loose collection of scholars who see the human mind and its 
products as parts of the physical world, not hovering somewhere above it, and who 
are therefore committed to breaching the cordon sanitaire that has traditionally divided 
the humanities and natural sciences.436 
 
Slingerland's “embodied approach” entails that all thoughts, mental states and products of 
these states can be ultimately explained by the deterministic laws of physical processes:  
 
                                                 
431 Strict naturalism is sometimes called ontological naturalism, reductive (or eliminative) physicalism, reductive 
naturalism or hard naturalism.  
432 Broad naturalism is sometimes called non-reductive materialism, non-reductive physicalism or soft 
naturalism.  
433 Taliaferro & Goetz 2008, 7. 
434 There are many other writers as well who have defended similar forms of naturalism in the study of religion. 
See, e.g., 1992 and McCutcheon 1997, 2001.  
435 Slingerland presents his arguments in more detail in his recent book What Science Offers the Humanities: 
Integrating Body and Culture (2008b).  
436 Slingerland 2008a, 378.  
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This means that our thoughts and behaviour are, at least in principle, as 
predetermined and predictable as any other physical process. It also means that the 
self as we ordinarily understand it – as a disembodied something, soul or spirit or 
mind, caused by nothing other than itself – is nothing more than an illusion created 
by the workings of our embodied brain.437 
  
This approach has several consequences for the study of religion. First of all, the study of 
religion should work towards “vertical integration”, namely, unifying scientific knowledge 
under a single causal and mechanistic scheme. This unification would also entail that our 
“ideal science” ought not contain any intentional or socio-cultural causes at all. All things can 
be explained by physical processes or processes that are reducible to physical processes.438 
Secondly, such an approach would leave little room for religious truth-claims: “at least as 
long as physicalism remains our current best explanation of the world – any religious or 
philosophical belief based on dualism is going to be in this sort of conflict.”439 In short, we 
know, Slingerland claims, that physicalism is true, so religious claims that refer to non-
physical realities must be false.440  
 Donald Wiebe argues for similar “disenchantment” of the social and cultural realm: 
social and cultural sciences are still enchanted because they posit entities that are more than 
mere physical objects.441 Different socio-cultural sciences postulate all sorts of entities and 
processes that contradict assumptions made by other socio-cultural sciences as well as the 
natural sciences.442 Wiebe calls for a unification of all scientific inquiry and the expulsion of 
what he considers to be non-naturalistic approaches to religion, namely, religiously, politically 
or ethically motivated inquiries, from the study of religion. In concert with Slingerland, 
Wiebe emphasises the explanatory and unificatory power of Darwinism. The reason for 
Wiebe‟s emphasis on Darwinism and naturalism is that he sees the study of religion as 
severely corrupted by extra-scientific, that is, theological, religious and political interests: 
 
Thus, conceptually integrated with the natural and behavioural sciences, the study of 
religion can clarify its referential field and clearly place its subject matter into 
naturalistic register, thereby assisting it in managing the massive amount of 
                                                 
437 Slingerland 2008a, 383.  
438 The idea of bringing all knowledge together in a naturalistic scheme has a long history. As we have already 
seen, Cosmides‟ and Tooby‟s “vertical integration” is one recent attempt to reformulate this idea. Another 
influential account is given by Edward O. Wilson in his Consilience: The Unity of Knowledge (1998). 
439 Slingerland 2008a, 401. 
440 In their answer to Slingerland‟s article, Francisca Cho and Richard Squier (2008a, 2008b) point out that the 
rhetorical strategy of the naturalists relies on an idealised image of what science is, and subsequently sets the 
standards of reasonable science too high. The naturalist critique of current theorising in the study of religion is, 
as we have already seen, based on three claims: (1) the study of religion posits ontologically vague entities 
(beliefs, religions, cultures, etc.), (2) explanations in the study of religion are insufficient and (3) there is a 
plurality of incompatible methodological assumptions in the study of religion. Cho and Squier point out that the 
naturalist assumes that “religion” as a category has to refer to some empirically self-evident quality in order to 
function as a scientific category. Contrary to this view, Cho and Squier argue that the function of social 
categories is precisely the opposite: they are useful because they do not pick out a single phenomenon, but 
rather function as guides into human thought. Finally, the naturalist sets up the demarcation problem too 
simply: either we adopt some kind of theological view of religion or a completely physicalistic view of religion. 
This dichotomy is not only problematic because it relies heavily on a metaphysically contested position but it 
also hinders the progress in the study of religion because it restricts the space of possible explanation-begging 
questions.   
441 See Wiebe 1991, 1999, 2005. 
442 The object of Wiebe's criticism is the image of a social scientist as a “virtuoso” who creates imaginative 
theories of cultural phenomena that cannot be empirically tested. Wiebe claims that virtuoso theorists like Levi-
Strauss or Geertz base their theories on their own intuitions rather than empirical evidence that is accessible to 
all. See, e.g., Wiebe 2005, 70-71.  
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information involved. ... The conceptual integration of the study of religion with the 
natural and behavioural sciences, moreover, reinforces the demarcation of the 
academic study of religion from the religio-theological approaches to the meaning of 
religion that preceded it.443 
 
If the study of religion were to be based properly on the sciences, then it could be clearly 
separated from ideological and religious interests. 
 Both Slingerland and Wiebe make explicit references to Daniel Dennett‟s Darwin’s 
Dangerous Idea: Evolution and the Meaning of Life (1995) in which Dennett claims that Darwinism 
gives a firm foundation for the natural sciences, humanities and philosophy. Indeed, the 
theory of evolution by natural selection is a “universal acid” that eats through all traditional 
ideas of the world, nature and humans and provides the basis of all philosophy.444 Dennett 
claims that natural selection imposes constraints on all life: the human body as well as the 
human mind and its products exist in “a design space” generated by natural selection. The 
fact that natural selection occurs in some form or another on both the cultural and the 
biological level explains why certain biological and cultural forms arise. In this way, the study 
of human societies, cultures, religions and psychology can all be subsumed under one single 
scheme. In his Breaking the Spell: Religion as a Natural Phenomenon (2006), Dennett applies this 
approach to religion. Drawing heavily from CSR writers he claims that religious behaviours 
and ideas are natural by-products of evolved cognitive capacities. Similarly to other naturalist, 
he dismisses religious truth-claims by pointing out that they have no scientific support. He 
also points out that a proper science of religion is needed in order to know what religion is 
really about.445 
 The strict naturalism of both Wiebe and Slingerland is similar to that of naturalists 
like Edward O. Wilson and Owen Flanagan to name just a few. As we have seen, strict 
naturalism includes several different claims about various ontological, epistemological and 
methodological issues. Wiebe's and Slingerland's strict naturalism involves at least three core 
claims:  
 
(1) Scientism: scientific enquiry has priority over all other enquiries. 
(2) Physicalism: all entities and processes are physical processes or reducible to physical 
processes. 
(3) Micro-reductionism: all “higher-level” states can be explained by their micro-states 
which in turn can be ultimately reduced to physical states.446  
 
The claim (1) is methodological and epistemological in nature: only science can provide us 
knowledge about reality and, therefore, scientific knowledge has priority over all other ways 
of producing knowledge. This claim is sometimes formulated in the following way: “all that 
exists can be described and explained in terms of the natural sciences”. Such claims have 
several methodological consequences. First of all, such claims allow no essential difference 
between sciences and humanities: explaining human action and products of that action, such 
as societies, languages and cultural artefacts, is similar than explaining natural phenomena 
                                                 
443 Wiebe 2005, 80. 
444 Dennett is not alone in emphasising Darwinism as a foundation for all our enquiries. See, e.g., Ruse 1986, 
1995.  
445 For Dennett‟s dismissal of religious truth-claims, see Dennett 2006, 240-246. Furthermore, Dennett points 
out (2006, 308-339) that we just cannot take beliefs about religion on faith. Instead we must use the best 
scientific tools that we have at our disposal to determine what we should think about religion. The preliminary 
results, in his view, show that religious truth-claims are problematic at best. 
446 Stenmark adds two claims: (1) science is essential in dealing with our ethical concerns and (2) science can tell 
us what the meaning of life is and deal with our existential concerns. Stenmark claims that at least Edward O. 
Wilson and Richard Dawkins accept all these claims. See Stenmark 2001, 123-128. 
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that the sciences study. In short, naturalists usually reject methodological dualism or 
pluralism. Secondly, the claim is usually interpreted to mean that naturalistic methodology 
and ontology should be accepted in humanities and social sciences more wholeheartedly than 
before. The advocates of such approaches usually emphasise the role of Darwinism as a 
general framework for social, cultural and behavioural sciences. 
 The claim (2) is ontological and it states that only “matter in motion” is real. Thus 
the strict naturalist is usually committed to some form of physicalism which claims that all 
entities consist of parts that are ultimately material or at least in the scope of physics. 
Physicalism can be construed in different ways, but usually it includes at least one of the 
following claims:  
 
(a) The generality of physics. 
(b) The causal completeness (or causal closure) of physics.  
(c) The explanatory completeness of physics.  
 
Claim (a) states that physics aims to describe all entities with spatio-temporal properties. 
Thus, the laws of physics represent the most general laws that apply to spatio-temporal 
entities and no entity can be outside of the scope of these laws. Claim (b) means that all 
spatio-temporal processes have a physical cause that can be deducted from a more general 
physical law. The basic idea of the causal closure of physics is that there can be no spatio-
temporal processes without physical causes. Usually the causal completeness of physics is 
taken as the central claim in physicalism: even if it is not currently possible to show how 
everything that happens has a physical cause, the “ideal science” or “complete science” 
includes nothing more than physical causes.447 Claim (c) states that explanation based on the 
laws of physics can explain all possible phenomena.  
 If the claim (a) is accepted and (b) and (c) refuted, then we have a kind of minimal 
physicalism that is compatible (or identical) with positions such as non-reductive materialism 
(or emergent materialism). If we accept (a) and (b), then our physicalism gets considerably 
stronger: usually the positions that accept the causal completeness of physics are said to 
endorse reductive physicalism (or reductive materialism). In reductive materialism, non-
physical looking properties are considered to be reducible to physics. Finally, the acceptance 
of all three claims produces a position called eliminative physicalism (or eliminative 
materialism) according to which all phenomena outside of physics are simply illusions.448  
 Physicalism leads to claim (3), namely, that there can be no “higher-level” states that 
are not reducible or causally dependent of physical states. This claim includes a strong 
rejection of dualism and the possibility of independent intentional explanation: mental states 
can be ultimately explained by non-mental, physical states. This claim, in effect, eliminates all 
possible teleological and intentional explanations as well as first-person explanations: 
consciousness and the products of consciousness are to be explained by non-conscious 
causes. The target of strict naturalism is dualism which takes mental states as “something 
more” than physical states in the sense that they can cause physical events without being 
dependent on physical states. The central point here, the physicalists claims, is that mental 
states cannot have physical effects without being physical themselves; but if they are indeed 
physical states and the causal completeness of physics is true, then physical causes are 
                                                 
447 The causal completeness claim has produced a massive discussion spanning from its original context in 
philosophy of mind to philosophy of science and other fields. Jaegwon Kim, for example, defends reductive 
materialism and physicalism against non-reductive materialism. See, e.g., Kim 1998, 2005. Kim is also known as 
a vigorous defender of the causal closure thesis. Paul Churchland defends a form of eliminative materialism. See 
Churchland 1988, 1995.  
448 These claims are neatly summed up by Tim Crane (2001, 43-48).   
136 
 
sufficient to explain all effects. Thus conscious mental states do not cause anything at all: 
mental states are epiphenomenal.  
 Strict naturalism seems to have destructive consequences for our everyday views of 
how the world is: although our phenomenology includes entities like beliefs, desires, reasons, 
cultures and religions, they are not “real” in any sense even if they can be used in everyday 
language as useful abstractions. If this is the case, we are, as Slingerland succinctly puts it, 
“robots designed not to believe that we are robots”. Furthermore, strict naturalism also 
eliminates the explanatory independence of cultural, social and behavioural sciences: social 
and cultural phenomena are nothing more than mental states which in turn are physical states 
of human brains and as physical states they can be explained as results of material causes. 
Finally, strict naturalism also makes it impossible to hold that religious beliefs that refer to 
gods, spirits or other supernatural powers or entities were true.   
 We have already argued against some of the elements of the strict naturalistic 
position in previous chapters. We pointed out that the clear-cut notions of causal 
explanation, micro-reduction and vertical integration have severe problems and should be 
replaced by more pragmatic understandings of these issues. If these arguments are right, they 
will undermine the justification of strict naturalism as the only possible “scientific” 
background philosophy for naturalistic sciences of religion.  
 In sum, strict naturalism is a broad conceptual framework in which the knowledge 
produced by different sciences is unified under a single scheme that would constrain our 
scientific efforts. Note that this position is mainly a philosophical one, not a scientific one: 
there can be no experiments that would verify these views directly. On a strict naturalist 
reading, CSR enquiry is worldview partisan because it begins from the acknowledgement that 
religious beliefs must be false (methodological atheism). Further, it takes one philosophical 
view as a guide for all scientific enquiries. Finally, this reading would also have negative 
religious relevance for most religious ideas: if the plausibility of supernatural agent concepts 
is based on our everyday experience and that experience can be explained in a naturalistic 
way, then we have no reason to believe that supernatural agents exist. This seems to be what 
Boyer had in mind when he wrote that “[p]eople who ask questions such as How can one believe 
that? are of course not among the believers”.449 
 This kind of view about the scientific study of religion is analogous to Dennett‟s 
position concerning the explanation of consciousness.450 In his Consciousness Explained (1991), 
he claims that the explanantia of a science of consciousness are the qualities and entities in our 
everyday phenomenology. Beliefs, desires, intentions, qualities of conscious experiences and 
the like are parts of our phenomenology but such entities can have no place in our scientific 
understanding of the world. To explain consciousness is to explain it terms that do not refer 
to intentional processes or phenomenal entities: to explain consciousness is to explain how 
these phenomenal entities and processes come about. If we take strict naturalism as the 
background philosophy for CSR (or the study of religion in general), we might think about 
religion in a similar way. Our everyday experience (or at least the everyday experience of 
some people) involves non-physical (or non-ordinary) beings, entities and phenomena that 
cannot be located in our scientific understanding of the world. The function of a properly 
naturalistic science of religion would be to explain why these strange things inhabit our 
everyday world and experience in terms that are natural and understandable – that is, not 
religious.451 We can reformulate the point in terms of “folk religion” and “folk theology”. On 
                                                 
449 Boyer 2001, 343.  
450 Philosopher Charles Taliaferro also makes this point in his paper Explaining Religious Experience (2009). 
451 As a matter of fact, this seems to be what Dennett has in mind in his Breaking the Spell (2006, 17) when he 
claims that we need “scientific, no-holds-barred investigation of religion as one natural phenomenon among 
many” to know whether religious ideas are true and whether religious practices are rational and meaningful. In 
the case of consciousness, we need science to determine whether the entities that inhabit our phenomenology 
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this reading, everyday assumptions about supernatural agents and our religious practices are 
parts of folk religion. On top of this folk religion cultures build their own folk theologies, 
that is, reflective systems that “explain” folk religion. Unfortunately for folk theology (and 
fortunately for scientists), the argument concludes that we now have a properly scientific 
(naturalistic) account of folk religion which eliminates the need for folk theology.   
 
5.3. Broad Naturalism and Methodological Naturalism 
In the previous section, we looked at one possible philosophical construal that could be used 
as a background for CSR. This section will look at another possible construal (already stated 
at the end of section 5.1) according to which 
 
(2) CSR theories are worldview neutral in the sense that they allow different worldview 
positions and religiously irrelevant for theistic beliefs in the sense that they do not 
have consequences for their truth or falsity. 
 
We will begin with a brief look at a position which may be called “broad naturalism” 
(sometimes also known as “non-reductive naturalism” or “non-reductive materialism”) 
which has been seen as an alternative to the view presented in the previous section. We will 
then proceed by looking at arguments put forward by those (mainly Barrett) who endorse 
such a position. As we will see, thte broad naturalist position involves a denial (or at least 
rephrasing) of the main claims of strict naturalism – that is, physicalism, scientism and micro-
reductionism – as it argues for some forms of non-reductive materialism and/or multiple 
realisation.   
 Before we proceed any further, we should distinguish strict naturalism and broad 
naturalism from “methodological naturalism”. Methodological naturalism is usually taken as 
a norm according to which scientists should not invoke supernatural entities to explain 
natural phenomena. In other words, when scientists are postulating theoretical entities to 
explain observed regularities or events, they should not postulate supernatural agents unless 
absolutely necessary. Virtually all scientists, irrespective of their religious views, accept this 
claim.452 As a methodological norm, the claim does not include ontological assumptions, 
such as physicalism, or epistemological assumptions related to the priority of scientific 
knowledge over other types of knowledge.   
 The term “broad naturalism” comes from Taliaferro and Goetz (2008) who use it to 
refer to naturalists who do not subscribe to the causal closure of the physical and micro-
reduction.453 The preferred ontological doctrine of broad naturalists is some form of non-
reductive or emergent materialism. According to emergent materialism, the natural world is 
physically constituted but includes complex entities and processes that cannot be explained 
by physical causes alone or reduced to physics. Thus, the advocates of non-reductive 
materialism usually deny or at least reformulate the claims for causal closure and the 
explanatory completeness of physics. In this scheme, mental states, for instance, can be seen 
relatively independent of the physical states that realise them in the sense that they can have 
                                                                                                                                                  
actually exist. The same goes in the case of religion. But in both cases we already know that such entities cannot 
exist because they do not feature in our current theories of physics. In this view, religious and scientific 
“explanations” of religion are seen as competitors much in the same way as everyday explanations of 
consciousness (e.g. dualism) and scientific accounts of consciousness are seen as competitors. If a proper 
scientific explanation of religion can be constructed, then the religious or theological (non-scientific) 
interpretation loses its plausibility. This seems to be the position of Paul Bloom as well. See, e.g., Bloom 2009.  
452 This definition of methodological naturalism is given in Draper 2005. Draper points out that this definition 
does not exclude the postulation of non-natural entities, such as ideas (numbers, propositions, etc.), in general, 
but only supernatural agents.   
453 Taliaferro & Goetz (2008) consider John Searle and Jerry Fodor as prime examples of broad naturalism. 
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true “causal power”. By the same token, the products of intentional states need not be 
explained by causes susceptible to physical description. Methodologically, non-reductive 
materialism allows more independence to the special sciences than physicalism. Fodor, the 
champion of this view, argues that special sciences study phenomena that are multiply 
realised functional states of physical systems. Fodor remains a materialist when in claiming 
that nature is completely materially constituted but he also claims that mental states are 
“multiply realised” in the sense that they can be explained by theories or laws that cannot be 
reduced to the theories and laws of physics. What is true of mental states is also true of 
phenomena that are studied in other special sciences: societies, for example, can be described 
as having true empirical generalisations without the possibility of such generalisations being 
reduced or even related to psychological, biological or physical theories.454  
 Some of Barrett‟s aforementioned comments (section 5.1) can be understood in the 
light of broad naturalism and worldview neutrality. In his article Is the Spell Really Broken?: Bio-
psychological explanations of religion and theistic belief (2007c), Barrett defends the worldview 
neutrality of CSR theories on the grounds that the “truth-question” is outside CSR theories. 
He also ends up endorsing views that are close to broad naturalism as previously described. 
Barrett‟s basic approach is to draw a distinction between psychological and biological 
mechanisms that underlie religious thinking and behaviour and the justification of religious 
beliefs and the rationality of religious practices. In his article, Barrett deals with five implicit 
and explicit arguments for the fact that biological and psychological explanations of religious 
beliefs and practices undermine the rationality of religion. Of these five arguments, the 
following three are relevant for our subject:455 
 
(1) The argument from religion as a by-product of non-religious cognition  
(2) The argument from inherited belief  
(3) The argument from the fallibility of cognition 
 
We will also examine one argument discussed by philosopher Michael Murray as he defends 
a position similar to Barrett‟s: 
 
(4) The argument from the lack of causal connectedness.  
 
Murray‟s discussion can be found in his article Four Arguments That the Cognitive Psychology of 
Religion Undermines the Justification of Religious Belief (2007).456  
                                                 
454 See, e.g., Fodor 1974, 1997. Hilary Putnam (1975) has also argued strongly for multiple realisation. For a 
short overview, see Niiniluoto 1999, 21-25. The position outlined here is also the position of some writers 
introduced in chapter 4. Recall Garfinker‟s argument against micro-reduction and for multiple realisation: in his 
view, macro-states can be constituted by several different micro-states. If macro-states are relatively 
independent from the micro-states that realise them, then the autonomy of the special sciences would be 
secured: there could be genuine explanatory generalisations that could not be described in terms of psychology, 
neuroscience, biology or physics. The relationship between higher-level states and lower-level states in non-
reductive materialism is usually identified as some form of supervenience relation or emergence. The exact 
nature of supervenience, emergence and multiple realisation has been debated hotly. For discussion, see, e.g., 
Clayton & Davies 2006; Craver & Wilson 2007; Craver & Bechtel 2007; Hohwy & Kallestrup 2008; Kistler 
2006; McCauley 2007; Murphy & Stoeger 2007; Zahle 2007. Classic articles can be found in Beckerman et al. 
1992.  
455 I will not deal with Barrett‟s two remaining arguments that concern (1) neurotheology and (2) adaptationism. 
In the former case, Barrett argues that the fact that some areas of the brain are activated in religious context 
does not constitute an explanation of anything. Furthermore, it does not make the objects of our ordinary 
experience false. In the latter case,  
456 Murray‟s arguments are recapitulated in an updated form in his Scientific Explanations of Religion and the 
Justification of Religious Belief (2009). 
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 First, consider the idea that religious beliefs and practices are a by-product of 
cognitive mechanisms produced by natural selection. It might seem that prima facie such a 
claim would severely undermine religious beliefs. However, if we look at this reasoning more 
carefully, Barrett argues, we realise that we have no reason to claim that beliefs that are 
evolutionary by-products or “accidents” produced by cognitive systems geared for other 
functions must be false.457 The argument can be formulated as follows: 
 
(1) Natural selection has created selection pressures which have led to the emergence 
of various dispositions in the human mind that accidentally give rise to religious 
beliefs.  
(2) Religious beliefs are accidents or by-products of evolution. 
(3)Therefore, religious beliefs cannot be trusted.  
 
Barrett points out that claim (1) is an interesting empirical claim and may even be true. Claim 
(2) might also be true: it seems that natural selection did not favour or work against 
individuals who had religious beliefs, but rather natural selection favoured some behaviours 
and cognitive systems that made religious beliefs and practices possible. Although the 
premises look fine, the conclusion does not follow: the two premises do not give us reasons 
not to trust accidents or by-products of natural selection. Barrett points out that most of our 
beliefs, including scientific beliefs, are evolutionary by-products: natural selection did not 
select individuals who could do calculus or had beliefs about quantum mechanics. We are 
able to form beliefs about quantum mechanics and calculus – as well as many other things – 
because our cognitive mechanisms, that originally evolved to do something else, are flexible 
enough to process different inputs. So the fact that evolved cognitive mechanisms are 
involved in producing religious beliefs does not entail that those beliefs are mistaken or even 
suspicious.458    
 It seems to me that the reason why the argument from religion as a by-product seems 
convincing is that it confuses the following claims: 
 
(a) Some features of religious thinking and behaviour can be explained by invoking 
cognitive mechanisms that were designed by natural selection to serve a non-religious 
purpose in our ancestral environment. 
(b) Religion is nothing more than a by-product of non-religious cognitive mechanisms. 
 
The latter claim does not follow from the former. To show that the latter is the case, one 
would need to do much more than to show that some features of religious traditions can be 
explained by the features of our non-religious cognition. Another reason why we might jump 
from an available naturalistic explanation of the origins of religion to its falsity is our 
intuition that in order for a belief that p be justified (that is, be a proper candidate for being 
true), the belief that p must be causally connected to the reality which it represents. So if 
religious beliefs are not caused by actual states of affairs in reality but merely by cognitive 
mechanisms themselves, then they do not seem to be proper candidates for being true. 
 Murray has formulated this argument in the following way: 
 
(1) The origin of religious beliefs can be explained without any reference to or without 
any causal connection to supernatural reality. 
                                                 
457 Both Dawkins and Dennett, for example, opt for this construal of the by-product view. See, e.g., Dennett 
2006, 309 and Dawkins 2006, 179.  
458 Barrett 2007c, 62-63, 65. Barrett points out that it seems difficult to understand how any belief could be 
encouraged by natural selection. This is because natural selection does not select beliefs or attitudes but 
behaviours. Natural selection does not care about truth, only survival. See Barrett 2007c, 64-65. 
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(2) Religious beliefs are not causally connected to their targets. 
(3)  A belief in general is not justified if it is not causally connected to its target in certain 
ways. 
(4) Therefore, religious beliefs are unjustified. 
 
The argument has two basic problems. The first problem is that although causal analysis of 
knowledge and justification are quite popular among philosophers, they are by no means the 
only possible theories available.459 Not all theories of justification require a causal connection 
between the object of a belief and the belief itself. Broadly speaking, theories of justification 
can be either internalist or externalist. Internalist theories of justification ground the 
justification of a belief in factors “inside the head” or factors knowable to the epistemic 
subject herself. In most cases, other beliefs possessed by the epistemic subject function as 
such factors. Evidentialist theories of rationality are prototypes of internalism: beliefs are 
justified by other beliefs. Contrary to internalists, externalists argue that a belief can be 
justifiably held if it is connected to the world in a proper way. Thus externalism allows that 
the justification of a belief can be out of the reach of the epistemic subject. One way to 
construe this relationship is to say that a belief should be produced by a reliable source.460    
 The second problem is that, even if we grant for the sake of the argument, that 
religious beliefs must be causally connected to a supernatural realm, the argument would still 
fail. The reason is that we can construct a causal connection between a religious belief and its 
target in a way that satisfies the requirements. Consider the following ways in which a belief 
about supernatural reality can be causally connected to its target:  
 
(a) Supernatural reality can directly affect our cognitive systems (brains). 
(b) Supernatural reality can be directly perceived or experienced.  
(c) Supernatural reality can cause a natural event which in turn functions as grounds for 
the belief in a supernatural reality.   
(d) Supernatural reality can set up our cognitive systems in such a way that they produce 
religious beliefs in certain environments.  
 
Murray points out that alternative (d) is always open to the theist. God can be understood as 
setting up our cognitive machinery and its environment in such a way that they together 
produce true beliefs about him. This move would make it unnecessary for God to directly 
reveal himself in one's experience or cause some natural events which would in turn cause a 
religious belief.461 Other alternatives are also possible. Take option (b) for instance. In his 
Perceiving God: The Epistemology of Religious Experience (1991), philosopher William Alston has 
argued that religious experiences can be understood as a form of perception.462 According to 
this view, the causal connection between some religious beliefs and religious experience is 
similar to the causal connection between perceptual beliefs and their targets. In both cases, 
the experience (religious or perceptual) constitutes a reliable process of belief formation.  
 Now, we can consider Barrett‟s second argument – the argument from inherited 
belief. The argument begins from CSR‟s claim that religion comes naturally to human beings 
as religious beliefs and practices “fit” quite well in our cognitive architecture. Barrett 
construes the argument as follows:  
 
(1) People are credulous recipients of religious beliefs.  
                                                 
459 For discussion, see, e.g., BonJour & Sosa 2003. 
460 A classical exposition of both reliabilism and externalism is Goldman 1992. Internalism is defended by, e.g., 
Roderick Chisholm (1989).  
461 Murray 2007, 368-369. 
462 Alston is also a defender of a certain kind of reliabilism in epistemology. See, e.g., Alston 1989.  
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(2) Natural selection provided us with the cognitive faculties that make us credulous 
recipients. 
(3) We know now why people believe in God so easily. 
(4)Therefore, continuing to believe in God is irrational. 
 
Again Barrett points out that claim (1) is an interesting empirical claim: not only can the CSR 
show that the claim is plausible but it can even explain why it is so. Claim (2) is a plausible 
claim as well: Barrett refers to evidence from developmental psychology that suggests that 
children, for instance, are quite credulous especially towards everything their parents tell 
them. Finally, claim (3) is inferred from the two previous claims. The problem with this 
argument, however, that there is again a considerable gap between the premises and the 
conclusion. What is missing is the following premise:  if humans have cognitive faculties that 
make some beliefs more plausible than others, we should not hold these beliefs true. This 
premise is clearly false: why should we think that the plausibility of a belief is evidence for its 
falsity? Finally, Barrett makes the most crucial point: if we hold that we can offer a 
psychological explanation of why certain beliefs are plausible and take this as evidence 
against these beliefs, then we are assuming that the plausibility of those beliefs is based solely 
on the cognitive mechanisms that psychologists study. If this were the case, we would 
commit ourselves to the claim that conscious deliberations would not come in at any point in 
the process of acquiring beliefs. This cannot be true, Barrett claims, because humans are also 
capable of grounding their beliefs in consciously reflected arguments and evidence, so there 
is at least a possibility that the plausibility of religious beliefs is produced by conscious 
reflection.463   
 At this point, Barrett's defence hinges on a certain conception of what cognitive 
mechanisms are and how they are related to conscious reasoning and to the outside world. In 
his view, what individuals believe is always a result of interplay between many different 
factors: unconscious biases created by cognitive systems, conscious reasoning and available 
information all contribute to produce a belief in an individual. This brings us back to the 
more general and mainly philosophical question concerning the nature of consciousness and 
its role in naturalistic world views.  
 Consider the argument from the fallibility of cognition. It is a well-known fact that 
human cognition makes systematic mistakes. Barrett points out that our perceptual systems, 
for instance, are prone to illusions and our inference systems do not always perform their 
tasks according to the rules of formal reasoning. If this reasoning is extended to our 
cognitive mechanisms that provide the plausibility for our believing in God, it would seem to 
undermine belief in God. The argument can be formulated as follows: 
 
(1) Our cognitive capacities provide the plausibility for our believing in God 
(2) Our cognitive capacities are prone to errors so they cannot be trusted to give us 
truth. 
(3) If we cannot trust our cognitive capacities, we should not hold belief in God 
plausible. 
(4) Therefore, the untrustworthiness of our cognition weakens the belief in God. 
 
Barrett notes that the goal of this argument is to present our cognitive faculties in a dubious 
light. The basic idea of the argument is that if a belief arises from a source that is not reliable 
and there is no other means of justifying it, then it is not rational to hold it true. Although 
the argument looks convincing, Barrett points out that two implausible assumptions are 
made: firstly, it assumes that the multitude of cognitive systems that support religious beliefs 
                                                 
463 Barrett 2007c, 65-67.  
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are all prone to errors, and secondly, it assumes that we do not have any other sources that 
might justify religious beliefs.464    
 The argument suffers from the same problems as the inherited belief argument, 
Barrett claims: it presupposes that the automatic cognitive systems which psychologists study 
are the only reasons that religious beliefs are plausible. Furthermore, in the case of perceptual 
illusions for example, we have other sources of knowledge that can be used to verify and 
rectify the distorted products of our cognitive systems. However, CSR writers claim that 
religious beliefs are supported by the same cognitive machinery that supports our other 
everyday beliefs as well. If all of our ordinary cognitive systems are seriously error-prone, 
then we fall into general scepticism for we cannot trust our belief-forming mechanisms at all. 
Thus, the argument produces too much “collateral damage”: if the argument is correct, we 
should not trust religious beliefs because their source is not reliable; but by the same token, 
almost all other beliefs would have to go as well because they are products of the same 
machinery.465   
 Finally, Barrett concludes that naturalistic explanations – psychological, biological or 
whatever – cannot remove the justification of religious beliefs by themselves:  
 
For the moment, it appears that theists have nothing to fear from the bio-
psychological explanations of religion. Although these scientific endeavours may 
grant new insights into mechanisms that play a role in shaping religious thought and 
action, whether or not belief in gods is rationally justified remains a question outside 
science.466 
 
Murray also reaches a similar conclusion. His answer to the question of whether cognitive 
explanations of religious beliefs show that religion is nothing more than evolutionary by-
product is that 
 
[o]ur first reaction to such a question should be: well, if they do, it is not clear how. 
These models, if correct, show not one thing more than we have certain mental tools 
(perhaps selected, perhaps spandrels) which under certain conditions give rise to 
beliefs in the existence of entities which tend to rally religious commitments. But 
pointing out does nothing to tell us about whether those beliefs are justified or not.467 
 
 
 The previous discussion supports a certain reading of CSR theories according to 
which CSR theories are worldview neutral in the sense that they allow different worldview 
positions and religiously irrelevant for theistic beliefs in the sense that they do not have 
major consequences for their truth or falsity. The latter conclusion may be a bit too strong as 
it depends on a given set of religious ideas; however the conclusion at least shows that CSR 
theories should not be construed as negatively religious relevant in principle without further 
enquiry. Moreover, Barrett‟s arguments reveal philosophical assumptions that contradict the 
strict naturalist reading.  First, Barrett argues that conscious (reflective) reasoning can be 
involved in justifying religious beliefs. His argument implies that conscious processes and 
reflective reasoning cannot be completely explained by mechanistic factors. In other words, 
he acknowledges the possibility of non-mechanistic or “non-causal” explanations of some 
events thus contradicting the explanatory completeness of physics. Second, both Murray and 
Barrett assume that the issue of whether religious beliefs are true or not is outside science, 
                                                 
464 Barrett 2007c, 67-68.  
465 Barrett 2007c, 69-70.  
466 Barrett 2007c, 70. 
467 Murray 2007, 365. 
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because science deals with empirically measurable reality. This, in turn, implies a certain view 
of the nature of scientific knowledge: there are aspects of reality that are not accessible to 
natural sciences and as a consequence there is genuine knowledge that is not scientific. As we 
have already seen, under the conditions imposed by strict naturalism these claims would not 
be possible. For if everything is considered as physical or reducible to the physical and the 
domain of physical states is completely exhausted by the natural sciences, then there is 
nothing left outside the sciences. Thus if the sciences can explain religious beliefs and no 
scientific evidence for their truth is available, then religious beliefs must be false. Advocates 
of the broad naturalist reading of CSR do not regard this line of reasoning as plausible. 
Finally, Barrett presents a certain type of defence of theistic beliefs by grounding them in the 
reliability of our cognitive systems. This is a topic, however, that we leave to the next section 
where we will look at some theological interpretations of CSR theories.   
 
5.4. Positive Relevance: Rationality of Religious Belief 
The previous sections have shown how implicit philosophical assumptions about the nature 
of scientific knowledge, the nature of religion, the ontological constitution of world and the 
like come in when CSR writers (and others) interpret CSR theories and their aims. The result 
was that – at least in principle – cognitive explanations of the origins of religious beliefs do 
by themselves have little bearing on the truth or falsity of religious beliefs. In order to get to 
the truth or falsity of religious beliefs, we must enter into the aforementioned philosophical 
issues. We examined two different interpretations – strict naturalism and broad naturalism 
and/or methodological naturalism. This section examines two possible points of positive 
religious relevance to theistic truth-claims, namely, the rationality of theistic belief and 
“cognitive fine-tuning”.468 
 One possible way to understand CSR theories in a theological context is given by 
theologian Niels-Henrik Gregersen in his article What Theology Might Learn (and Not Learn) 
from Evolutionary Psychology: A Postfoundationalist Theologian in Discussion with Pascal Boyer (2006). 
He conducts his discussion of Boyer in the light of J. Wentzel van Huyssteen's theology and 
especially his model of rationality.469 Gregersen and van Huyssteen see no particular religious 
or theological problem in the claim that religious beliefs are evolutionary by-products. The 
fact that human cognition has evolutionary roots means that all beliefs have evolutionary 
roots, even religious ones. However, in a similar way to Barrett, Gregersen concludes that 
rationality and the truth of religious beliefs should not be evaluated in terms of their 
biological origin. Gregersen refers to van Huyssteen‟s treatment of evolutionary 
epistemology and points out that van Huyssteen‟s ideas can be easily transferred over to 
evolutionary psychology and CSR.470  
 Van Huyssteen‟s motivation for appreciating evolutionary considerations is his 
attempting to find grounding for common human rationality in human evolutionary roots. 
He writes that  
 
[e]volutionary epistemology thus reveals the process of evolution as a belief-gaining 
process, a process that in humans, too, is shaped pre-consciously. All our beliefs, and 
                                                 
468 In the current literature, claims for positive religious relevance are rare. In addition to Gregersen 2006 and 
some remarks by Barrett, only Clark & Barrett 2009 comes to mind. Some articles in a recent book The Believing 
Primate: Scientific, Philosophical, and Theological Reflections about the Origins of Religion (Murray & Schloss 2009) point to 
this direction also. 
469 For an overview of van Huyssteen's postfoundationalist model of theology, see van Huyssteen 1998, 1999. 
van Huyssteen's take on the evolution of human cognition can be found in van Huyssteen 2006. van 
Huyssteen's account of Boyer's theory is congruent with Gregersen. See van Huyssteen 2006, 261-270.  
470 For an overview, see Pinxten & Callebaut 1987. 
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I would argue, also our religious beliefs, thus have evolutionary origins and were 
established by mechanisms working reliably in the world of our ancestors. This still 
does not mean, however, that natural selection can offer an adequate explanation for 
beliefs that far transcend their biological origins. But this again underlines the fact 
that cognition is a general characteristic of all living beings, and that human 
rationality, therefore, can only be fully understood if its biological roots are 
understood.471  
 
Thus van Huyssteen sees no problem in treating religious beliefs and religious imagination 
equally with all other sorts of human thinking and reflection.472 Furthermore, both Gregersen 
and van Huyssteen also accept, although not without criticism, the main claims of 
evolutionary psychology: first, that the human brain houses a number of functionally distinct 
systems that have evolutionary origins and, secondly, that these systems create cross cultural 
cognitive strategies that in turn have effects on how cultural information is processed. As 
postfoundationalists, Gregersen and van Huyssteen assume that the Christian community 
has prima facie justification for their truth-claims, so they are not looking to justify Christian 
claims through science. However, they are interested in the way scientific findings about the 
development of religious ideas and religious thinking might inform theological work. Both 
Gregersen and van Huyssteen are mainly interested about the origins and functions of 
rationalities in different domains of life. If religious rationality has cognitive and evolutionary 
roots in the sense that it is not its own distinct domain of rationality, all the better for 
religion, they claim. 473   
 Gregersen makes several critical points about Boyer's claims. First of all, he point out 
that no straightforward causal connection exists between mental modules and processes in 
the brain. Thus Boyer's account is ultimately incomplete. In the future it might be that the 
neurosciences will validate assumptions concerning psychological theory, but they also might 
not. Secondly, Boyer's “supra-rationalistic” idea of religion neglects the practical dimension 
of religion as well as the fact that religious ideas also represent natural rather than 
supernatural realms. Thirdly, the generality of Boyer's theory, the fact that it deals with the 
“cultural fitness” of religious ideas, makes the explanatory scope of the theory quite limited: 
in particular, religions and behaviours are not explained. Finally, he criticises Boyer's claims 
to have “explained religion” as if his theory were equipped to evaluate the rationality of 
religious beliefs. Gregersen writes that 
 
Boyer concerns himself with cultural adaptation, with “cultural fitness”, and not with 
the conceivability or rationality of particular religious imaginations. He is thus well 
aware that he cannot qua evolutionary psychologist evaluate the internal rationality of 
religious belief. The self-affirmative rhetoric of “explaining religion” disguises this 
fact, as Boyer's many Feuerbachian side-remarks do. For a theory about the 
emergence of religious concepts and imaginations does not answer the philosophical 
question about the validity of religious beliefs, nor the issue as to whether and how 
religious imagination may refer to extra-linguistic realities. The reasons that may 
undergird the unreasonable effectiveness of religious thought (to reuse John Wheeler's famous 
phrase about the unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics) simply transcends the 
scope of evolutionary psychology.474 
 
                                                 
471 Van Huyssteen 1998, 151-152.  
472 Van Huyssteen 2006, 264. 
473 Gregersen 2006, 312-314; van Huysteen 2006.  
474 Gregersen 2006, 320.  
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 Despite the shortcomings of the cognitive approach, Gregersen claims that 
theologians should wholeheartedly accept the idea of naturalness of religious ideas. First of 
all, the fact that religious concepts are easy to understand and process coincides with the 
Judeo-Christian idea that humans are created in the image of God and thus endowed with 
abilities to be in communication with him. This “cognitively fine-tuned” ability to understand 
God is common to all humans irrespective of their religious views. Secondly, the fact that the 
ability to form religious ideas is part of human nature makes religion as real and natural as 
any physical phenomena. Finally, and most importantly, Gregersen points out that  
 
what evolutionary psychology shows us is that religions consistently produce mental 
representations with similar contents as a result of the ordinary workings of the 
human mind, including its imaginative capacities. This suggests that religious 
imaginations and concepts are to be treated on a par with all other sorts of human thinking. ... The 
human ability to form pictures and create metaphors is simply a fact of life that does 
not need justification. The philosopher of theologian is therefore freed from burden 
of giving evidence of rationality of religious concepts in general. Religious 
imaginations cannot be treated as a generic unity, but flow in many directions. 
According, their rational or irrational nature has to be evaluated on a case-by-case 
basis.475  
 
Gregersen takes CRS theories to show that religious thinking and rationality are not that 
different from other types of human thinking. In a similar fashion to Barrett, he connects the 
rationality of religious beliefs to the cognitive systems that produced them and concludes 
that the naturalness of religious ideas actually supports religious claims rather than 
undermines them.  
 Recall the previous section where it was pointed out that Barrett's arguments against 
the anti-religious interpretations of CSR theories were partly based on the reliability of our 
cognitive systems to produce true beliefs. He makes a strong connection between the 
justification of religious beliefs and the truth-preserving nature of our cognitive systems: if 
religious beliefs are largely produced by normal human cognitive systems and if we generally 
trust these systems, then we should not suspect them in the case of religious beliefs. In a 
brief chapter of Why Would Anyone Believe in God? (2004), Barrett compares belief in God and 
belief in other minds and argues that they are psychologically speaking in the same level.476 
Both types of beliefs – belief in gods and belief in other minds – (1) lack empirical support, 
(2) are believed both reflectively and intuitively and (3) are mostly universal. Barrett writes 
that 
 
[p]erhaps surprisingly, no scientific evidence exists that proves people have minds. 
Indeed, such direct evidence of minds falls beyond the realm of science because 
minds (as believed in) are experiential and not material. ... Ultimately, what 
psychologists study is human behaviour, including the behaviour of brains and 
nervous systems. Psychologists and cognitive scientists interpret behaviors in terms 
of mental states and the functions of minds. However, minds are not accessible to 
direct investigation and have not even been proven to exist.477  
 
Barrett points out that it is not scientific evidence that makes people believe in minds but the 
outputs of their cognitive systems: “believing in minds is a natural and nearly inevitable 
                                                 
475 Gregersen 2006, 322. 
476 Barrett 2004, 95-105. Barrett‟s argument draws from Plantinga‟s book God and Other Minds: A Study of the 
Rational Justification of Belief in God (1990). 
477 Barrett 2004, 96.  
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consequence of the sort of biology we have, by virtue of being humans and living in the 
general sort of world in which we live.”478 The gist of Barrett‟s argument is that belief in 
minds and belief in God or gods should be held as foundational or basic, that is, they are not 
based on empirical evidence or logical proof. Foundational beliefs need no outside 
justification. Further, as they are both basic beliefs, if we doubt the one on the basis of lack 
of empirical evidence or logical proof we should also doubt the other.479  
 Gregersen‟s and Barrett‟s picture fits quite well with what CSR writers say about 
belief acquisition. We already covered this in section 3.1 when we talked about intuitive and 
reflective beliefs so I just make some clarifications. Boyer contrasts two models of belief 
acquisition: the first model is based on our everyday (and sometimes philosophical) 
understanding whereas the second is suggested by psychological evidence. Consider belief 
acquisition as sort of judicial process. First the epistemic subject receives or collects 
information and forms a belief or a system of beliefs about something. Then this belief 
system is brought before a “belief-judge” and a “belief-attorney” presents all available 
evidence for and against it. Finally, the judge presents his verdict: either the belief system is 
accepted or discarded. The purpose of describing this model is to highlight the idea that 
acquiring new beliefs is based on analysis of evidence and coherence as well as exercise of 
reflective reasoning and inference. Further, the model supposes that we basically choose our 
beliefs as if our consciousness were like a guard standing at the gate of our mind. Only 
beliefs that are accompanied with sufficient evidence and coherence are let in.480  
 The second model – model suggested by cognitive psychology – is more 
complicated. The basic idea is that  
 
people do not have beliefs because they somehow made their minds receptive to 
belief and then acquired the material for belief. They have some beliefs because, 
among all the material they acquired, some of it triggered these particular effects.481 
 
What Boyer is trying to say here is that the epistemic subject does not somehow open his 
mind to new information and assess it, but rather the epistemic subject acquires and 
processes information all the time and the information acquired triggers certain beliefs. There 
is no judge or jury in the mind, only a large number of independent systems that process 
information and send their processed information to other systems as facts.482  
                                                 
478 Barrett 2004, 95-99. Barrett acknowledges the fact that although most people believe that other people have 
minds there are philosophers and psychologists who believe that humans do not have minds (i.e. having 
conscious experiences) at all.   
479 Barrett 2004, 98.  
480 Boyer 2001, 302-303. Boyer writes that “we have two quite different pictures of how a mind reaches a 
verdict. On the one hand, we sometimes weight the evidence and decide on its merit. On the other hand, there 
seems to be a great deal of underground belief making going on that is simply not reported. When we discuss 
religious concepts and beliefs, we tend to assume that these are processes in the mind along the lines of the first 
model, a kind of Judge and Attorney system in the mind. We assume that notions of supernatural agents, what 
they do, what they are like, etc. are presented to the mind and that some decision-making process accepts these 
notions as valid or rejects them. But this may be a rather distorted view of how such concepts are acquired and 
represented.” Boyer 2001, 304.  
481 Boyer 2001, 30-31. 
482 Boyer 2001, 304. Psychologists and philosophers have pointed out that our standard philosophical picture of 
belief-formation is somewhat misguided: human beings are not ideally rational agents that assess the truth of 
beliefs according to the rules of normative rationality, but rather they are agents with limited cognitive powers 
who apply fast heuristics procedures and fuzzy logic in everyday situations. For a summary of this “rationality 
debate”, see Stein 1996. For more discussion, see Evans & Over 1996. Arguments from the both sides are 
presented in Stainton 2006, 113-144. The most famous psychological test which shows that humans make 
systematic mistakes in tasks that require formal reasoning is the Wason selection task described by, e.g., Botterill 
& Carruthers (1999, 105-130). 
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 If the latter model of belief acquisition is more accurate than the former, what are we 
to think of religious beliefs? First we must note that the “direction of justification” is 
different in the former model than in the latter. According to the latter model, it is a mistake 
to assume that the epistemic subject first decides to adopt some fairly general religious belief 
(like ”our forefathers are present now” or ”God exists”) and then interprets everyday 
situations in the light of this belief. On the contrary, the human mind is built in such a way 
that it produces intuitions in different situations that are easily compatible with reflective 
religious beliefs such as “God exists”. If there are practices of interaction, such as rituals and 
prayers, then intuitions, which increase the plausibility of a reflective religious belief are 
automatically produced. In this sense, the cognitive model suggests that the plausibility of 
very general and reflective religious beliefs is grounded on interplay of religious practices and 
cognition rather than the other way around.483 This result corresponds to our everyday 
observations as well: religious people do not usually come to believe in the existence of God 
through metaphysical reflection, but rather hold the belief that God exists true, because it is 
compatible with what they do and experience. Moreover, if formation and justification of 
religious beliefs (and other everyday beliefs) are based on intuitive conceptual schemas, then 
we should not expect the process acquisition to proceed according to the abstract norms of 
philosophical rationality.  
 The moral of this story, in Barrett‟s and Gregersen‟s terms, is that the demands of 
normative rationality are simply too high for humans in most cases to achieve. The “standard 
model of rationality” suggests that religious thinking is irrational compared to other domains 
of thinking. However, what CSR theories and other theories in cognitive psychology seem to 
suggest is that religious thinking is on a par with other forms of everyday thinking. This 
result, according to Barrett and Gregersen, supports the idea that religious beliefs should be 
held as prima facie plausible because they are mostly produced by ordinary cognitive 
mechanisms – mechanisms that are normally thought to be reliable sources of beliefs.484  
 Finally, Barrett and some others have argued that CSR results support the Christian 
claim that humans are naturally endowed to know God – an idea that Gregersen mentions 
only in passing. Barrett writes that   
 
God created people with the capacity to know and love him but with the free will to 
reject him. Consequently, our God-endowed nature leads us to believe, but human 
endeavours apart from God‟s design may result in disbelief. ... God may have fine-
tuned the cosmos to allow for life and for evolution and then orchestrated mutations 
and selection to produce the sort of organisms we are – evolution through 
„supernatural selection.‟485  
 
In this sense, cognitive theories have ended up revealing a certain form of sensus divinitatis, 
that is, our God-given capacity to know God.486 Barrett‟s claim rests on an idea of what we 
                                                 
483 Boyer 2001, 315. Boyer presents some results from cognitive psychology that show that human reasoning 
has the tendency to make mistakes: for example, people generally have the tendency to adjust their beliefs 
according to beliefs of other people (consensus effect) and to detect and recall positive evidence for their 
hypotheses better than negative evidence (confirmation bias). See Boyer 2001, 300-301. 
484 If we were to develop the idea further, we could argue that most of our everyday beliefs, such as beliefs 
about time passing, the solidity of material objects, the existence of other minds and God or gods (perhaps) are 
basic or foundational in the aforementioned sense. Notice that we are talking about the rationality of religious 
belief here, not its truth. It might be rational for a person to believe something that will turn out to be not true. 
Thus, the fact that a person has rational warrant (justification) to believe in God, for instance, does not 
guarantee that her belief is true.  
485 Barrett 2004, 123. 
486 Barrett also highlights this point in his recent article Cognitive Science, Religion and Theology (2009, 98) where he 
writes that “[w]hatever the reasons for these cognitive biases to serve as imperfect guides to God, a Christian 
version of the cognitive science of religion remains possible. The Christian may argue that through some means 
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might call “cognitive fine-tuning” which is related to a more general account of fine-tuning 
of the cosmos.487 According to claims based on cognitive fine-tuning, God has set up our 
cognitive system in such a way that given a normal human environment our cognitive 
systems produce correct beliefs and intuitions about him.488  
 
5.5. Religious Relevance Revisited: Causes and Reasons of Religion  
In the preceding sections we were dealing with the problem of religious relevance. In section 
5.1 we outlined the problem and briefly described three alternative readings of the aims and 
religious implications of CSR theories. In subsequent chapters, I attempted to reconstruct 
these alternative readings and their background theories. According to the strict naturalist 
reading (section 5.2), CSR theories have clear negative religious relevance as they explain why 
humans postulate such unnatural entities as supernatural agents even though such entities are 
at odds with current scientific theories. We also pointed out how strict naturalism is driven 
by a set of philosophical assumptions connected to scientific explanation (micro-reduction 
and the unity of science), physicalism, and to a certain view of the nature of scientific 
knowledge (scientism). Writers who advocate the second reading described in section 5.3 
reject strict naturalist background assumptions in favour of broad naturalism. These writers 
claim that treating religion as a by-product of ordinary cognition and as natural for humans is 
mostly religiously irrelevant. Further, they distance themselves from physicalism, scientism 
and wholesale micro-reductionism. Finally, we looked at some writers who have argued that 
CSR theories provide support for some theistic claims. The naturalness of religion was seen 
by these authors to relieve the religious person of responsibility for providing a general 
justification for religious beliefs.  
 My point was to show that the religious implications of CSR are for the most part a 
matter of interpretation. The advocates of all three views mostly accept the core CSR 
theories (albeit not without some criticism) and auxiliary theories, but they differ on how 
they interpret their relationship to religious ideas. If CSR theories and auxiliary theories are 
put in different philosophical frameworks, then its religious implications are also different. 
This point implies that there need not be a single set of philosophical assumptions that must 
be shared in order to engage in CSR enquiry. The point also highlights the extent to which 
philosophical background assumptions can and will have effects on scientific work and 
especially on the interpretation of its results. Finally, we also noted that we cannot have an a 
priori account of what is religiously relevant and what is not, because religious relevance 
depends on what religious ideas we are talking about and how we are interpreting those 
religious ideas. Religious ideas are simply so diverse and so flexible in their interpretations 
that we cannot deal with them as a single set of ideas.  
 In the course of my treatment, I have mostly avoided favouring one of the three 
aforementioned positions over the other two. All three proposals have their advantages and 
disadvantages which for the reasons of space cannot be addressed here. However, I would 
like to highlight one question that is, in my view, the most important one regarding the 
                                                                                                                                                  
(perhaps including evolution) God has equipped people with the prerequisite cognitive equipment to have an 
appropriate relationship with God.” 
487 The term “cognitive fine tuning” originates from philosopher Del Ratzsch (2009). For an overview of 
biological and cosmological fine-tuning arguments and other types of arguments from design, see Manson 
2003.  
488 Barrett goes on to (2009, 97-98) suggest that the perceived plurality of god-concepts today is due to the 
“sinful, fallen world” in which we live: in the ideal condition, he speculates, humans might develop a unified 
theistic concept of God automatically. In his joint article Reidian Religious Epistemology and the Cognitive Science of 
Religion (2009) with philosopher Kelly James Clark, Barrett develops this theme further. The article explores the 
claim that CSR results support a certain notion of rationality exemplified historically by Thomas Reid and some 
contemporary philosophers such as Nicholas Wolterstorff. 
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religious relevance of CSR theories. This is the question of the relationship between reasons 
and causes of religion. The broad naturalist position of Barrett and others is based on the 
idea that causes and reasons are quite distinct. Barrett and Murray seem to be saying that it 
does not matter what the causes of theistic belief are. By definition, explanations of religious 
beliefs describe causes of religious beliefs rather than their reasons. However, the matter 
might not be as simple as this, because in order to be justified, that is, to be a proper 
candidate for being true, a belief must be caused in some appropriate manner. The fact that 
sometimes reasons and causes overlap (but not always and not necessarily), suggests that we 
cannot a priori decide that the causes of religion that science reveals are irrelevant for the 
justification of theistic beliefs.  
 To determine the religious relevance of cognitive accounts of theistic beliefs one 
should answer the following questions:  
 
(1) What do cognitive accounts of religious beliefs explain? 
(2) What kinds of causes do these explanations involve? 
(3) What kinds of causes of their own beliefs are the adherents of theism committed to?   
 
Notice that the third question is a theological one: as most religions and theologies seldom 
come with elaborate accounts of the causes of their beliefs, theological work is needed to 
assess whether the causes invoked in scientific explanations, in our case by cognitive 
explanations, are compatible with a particular theology.  
 Philosopher Peter van Inwagen (2009) highlights this point when he claims that all 
naturalistic explanations can be in principle – that is, without logical contradiction – 
assimilated into a supernaturalist framework. However, some naturalistic explanations 
“resist” assimilation more than others and this resistance has to do with how the causes of 
supernatural beliefs and their referents are understood. Some natural causes just simply seem 
to undercut some beliefs about the nature of supernatural realities more than others. He 
illustrates his point with the following example.  
 
Suppose that a statue of the Virgin in an Italian Church is observed to weep; or, at 
any rate, that is how it looks. It is eventually discovered, however, that the apparent 
tears are bat urine (it seems that some bats have made their home in the dim recesses 
of the church ceiling). This account of the tears is of course logically consistent with 
their having a partly supernaturalistic explanation (maybe God wanted the statue to 
appear to be weeping and He so guided the bats that they took up residence in just 
the right spot). Still, it resists being incorporated into a larger supernaturalistic 
explanation – it strongly suggests that there‟s “nothing more to it” than ordinary 
causes and change.489 
 
In this case, it somehow seems “unreasonable, contrived, artificial, or desperate”490 to say 
that bat urine was “God‟s way of doing it”.  
 Now, if we leave bat‟s urine behind and move our focus back to CSR explanations, 
then the question is whether the causes that CSR writers invoke to explain the prevalence of 
religious ideas are causes that resist theistic interpretation. Barrett, Murray and Gregersen do 
not seem to think so. Neither does van Inwagen who writes that  
 
[s]uppose that God exists and wants supernaturalistic belief to be a human universal, 
and sees (he would see this, if it were true) that certain features that it would be 
useful for human beings to have – useful from evolutionary point of view: conducive 
                                                 
489 van Inwagen 2009, 135.  
490 van Inwagen 2009, 136.  
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to survival and reproduction – would naturally have the consequence that 
supernaturalistic belief would in due course become a human universal. Why 
shouldn‟t he allow those features to be the cause of the things he wants? – rather as 
the human designer of a vehicle might use the waste heat from its engine to keep its 
passengers warm.491  
 
Finally, van Inwagen suggests, in a similar vein to Gregersen, that the reason why some CSR 
writers and their associates consider CSR as anti-theistic is that they implicitly slide from the 
claim that there are natural factors that contribute to the origin and pervasiveness of religious 
beliefs to the claim that religious beliefs are completely caused by natural factors and do not 
point to supernatural realities. The former claim is a simple scientific claim whereas the latter 
requires a commitment to a metaphysical position.  
 This position could be challenged by claiming that neither Barrett, Murray, Gregersen 
or van Inwagen are interested in giving a more positive – that is, more theologically 
constructive – case for the compatibility of cognitive (and evolutionary) causes of religious 
belief and the theistic account. They seem to be satisfied in giving, like in van Inwagen‟s case, 
a brief analogy that shows how cognitive causes are compatible with theism in principle and 
leave it at that. Maybe this is as far as philosophers can go, but for theologians it might be 
important to examine this theme further and try to formulate a more integrated account. In 
other words, all those who seek to assimilate the results of CSR into a theistic scheme must 
show that the causes of religious belief are compatible with theistic accounts of the causes of 
such beliefs. And such accounts must be actual theologies rather than merely making relevant 
points “in principle”.    
                                                 
491 van Inwagen 2009, 136.  
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6. Conclusion: Prospects and Boundaries 
 
In this work, I examined the main theories and methodological assumptions of three writers 
normally associated with the cognitive science of religion. In addition to looking at these 
three writers – that is, Scott Atran, Justin Barrett and Pascal Boyer – I also brought in Dan 
Sperber who, although not a CSR writer himself, has formulated some of the most important 
auxiliary theories of CSR. My perspective was philosophical in the sense that I attempted to 
give a philosophically informed account of their methodological principles and their main 
theories as well as to point out problems and possible solutions for them.   
 I began by outlining the development of the “cognitive science approach” in very 
general terms and pointed out how CSR theorising is done in the intersection of several 
different disciplines, namely, cognitive sciences, anthropology and evolutionary psychology. 
In addition, the multidisciplinary nature of CSR theorising also makes it a fertile ground for 
different kinds of philosophical considerations coming from philosophy of psychology, 
philosophy of mind and philosophy of social science. Finally, to bring some conceptual 
rigour to our analysis a distinction between three levels of CSR theorising was introduced: (1) 
core theoretical contributions (MCI hypothesis, HADD hypothesis, etc.), (2) auxiliary 
theories (epidemiology, modularity, etc.) and (3) philosophical assumptions (causal 
explanation, materialism, etc.). My goal was to examine both core theoretical contributions 
and auxiliary theories in order to reveal their philosophical assumptions.  
 Chapter 2 focussed on spelling out the methodological assumptions and auxiliary 
theories of CSR writers by situating these theories and assumptions into the nexus of existing 
approaches to religion. First it was pointed out how CSR writers like to contrast their 
approach with those who advocate a special method of “understanding” in the study of 
religion and anthropology in general. Their basic argument was that contemporary cognitive 
sciences can inform anthropological theorising about the human mind and offer tools for 
producing causal explanations. They insisted that since cognitive science examines thinking 
in terms of causal and physical processes of the brain, they can link thinking and its socio-
cultural products to the natural world of brains, bodies and physical things. They also insisted 
that as non-religious factors can be invoked to explain some religious phenomena we should 
conclude that religion is not a sui generis phenomenon, but rather part of the natural world 
and susceptible to naturalistic explanations. Second, we drew attention to the way in which 
CSR writers connected cognition and culture. They claimed that rather than being extra-
individual “cultural systems”, cultures (and religions) should be viewed as special 
configurations of cognitive processes. Since cultures and religions can be seen as widespread 
ideas, they can be explained by invoking cognitive constraints that make some ideas easier to 
learn and transmit than others. Thus, the goal of CSR explanations is to explain the 
prevalence and persistence of religious ideas by invoking cognitive systems. This suggested 
that the explanatory factors come from the cognitive and behavioural sciences rather than 
from the socio-cultural sciences. It is the domain-specific and modular architecture of human 
cognition that provides the cross-cultural constraints for this explanatory scheme: cognitive 
systems create recurrent patterns in human thinking and behaviour by constraining and 
informing the ways we act and think. Finally, CSR writers distinguished their “spandrelist” 
approach to religion from those who emphasise the adaptive role of religion. The spandrelist 
(or religion as by-product) approach emphasises the flexibility of cognitive modules: modules 
that were originally selected to perform other functions create a cultural domain of 
knowledge around them. In this sense, all aspects of culture (and religion) are evolutionary 
by-products of our cognitive processes.     
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 In chapter 3, we provided an overview of the core contributions of CSR focussing 
mainly on the MCI hypothesis and on the different ways in which supernatural agent 
representations activate our cognitive systems. Generally speaking, CSR writers explain the 
fact that religious ideas and practices are widespread and pervasive by the fact that human 
cognition operates in such a way that religious ideas are easy to acquire and transmit. 
According to the MCI hypothesis, representations that are minimally counterintuitive – that 
is, representations that include a single violation of intuitions created by our pre-existing 
domains of intuitive knowledge – have a selective advantage over purely intuitive and highly 
counterintuitive representations. Further, CSR writers argued that most successful religious 
ideas, such as those of gods and spirits, are minimally counterintuitive in this sense. It was 
also pointed out that the MCI hypothesis requires the existence of cross-cultural domains of 
intuitive knowledge that provide the backdrop for counter-intuitive representations. The fact 
that most religious ideas include references to supernatural agents can be explained by the 
“inferential potential” of agent representations. The (hypersensitive) agent detection device 
creates a general bias towards agent-driven representations, and the systems of social 
cognition – mainly those dealing with mental states and social interactions of other humans – 
inform inferences about supernatural agents. The relevance of supernatural agent 
representations is increased by the fact that they can be easily linked to moral intuitions, 
events of misfortune, death and ritual. As the origin of our moral intuitions is outside our 
conscious awareness supernatural agent representations can be invoked as sources of our 
moral norms. Further, the fact that human cognitive systems are geared to find explanations 
to salient and life-threatening events and biased towards agent-driven representations makes 
supernatural agent representations plausible candidates for causes of fortune and misfortune. 
CSR accounts of rituals are quite diverse for some writers emphasise the way in which rituals 
promote intra-group cooperation whereas others highlight the intuitive sense of urgency. 
Finally, CSR writers are keen to emphasise the difference between theological systems and 
actual religious beliefs: abstract and universal religious systems are not very relevant for the 
everyday life of believers and thus they are constantly being countered by the more local and 
particular religious beliefs of believers. In sum, supernatural agent representations have a 
very high probability of distribution because humans have a large number of cognitive 
systems that are specialised for identifying agents, making predictions about their behaviour 
and figuring out their interrelationship.  
 In chapter 4, we examined the scope of CSR explanations. The “problem of scope” 
was created by the fact that some writers claim that CSR explanations are mostly irrelevant 
for explaining religion whereas others claim that they can answer most of our questions 
about religion. We began by looking at how selective explanations work in general and 
concluded that CSR explanations are mainly ultimate explanations of cultural evolution. In 
this sense, they explain population-level tendencies rather than particular cases of religious 
thought and behaviour. This conclusion also led us to reframe the problem of scope: 
ultimate explanations of cultural evolution provide us with abstract models of selection 
pressures – namely, models of “cultural fitness” of representations. Next, we examined the 
nature of psychological explanation and the relationship of personal and sub-personal 
explanations and concluded that sub-personal explanations explain regularities in thinking 
and behaviour (psychological effects) by the structure of psychological capacities. 
Furthermore, it was argued that the explanatory scope of CSR depends (to some extent) on 
how the relationship of personal to sub-personal explanation is understood. Since the live 
options are varied it was concluded that instead of a strong a priori position, we should 
proceed by putting forward hypotheses at different levels of psychological explanation. After 
considering psychological explanation, we turned to causal explanation in general. After 
arguing that CSR writers views coincide quite well with causal-mechanism model of causal 
explanation I proceeded to describe some of the critique that has been directed towards the 
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causal-mechanism model. It was suggested that the emphasis on “material causes” is too 
strong and leads to unnecessary elimination of “higher-level” explanations. Finally, I 
presented an alternative to the causal-mechanism model, the interventionist model of causal 
explanation that can clarify what our explanations actually explain and highlight the 
usefulness of “higher-level” explanations.    
 After examining causal explanations I pointed out how CSR writers are committed to 
a certain view about the integration of scientific disciplines that was connected to their 
notion of causal explanation. CSR writers seem to endorse a certain type of “vertical 
integration” advocated by some Evolutionary Psychologists which seeks to make the socio-
cultural sciences mutually compatible and also compatible with the behavioural and natural 
sciences. We also compared vertical integration to traditional and classical models of inter-
theoretic reduction and pointed out several similarities. Finally, I pointed out some problems 
in the previous models (mainly their physicalist commitments) and offered an explanatorily 
pluralistic account as an alternative. McCauley‟s explanatory pluralism is based on the idea 
that disciplines and theories in different analytic levels can have different assumptions and 
poor inter-level mapping without the need for reduction or elimination. We also looked at 
Craver‟s multi-level mechanism according to which we can explain acting wholes by the 
actions performed by their component parts. We concluded that both aforementioned 
models work towards the same idea, namely, scientific explanation as a multi-level and 
pragmatic enterprise.       
 My conclusion was that the problem of scope is created by the fact that the critics are 
interested in explaining different things than CSR writers. The critics are looking for causes 
that make the difference between particular products of “reason, imagination, and will” 
whereas CSR writers are looking for causes that explain similarities between large groups of 
ideas, practices and actions. I also proposed that we should not stick too rigidly to one set of 
methodological assumptions, but acknowledge that different assumptions might help us to 
answer different questions about religion. It seems that we might adopt explanatory pluralism 
which would allow allows different kinds of methodological presupposition in the study of 
religion provided that they attempt to answer different kinds of why-questions. It seems that 
religion is a multi-faceted phenomenon that spans over a variety of fields of special sciences. 
It seems, therefore, that we should not restrict the study exclusively to the socio-cultural 
“level of analysis”. Nor should we claim that religion is “merely” a by-product of cognitive 
processes, “merely” a device for social cohesion or “merely” an existential stance towards the 
uncertainties of the world around us. The moral is that we should refrain from drawing sharp 
juxtapositions between seemingly different approaches in the study of religion without 
proper analysis of their explananda and explanantia. Many CSR writers, for instance, want to 
distance themselves from adaptationist approaches, but it might very well turn out that those 
who advocate the adaptationist approach are actually explaining different things than those 
explaining religious cognition. It might also turn out that some aspects of religion are 
adaptations and others are not. This same point holds when we consider hermeneutically 
oriented approaches. Rather than explaining general tendencies, hermeneutical approaches 
are concerned with particulars and individuals.   
 In the final chapter, I examined the religious relevance of CSR theories. I argued that 
this is interesting for two reasons. First, there seems to be a lot of confusion about this issue: 
some writers have claimed that CSR theories show that religious beliefs are false, whereas 
others invoke CSR theories to defend some religious ideas. Secondly, different 
interpretations of the religious relevance of CSR theories reveal the more general 
philosophical assumptions of those who make these interpretations. I began by sketching 
three different positions: strict naturalism, broad naturalism and positive religious relevance. 
Given a set of philosophical assumptions that we called strict naturalism, CSR theories lead 
to the rejection of most religious truth-claims. If we assume that all causes can be accessed 
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by the natural sciences and that the natural sciences can give an adequate account of religion 
based on such causes, there seems to be no reason to believe that there is something “more” 
to religion than those causes. However, those who advocate broad naturalism of some sort 
usually reject the physicalist assumptions behind strict naturalism and claim that causes 
invoked by CSR theories (and other naturalistic theories) are mostly irrelevant for religious 
truth-claims. CSR theories, they claim, have little positive or negative relevance for religious 
believers or the truth or falsity of their beliefs. Finally, I examined those (few) writers that 
have argued for the positive religious relevance of some CSR theories. The argument is, very 
roughly, that CSR theories show how religious beliefs are produced by cognitive machinery 
we ordinarily hold reliable and thus we should hold religious ideas prima facie plausible 
candidates of being true.  
 My conclusion was that CSR theories can be interpreted inside different 
philosophical frameworks without doing violence to the core theories or their auxiliary 
theories and that these frameworks give different kinds of results regarding the religious 
relevance of CSR theories. Furthermore, I pointed out that the religious relevance of CSR 
theories depends on how we understand the relationship of causes and reasons for religion. 
If the atheist assumes that a scientific account of religion removes the plausibility of religious 
ideas and the rationality of its practices, he cannot do so simply on the basis of the fact that 
he has a naturalistic explanation. A specific case must be made that the natural causes 
revealed by a given naturalistic explanation are incompatible with those given by a religious 
account – a case that is philosophical in nature, rather than scientific.  
 In conclusion, I will highlight some philosophical points about naturalistic 
explanations of religion that have come up in this work. The main point was that, contrary to 
the materialist and “scientific” insistence of CSR writers, we should not commit ourselves 
methodologically to some general “metaphysical” theory or a general account of what causes 
of religion (“material” versus “non-material” or supernatural) qualify as “proper causes” in 
the study of religion. Our enquiry into religious phenomena can proceed in piecemeal 
fashion, more “locally” than “globally”, and it can be based on the usefulness of different 
kinds of explanations rather than a priori commitment to a possible set of causes (“material 
causes”). Recall Boyer‟s point that “the shift to „physicalist‟ or materialist interpretation of 
cognition is made possible, because cognitive science has at least a minimal „causal story‟ to 
explain how thought processes can be actualised in material processes”. Recall also 
Slingerland‟s point that “our thoughts and behaviour are, at least in principle, as 
predetermined and predictable as any other physical process.” The problem with such 
comments is their “in principle” nature: they are statements about philosophical positions 
rather than claims about actual explanations or theories.  
 The fact is that there is no theory in the cognitive or behavioural sciences that makes 
behaviour “as predetermined and predictable as any other physical process” and we do not 
even have an idea of what such a theory might look like. The question is not what cognitive 
(purportedly physical) approaches can explain “in principle” but what they can explain in real 
life – now rather than in some ideal, future science. Further, we should ask what regularities 
cognitive approaches can explain and what minimal causal stories they can actually give. My 
point is that appeals to “future science” where all “non-physical” explanations are eliminated 
are not very plausible because we do not have this “future science” but actual science. And in 
actual science we do not have “material explanations” that would do the same work as socio-
cultural explanations. If we understand explanations in the way that I suggested in chapters 
4.5 and 4.6, we need not worry so much about whether or not our explanations “posit no 
special phenomena, ontologies, causes, or laws beyond those of ordinary material objects and 
their inter-relationships”. Rather, we can ask whether or not “non-material” explanations 
really work or not (and many have suggested that they do work). The moral is that we should 
not mix our philosophical views about ultimate ontology with our empirical research and our 
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interpretations of such research. That being said, however, we should acknowledge that we 
have no a priori reason to deny the explanatory relevance of cognitive and/or biological 
factors in explaining some features of religious ideas and practices. But we should not 
assume that cognitive and/or biological explanation will do all the work as if only they 
revealed the “actual, material causes” of religion. How deep these explanations go and what 
they actually explain is a matter for future empirical research rather than a priori commitment 
to some strictly naturalistic philosophical position.   
 I also pointed out that we should not expect CSR or any other “naturalistic” 
approach to religion to automatically provide us with an account of the “ultimate” or 
fundamental nature of religion for several reasons. First of all, scientific explanations are 
complete only in the sense that they give a satisfactory answer to the question we are asking 
at a given moment. Our interests can change and, as a consequence, our questions and 
contrasts can change. Second, as we have seen, the concept of religion is quite flexible: one‟s 
religion is another‟s superstition. In this sense, an explanation of religion is always an 
explanation of some conceptualisation of religion. Finally, if we endorse some form of 
explanatory pluralism, we can then conclude that we can have many “explanations of 
religion” at different levels at the same time that need not be reducible or even compatible. 
The question of which of these explanations is the “ultimate” one lacks definite meaning. 
Incidentally, this is also the reason why we should not expect the CSR to provide an 
overarching theoretical framework for all approaches to religion. 
 As for the theological or religious implications of these considerations, religious 
beliefs and practices would be (at least to some extent) parts of the natural world even in the 
case that gods, spirits or some transcendental reality existed. Further, if religious beliefs are 
processed with the same cognitive machinery as all other beliefs (which seems reasonable), 
then we should not be surprised by the fact that this cognitive machinery influences religious 
beliefs in some way. The fact that all our beliefs and practices have to do with our cognitive 
machinery, which is implemented in our brains and part of our bodies as a biological 
organism, should make inquiry into our psychological and biological mechanisms a 
reasonable enterprise for even the most supranaturalist (and/or dualist) of thinkers. 
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